Abstract Until not very long ago, the literature on legislative-executive relations was bifurcated. It had evolved into two separate and independent bodies of work. One thesis focused and the other on presidential systems, which were considered to represent two completely independent and alternative ways to organize the political world. Today a more integrated view of executive-legislative relations in democratic regimes exists. The emergence of this new perspective owes a great deal to the appearance of two seminal books, which, perhaps in a way unintended by the authors, questioned the premises upon which the bifurcated view of parliamentary democracy and presidential democracy rested. Kaare Strom’s Minority Government and Majority Rule (1990) demolished on empirical and theoretical grounds the basic office seeking assumption that informed studies of parliamentarism. John Huber’s Rationalizing Parliament (1996), in turn, questioned the appropriateness of the conflict model at the root of most thinking about executive-legislative relations in democracies. The specific contribution of each of these authors may be traced to studies of legislative politics that focused on the United States of America congress. As a consequence of these shifts, legislative organization came to the forefront of analyses of executive-legislative relations. In Nigeria, since the transition to civilian rule in May 29, 1999, the country has witnessed conflicts between the legislature and the executive over budget, oversight, and vote allocation matters. These conflicts are not only restricted to the federal level but also a common phenomenon at the state government level. This paper discusses the poor relationship over the confirmation of service chief’s matter and offers suggestions on how to improve the process. The paper concludes by positing that until strong democratic institutions are built and elected officials better understand their roles, the search for harmony between the executive and the legislature will continue to elude Nigeria. The new chiefs must put their best foot forward as they set forth to tackle the insecurity in the North-East zone of the country. This is not the time for rhetoric. They must frontally confront the security problems facing the country, especially the Boko Haram insurgency which President Jonathan recently described as the biggest challenge his administration has faced since inception.
Privatization has been the most controversial policy dominating the political agenda of many countries around the world. For instance, in the 1980s privatization were the policy choice and preferences as well as the new wave of conservative market reforms beginning in the west with the Thatcher government in the United Kingdom in 1979 and the Regan government in the United States the following year. In Africa it has remained a highly controversial, a subject of debate and politically risky. After her independence ,Nigeria, engaged in the expansion of the public sector in the first, second and third development plans following the keynesian paradigm .The present drive towards privatizations is the inability of the Keynesian paradigm to deal decisively with the worldwide economic crises and the various economic system adopted in Nigeria .Privatization of public enterprises in Nigeria is believed will bring about an end to Inefficiency, Balance of payment deficit, Low performance, Indiscipline, mismanagement of finance, attract Foreign and local Investment which will integrate the country in the globalization process and bring about competitive system, quality, and low price, better choice and satisfaction of goods and services. This paper seeks to discuss the major theoretical under pining of the concept of privatization, its major ideas and proponents in a thematic form. The paper concludes by positing that from literatures on privatization three things are clear. First, for privatization to take place there must be in existence public enterprises, which need to convert into private enterprises. Secondly, there is the reasoning that private ownership or control or management would be better than public ownership. Finally, privatization is premised on the fact that there are problems with public ownership of enterprises and privatization is part and parcel of a reform agenda to turn around these enterprises so that they can deliver goods and services more efficiently and effectively. As we shall show later, this kind of reasoning is ideologically loaded and cannot be substantiated by the existential reality of Nigeria.
Good organizational structure alone, does not guarantee enhanced performance and increased productivity but with well-managed personnel. Personnel is therefore, a critical factor in the attainment of organizational goals. This is because all the organizational activities are initiated and determined by the persons who make up that institution, as plants, offices, computers, automated equipments and all else that a modern firm uses are unproductive except for human effort and direction. However, these abilities and capabilities of the personnel to contribute significantly to the attainment of organizational goals have contemporary, been hindered and hampered by some issues that are amenable. The local government as an institution cannot be exempted. The importance of personnel in the local government cannot be over-emphasized, so it becomes very essential that the personnel of the local government should be judiciously managed to achieve the goals of the local government. In the light of the above, this paper examines the importance of personnel, its sourcing, recruitment and maintenance and the problems they encounter in the course of administering the local government and then proffer some tangible solutions to the problem.
The linkage between money and polities is a powerful one with implications for democracy, especially in new democracies. Political finance has been identified as a source of political corruption in several countries. Political finance laws and regulations, through which political parties and candidates for office declare their funding sources, are among the main instruments. The relationships between party financing and corruption are so significant that to ignore party funding is simply to open wide the donor for corruption. Looking into Nigerian and Kenyan political history one realizes that there is much that need to be done in this regard. This is why the financing of political life is both a necessity and a problem. The frequency with which new laws concerning campaign and party finance are enacted is testimony to the failure of many existing legal frameworks and legislations. For instance, the Electoral Acts of 2002, 2006 and 2010, the Election Campaign Financing Bill 2012, the Public Collections Act 1960 review the current status of campaign and political finance regulations in Nigeria and Kenya. The cover among other issues: the regulation, management, expenditure and accountability of election campaign funds during election and referendum campaigns. This is because hardly a month goes by without a new scandal involving political money breaking out in some in this part of the globe. Political parties constitute one of the core groups of institutions in Kenya and Nigeria’s democratic systems. The parties that emerged in Nigeria for instance, since Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, however, are characterized by undemocratic practices and exhibited gross misconducts against transparency and accountability. At their best, political parties should nurture and articulate the expression of socio-political interest and opinion. Under current Nigerian conditions, however, most political parties lack ideologies, not issue oriented, but are merely zero-issue alliances of notables who are able to control and, often enough, manipulate party structures, candidacies and even the general electoral process itself. Most parties are vehicles in the hands of few “political entrepreneurs” who invest huge amount of money and expect concurrent rewards on such investment (in the form of public works and procurement contracts, prebendal appointments of cronies to public offices and other forms of prebendal activity). The fallout has led to mass electoral/political violence and political destabilization and disempowerment of the generality of the Nigerian electors, the exclusion of alternative parties seeking to participate in electoral politics and the absence of an effective system to regulate political finance. This paper seeks to explore the concept of political finance. It will equally attempt to concisely analyze the extant legal framework regulating political finance in Kenya and Nigeria, highlight their inadequacies with a view of reforming these inadequacies for a better political finance management and best practices and proffer suggestions on the ways forward drawing freely from the instructive practices of other emerging and advanced democracies.
The Paper explores the practical implications of the new political economy of federalism, Tiebout hypothesis and the subsidiarity principle all of which couched around the modern market system of federal governance. Focusing on Nigeria’s experimentation, the paper casts a dissenting voice to the emergent converging proposition of the new political economy of federalism by arguing that federal governance is not merely a matter of market efficiency because the distinctive features of plural societies often require that both principles of good economics and federal governance be subordinated to political considerations. After exploring the practical implications of the Nigerian market preserving model of federalism in the light of its “three-player ethnic game,” the inference is that, there is organic relationship between the logic of the market and state, and the contradiction between “competitive federalism” and “cooperative federalism” that undermines the centralizing tendencies and enhances federalism’s perdition, and therefore predisposes the state to adopt both defective model of development and federal governance. Against the prevailing orthodoxy, the paper avers the need to move from a “market preserving federalism” that encourages “bargaining and compromise” at the cost of social equity to an institutional dimension and makes a case for yet another experimentation with the social market economy model of the East Asian and the Nordic nations which lays greater emphasis on social equity and participative aspects of delivery as well as encouraging of freedom of choices, political, social, economic and cultural freedom within the rule of law. Finally, as an alternative to the prevailing nominal modern market system of federal governance in Nigeria, the paper concluded by noting that the concept and practice of market preserving federalism had to be deconstructed to reflect the extension of the concept of market into politics and original idea behind federalism as a model of political organization.