Syrian Crises and the Failure of the United Nations to Impose Sanctions: A Political Economy Approach
Uploaded by: Society For Research And Academic Excellence
This paper explored the Syrian Crises and United Nations Sanctions from the political economy approach with the view of examining the role of the UN Security Council in the management of the Syrian crisis. In this article we ascertain the rationale behind Russia and China veto in the UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. This study has uncovered the division within Russia, China and USA, France and Britain, permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), in spite of their enviable roles in maintenance of global peace and security. This study posited that the division in Security Council barriers the UN Security Council resolutions in achieving peaceful and collective solution to the crises in Syria. This study relied on data from secondary sources, especially journals, books and online media reports that dwelt on the Syrian crises. This article adds to the ongoing debate on Syria. We adopted the Marxian political economy theoretical framework of analysis and argued that Russia and China vetoed the UN resolutions in order to protect her economic interests in Syria. The study recommends thatthe veto of the five permanent members should be removed in the charter and simple majority voting system should be adopted. Primarily, the veto was introduced to protect the interest of the „Allied Forces‟‟ that defeated the „Axis Forces‟ during the Second World War (WWII). The Security Council must persevere to enforce its resolutions so as to guarantee and preserve its credibility, respectability and above all, its integrity without the veto.
About the Authors
Samuel Asua Asua