

# THE POLITICS, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTRA-STATE CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: A CRITICAL LOOK INTO THE CONFLICT OF (DR) CONGO

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## **Abstract**

Conflict is a part of life, but when turned violent, it can be like a handshake that extends beyond the elbow which can no longer be tolerated. In a similar understanding, the internationalization of the Congo conflict is very complex due to the various involvements of states. However, in accomplishing the objective of this research, the problem that led to this conflict and made this study possible was the spillover effects from the conflict. There were issues arising from internal and external countries and actors taking sides, and also the involvement of organizations on regional continental and global levels. My findings however included the use of proxies in the DR Congo conflict, which served as part of the factors that played out mostly by external states sponsoring rebel groups to help fight in Congo, and the exploitation of the resources of DRC through transnational networks was an intricate system of political economic and socio-cultural forces. My recommendation for the issues brought out by this study was that there should be a development in the defense base of the Congo, there should be an improvement in one of the arms of government so that in the long run, it would enhance their balance of power system, and make it possible for them to check each other for more effective administration, States should provide basic amenities for the citizens, in other to avoid divided loyalty, in situations of intervention, proper agreements should be laid out in other to avoid an infringement, and the democratic system of government should be encouraged, because when the democratic peace theory is applied states would engage each other on the basis of war.

**Keywords: Internationalization, Conflict, Political and socio-cultural forces, Balance of Power**

## Abbreviation List:

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**ADFL-** Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo

**AI-** Amnesty International

**AU-** African Union

**CRD-** Congolese Rally for Democracy (Congolese Democracy)

**DHC-** Diamond High Council

**DRC-** Democratic Republic of Congo

**ECOWAS-** Economic Community of West African States

**FRELIMO -** FREnte de Libertação de Mozambique

**IMF-** International Monetary Fund

**MLC-** Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo),

**MOUNSCO-** United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

**RBIRC-** Richard Brennan International Rescue Committee

**RCD-** Rally for Congolese Democracy

**RENAMO-** Mozambique Resistance Movement

**SADC-** Southern African Development Committee

**UNHCR-** United Nations High Commission for Refugees

**UNITA-** National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

**UNOCHA-** United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

**UPDF-** Ugandan People's Defense Forces

**WTO-** World Health Organization

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# Introduction: The Congo Conflict

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## Section Outline:

- **Review of Related Literature**
  - Internationalization of the Conflict
  - The Congo Conflict
  - The Internationalization of the Congo Conflict
- **Theoretical Approach: The Domino Theory**

## **Review of Related Literature**

The African Continent has witnessed considerable number of conflicts spanning into decades. These conflicts can be broadly grouped between intra-state and inter-state conflicts. The intra-state conflicts come in the pattern of civil wars, militant insurrections and inter-tribal warfare. Notable ones in this group include the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), Liberian crisis (1989-2003), Democratic Republic of Congo crisis (1997-2003), Angolan Civil War (1975-2002) and Sierra-Leone Civil War (1992-2002). These conflicts were more frequent, long drawn and the most difficult to resolve and in most cases, they were motivated by the desire of individuals or groups to seize power which is considered unrealizable through the constitutional process (Galadima 2004:3).

The inter-state category of conflict involves the nature of conflict between two or more states. The conflict between the Guinea-Bissau border crisis with Senegal in 1989, the Ogaden war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977, the Nigeria-Chad Lake Chad crisis of 1983, the Tanzania – Uganda wars between 1972-1979 and Nigeria – Cameroon feud over the oil rich Bakassi Peninsular can be used as instances in this case. In most of these wars, territorial claims were the paramount issue. Other issues were the allegation of harboring dissident elements of which attempts were made to flush such out provoked inter-state conflict (Galadima 2004:3-4).

Alli (2006:8) identified three types of conflicts in Africa during the post-World War II era:

- Conflict that arises as a result of struggle for political participation, conflict caused by the contest for access to resources, and, conflict caused by struggle over identity;
- Conflict no matter the cause, has led to insecurity in Africa, as lives and properties had always been lost each time it occurs; and
- Conflict generally undermines the possibilities of economic progress in Africa; no wonder the continent has continued to be backward (Alli 2006:8).

This is because conflicts tend to turn the attention of people from creative production to creative destruction (Alli 2006:8). Currently, Security analysts have agreed that the nature of global conflict has changed since the end of the world war. One of the most frequently cited manifestations of this change is the increase in the number of intra-state conflicts. Artificial developments in Cambodia, Kosovo, Sierra-Leone, Congo DR, Sudan, Liberia, just to mention a few, left devastating consequences for a world that was auspicious of peace dividends after the cold war. Amongst others, this pattern of conflict is rooted in:

- Tension between sub-national groups stemming from the collapse of old patterns of relationships that provided the framework for collaboration among the many ethnic groups in most states;

- Disputes over resource sharing arising from gross disparities in wealth among different groups within the same countries and
- The consequent struggles for reform of economic systems to ensure an equitable distribution economic power, absence of democratic structures,
- Culture and practice and the consequent struggle democratization, good governance and reform of political systems,
- Systemic failures in the administration of justice and the inability of states to guarantee the security of the population; issues relating to religious cleavages; and
- Religious fundamentalism (Alao 2010:18).

### **The Internationalization of the Conflict**

Given the inevitability of conflict and its frequency as well as its negative implications on the socio-economic and political development of the human society, scholars have written quite much on the subject matter with a view to minimizing its frequency as well as finding better avenues for conflict resolution and conflict management through negotiations, mediations and mostly diplomacy. Conflict theory is a social theory which emphasizes a person's or group's ability to exercise influence and control over others, thereby affecting social order (Marx 1971:20).

The theory of conflict posits that individuals and groups struggle to maximize their benefit, inevitably contributing to social changes such as innovations in politics and outright revolution. The Marxist conflict approach emphasizes a materialist interpretation of history, a dialectic method of analysis, a critical stance towards existing social arrangement, and a political program of revolution, and reform.

However, given the frequencies of conflict in human history, the United Nations in maintaining a list of issues that it sees as global, identified conflict as one of the global challenges confronting humanity. At the World Bank Seminar series on the global issues facing Humanity, 2005; Dr. Vinay Bhargava, Director, International Affairs of the World Bank, made some observations:

- The immediate post-Cold War period witness a decline in the frequency of war between countries but an increase in conflict within countries. In 2004 alone there were 230 armed conflicts, including 3 wars and 33 severe internal crises.
- Armed conflict reduces or even reverses development in the afflicted country, and it disproportionately affects children and other non-combatants.
- Moreover, the effects are not limited to the country or countries in conflict; neighboring countries also often suffer spillover effects in the form of reduced income increased incidence of disease, and heightened refugee flows (Bhargava 2005).

Richards (2002:3-15) observed that, what makes certain issues inherently global is that these issues are insoluble outside a framework of global collective action involving all nations of the world. Global issues have to do with how we share our planet, they are social and economic and security issues of global concern, whose solution requires forming global coalition and they involve legal and regulatory issues that must be handled globally because of the potential for free riders and leakages.

The issue dealing with the consequences of war on global perspective pointed towards Alao's (2000) paper on the role of African regional and sub-regional organizations in conflict prevention and resolution, where he noted that the following devastating effects of conflict in Africa, one reason for the extensive interest in post-Cold War

African conflict has been their devastating consequences on the civilian population, especially women and children. In wars often prosecuted by armed groups that ignore international conventions governing the conduct of conflict, the suffering of the civilian population has evoked compassion from the international community. Also included in this sympathy are the refugees and internally displaced people. While Africa has historically produced the world's largest number of refugees, the post-Cold War increase in intra-state conflict has further worsened the situation, thus putting more pressure on those involved in managing conflict in the continent.

Also contributing on the frequency of conflict in Africa, Galadima (2006:10) observed that, Africa has been by far the most important regional setting for peace support operations of the United Nations. This is because over the years, Africa has been challenged by a variety of political, economic, environmental problems in degrees and intensity that is unprecedented in the continent. These challenges have launched the continent into a series of devastating intra-state conflicts ever experienced in a single continent anywhere in the world in the last decade and a half.

Goldstein (2005:197) observed from his study that conflict among (and with) states' is not an unusual condition. Thus, conflict may be defined as a difference in preferred outcome in a bargaining situation. States develop capabilities that give them leverage to obtain more favorable outcome than they could obtain without such leverages. Whether fair or unfair, the ultimate outcome of the bargaining process is a settlement of the particular conflict.

### **The Congo Conflict**

The office of the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), February 2006, disclosed that: there are more than 450,000 Congolese refugees, most of them in neighboring countries. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs revealed that: almost 1.7 million people are displaced at the end of 2005 as a result of conflict in Congo Democratic Republic. Commenting on the conflict in Congo DR, Richard Brennan International Rescue Committee (IRC), health director, described that "Congo is the deadliest conflict anywhere in the world over the past 60 years". The chief executive of an Irish Relief Agency, GOAL, John O. told Alert Net that, the conflict in Congo is the worst humanitarian tragedy since the Holocaust, the greatest example on the planet of man's inhumanity to man.

To conceive on the devastating consequences of armed conflict in Congo DR, a US-based aid agency – International Rescue Committee made the following observations Some 3.9 million people died since 1998 from violence and war-related illnesses, fighting frequently prevent people from seeking out what health services are available 1,200 people died every day. Militias go on the rampage and live by brutalizing villagers for food and loot, and the very old and the very young suffer the worst.

Ambassador Joyce E. Leader, a senior fellow of the Fund for Peace, in answering the question why is there war in DRC, observed that, Mobutu Sese Seko's unpopular dictatorship and egreocrism, had undermined the country, and the Rwandan genocide in which about 800,000 minority Tutsi were slaughtered by the majority Hutu, were Holtsi characteristics of conflict, rises and competition, Conflict behavior (attributes and actions) is likely to result when party "A" occupies a position that is incompatible with the wishes or interest of party "B" and perhaps others.

The critical condition is thus the condition of scarcity, where a move in an issue field by one party is seen to be at the expense of the other party's position. The most traditional issue field is actual territory, but territorial control is hardly the only condition that gives rise to international conflict. There may also be incompatibilities of position on

such issue fields as tariff structure, price of oil proliferation of nuclear weapons, the treatment of minorities in a state. Conflict may arise in these areas because one government wants the problem solved in a manner incompatible with the wishes of another party or parties (Holsti 1988:396). The World Health Organization 2005 reported that, at least there are 40,000 survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in Democratic Republic of Congo.

### **The Internationalization of the Congo Conflict**

It is pertinent to note that most of the conflicts witnessed in Africa had third party involvements which could either be African or non-African in nature. The aftermath of these external involvements manifested in the protracted nature of such conflicts thereby making resolution of such crises intractable, if not impossible (Galadima 2006:13-14). Although some former rebels have given up their guns or joined the national army, others are still resisting the integration process and continue to fight over resources, territory or ethnic grievances. A confusing range of armed groups operate in Congo. Militias called Mai Mai model themselves on traditional warriors, touting talismans that they say make them invincible and terrorizing villagers. It is hard to keep up with the shifting loyalties of militias and their leaders, some of whom have been backed at various times by Rwanda or Uganda but later switched sides. And sometimes rival militias join forces to take on the national army (Gidley 2006:2).

According to Ntalaja (2002) in his work the international dimension of the Congo crisis goes further in trying to explain the ways in which the Congo crisis internationalized. The decay and collapse of the state and its armed forces under the weight of corruption of the Mobutu regime had greatly enhanced the chances of the latter's successful overthrow. For this disintegration not only reduced the capacity of the already weak state to deal with the pernicious effects of poverty and environmental degradation, it also exposed this richly endowed country to external invasion, occupation and plunder. How else can one explain why a country of continental dimensions could be invaded, occupied and plundered by countries of Lilliputian size such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi? Nzongola also states that the conflict of the Congo from Leopold to Kabila that the inter-African war of 1998–2003 in the Congo was basically a war of partition and plunder.

Therefore, who the actors involved in this plunder were, and why the war was basically an externally driven agenda with national proxies, are questions that this research paper attempts to answer within an overall analysis of the international dimensions of the current DR Congo conflict. To understand this salient aspect of the crisis, it is necessary to explain the nature of the war, which is the second war in the 1990s, because while the two are inter-related, they need to be differentiated

### **Theoretical Approach- The Domino Theory:**

For the purpose of this work, the domino theory was engaged in order to provide further analysis on the subject at hand- the internationalization of the Congo conflict. The theory states that political events are inter-related and one triggers' off a chain of others. It can also be referred to as an inevitable succession of related and unusually undesirable events, each caused by the preceding one. Domino theory is that which has different variance; however, the profounder of this theory in relation to the 20<sup>th</sup> century is Frank Ninkovich. Ninkovich's modernity and power provides a fresh conceptual overview of twentieth century United States foreign policy, from the Roosevelt and Taft administration through the presidencies of Kennedy and Johnson. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson, America leaders gradually abandoned the idea of international relations as a game of geopolitical interplays, basing their diplomacy instead on a symbolic opposition between world public opinion and the forces of destruction and chaos.

Frank Ninkovich provocatively links this policy shift to the rise of a distinctly modernist view of history. To emphasize the central role of symbolism and ideological assumptions in twentieth century American statesmanship, Ninkovich focuses on the domino theory that departed radically from classic principles of political realism by sanctioning intervention in world regions with few financial or geographic claims on the national interest. Throughout the book *Modernity and Power*, Ninkovich draws on primary sources to recover the worldview of the policy makers. He carefully assesses the coherence of their views rather than judge their actions against "objective" realities. Offering a new alternative to real politic and economic explanations of foreign policy, *Modernity and Power* will change the way we think about the history of U.S. international relations.

The domino theory was a theory during the 1950s to 1980s, promoted at times by the government of the United States that speculated that if one land in a region came under the influence of communism, then the surrounding countries would follow in a domino effect. The domino effect suggests that some change, small in itself, will cause a similar change nearby, which then will cause another similar change, and so on in linear sequence, by analogy to a falling row of dominoes standing on end. The domino theory was used by successive United States administrations during the Cold War to clarify the need for American intervention around the world. The above was in the perspective of President Eisenhower, and he was the first to refer to countries in danger of Communist takeover as dominoes, in response to a journalist's question about Indochina in an April 7, 1954 news conference, though he did not use the term "domino theory". If Communists succeeded in taking over the rest of Indochina, Eisenhower argued, local groups would then have the encouragement, material support and momentum to take over Burma, Thailand, Malaya and Indonesia; all of these countries had large popular Communist movements and insurgencies within their borders at the time.

Eisenhower's domino theory of 1954 was a specific description of the situation and conditions within Southeast Asia at the time, and he did not suggest a generalized domino theory as others did afterward. Just like any other concept in international relations there are arguments for and argument against the theory, but the major variance of the theory is the fact that it always has a spillover effect whether directly or indirectly. Policymakers in the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson administrations added another dimension to the domino theory that embraced the notion of credibility. From their perspective the need to contain communist expansion in Vietnam had taken on a symbolic and global dimension in the fight against wars of national liberation. Thus the domino theory had been incorporated into a more sweeping doctrine, shaped by the need to appear strong and resolute in the face of any possible Chinese or Russian geopolitical challenge to American global interests.

This theory is suited for the purpose of this research because it emphasizes the spillover effect of the Congo crisis to other countries, nine countries to be specific, with grave consequences on the country in all aspects which they are still facing till date, and way of trying to avoid such a conflict from taking place in the world, it has continued since its inception to remain one of the most popular games of all time that has been applied to war strategy.

# THE CONGO CONFLICT: AN ANALYSIS

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## **Section Outline:**

- Overview of the Congo DR Conflict
- Actors involved in the Congo DR Conflict
- Political and Socio-economic dimension of the Conflict

## **Overview of the Congo DR Conflict:**

The second Congo war which began in 1998 has been described as the deadliest since World War II. The nature of the war and its twin causes is deeply rooted in the decay and collapse of the state in the Congo, on one hand, and the envy of its abundant resources by its neighbors and other external actors, on the other (Leader 2001:3). The very first step in redressing the errors of representation concerns, and the terminology employed when referring to the Congo war. To describe the Congo war as a civil war is irresponsible, the DRC is more direct than most acknowledge; the Congo war was an international war in which legitimate and illegitimate actors alike, neighboring African states, rebel groups, multinational companies and western consumers contributed to the creation of an alternative system of profit from the country's abundant and lucrative natural resources (Conrad 1999).

The second Congo war, also referred to as Africa's Great War, was a highly complex conflict, with a variety of political actors involved, both internal and external, with repeatedly changing alliances between these and the diffusion of ethnic conflicts over national borders. It is for this reason that the search for explanations for why this war happened is such a complicated and challenging endeavor, whether the key variable producing the conflict was economic or political, if it stemmed from fears of neighboring regimes for their security, or if everything followed from Congo's state collapse; all of these theories and more competed in academic discourses ever since the conflicts began (Huening 2000).

Dunn and Boas (2007:20) are clearly aware of the fact that the Great Lakes region developed into a regional conflict zone during the second Congo war. Yet, the two insist that this regionalization was largely related to the crash of the Mobutist state. They see the second Congo war as a series of local and national conflicts that do not always have much in common but become intertwined through the weakness of the state system of Congo. They also explicitly reject simplified notions of interventionist regional states (i.e. Rwanda and Uganda) and maintain that the conflict in eastern DRC is a Congolese conflict. Dunn and Boas's theory, for all its worth in shedding light on the motivations of recent guerrillas in Africa, has the tendency to dwarf the importance of external involvement. Their theory cannot integrate larger regional, trans-national processes.

Starkly opposing this state centered theory is John Clark's approach, Clark advances the theory of regime security as a key to understand the foreign policy behavior of most states, if not all of those involved in the two wars. Following his line of argument, intervention in the Congo can be seen as been predominantly motivated by the gain for personal or family wealth, political advantage against internal opponents, or as a means to strengthen regimes security against rebel groups based in neighboring states. The second Congo war cannot be discussed without making reference to the first war in 1996, which also had Rwanda at the fore front of the war, in the first stages of the war in 1996; one has to acknowledge security concerns as an overriding motive for Rwanda's regime, even so, Rwanda had removed the border threat of the Hutu militias by December 1996 (Clark 2002:12).

The war could have stopped there, but moved on to another larger agenda: the removal of Mobutu Sese Seko. Related to Rwanda's decision to wage war for a second time in 1998, the regime security argument loses even more informative value. A mixture of motives must be recognized. Firstly, security concerns did exist, but they were vastly exaggerated by other regimes. More importantly, yet, the internal strife within the Rwandese ruling elite itself and already at the outset of the second Congo war, did continuing access to mineral resources figure high on Rwanda's agenda, as well.

Regime security as the dominant force formative in most of the state's decisions to fight the first and second Congo wars can only serve as a starting point of analysis. It appears to be more apt to acknowledge a mixture of motives held by most actors and to recognize that these motives underlay drastic changes due to altered realities during the wars, imperialistic motivations on behalf of Rwanda might have already played a key role during the first, but almost certainly the second war (Prunier 2005:3). One has to water down the hypothesis of regime security so that it fits neatly the motivations over the duration of both wars of the majority of states involved. But the explanatory significance that this argument then still wields is questionable.

Whereas the former hypothesis crowds out the regional, international and trans-national dimensions of the wars to add weight to their state centered theory, the latter cannot account for important changes in the motivations of the various players involved, instead of relying on concepts that adhere to national frameworks, or theories that are not able to adapt to changing realities, some studies that establish the historical background and comprehensively examine the multifaceted aspects of the wars, can provide better insights as to why the Congo wars occurred (Lemarchand 2002:1).

Unlike the first war, this was a new type of war altogether, a war of resources, this was a war in which there was little engagement between the belligerents, and even allies would fight over turf for the control of resources. The best example of this particular behavior is the fighting that erupted three times between the Rwandan and Ugandan armies in Kisangani in 1999 and 2000. On the other hand, a war of resources is a war of partition and plunder that is waged against a territory and its civilian population, in which men are perceived as competitors or potential enemies and women are sexually violated (Onyango-Obbo, 1999).

### **The Actors in the DR Congo Conflict:**

There were so many actors involved in the Congo conflict, but internally the major actors in the conflict included; Mobutu Sese Seko regime, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Liberation du Congo), another rebel group, Congolese Rally for Democracy, sometimes Rally for Congolese Democracy, which was formerly known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) in the First Congo War, and the transnational networks.

According to Leader (2001) the war in DRC dates back to 1994, at that time Mobutu, who had seized power in a 1965 coup, was at the helm of affairs in the country then called Zaire. Mobutu, who initially appointed chief of staff of the new Congo army by Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, took advantage of the political feud between Lumumba and President Joseph Kasavubu, to garner support within the army to create mutiny (Leader 2001). It would be recalled that President Kasavubu had declared Lumumba's dismissal from office, which was described as unconstitutional action by Lumumba. By 1965, Joseph Mobutu seized power from President Kasavubu.

In 1996, he nationalized mining interest and redistributed foreign country management to local elite, mostly his friends and family (Havermans 1999). He squandered and embezzled millions of dollars through trade in copper,

cobalt, diamonds, and coffee, “between” 1975-1997, Mobutu’s dictatorship was alleged to have embezzled \$4billion in aid (Synders 2004). In 1971, Mobutu calls himself Mobutu Sese Seko and renamed the country Zaire; he became the darling of Washington by twining the country into a spring-board for operations against Soviet backed Angola. During the 1970s and 1980s, Mobutu was invited to visit the US on several occasions, and meeting with its president Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W Bush (Ntalaja 2002).

In June 1989, Mobutu was the first African Head of State invited for a state visit with newly elected president Bush. This romance between Mobutu and the western world, according to some historians was related to his propagating their interests through the exploitation and export of natural resources at the expense of DRCs economy. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, US relations with Mobutu cooled, as he was no longer deemed necessary as a cold war ally (Huening 2000). Thus Mobutu continued in power until conflict forced him to flee his country in 1997, thereby bringing his draconian rule to an abrupt end, after involving countries like Angola, Eritrea, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe who sponsored movements to get rid of Mobutu (Havermans 1998).

Thus, the recklessness and mismanagement of national resources which characterized Mobutu’s rule his continued manipulation of the constitution to perpetuate his regime as well as his inability to checkmate the excess of ‘interahamwe’ militia (those who fight together) and Hutu government army who had fled into DRC, and making clandestine raids back into Rwanda, destabilizing the efforts of the minority Tutsi government to stabilize the country (Cornwell 2005). For two years and a half, the Mobutu administration watched and did nothing to stop the above, and continued to be pre-occupied with feeding the refugees, rather than trying to remove the killers among them and find a long lasting solution to the crisis. Thus, Mobutu’s support for Militias malfeasance to sponsor an uprising of indigenous Zairians whose resolution appeared seemingly intractable. To this end, Mobutu’s insensitivity fundamentally triggered the DRC’s conflict (Ntalaja 2002).

In 1997, Laurent-Désiré Kabila was installed as President of the DRC following the victory by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (ADFL) in the First Congo War, with heavy support from the governments of Uganda and Rwanda. However, the ethnic tensions in eastern DRC did not disappear (Moloo 2007). Thousands of Hutu militants who had taken part in the Rwandan genocide and been forced to flee into the DRC maintained a low intensity war with the invading Rwandan army and their Banyamulenge co-ethnics living in the Congolese provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu, by February 1998 the Kivus were engulfed in ethnic warfare (Hari 2002). Banyamulenge troops based in the town of Bukavu who belonged to the ADFL mutinied as tensions increased; the mutiny caused a souring of the relationship between Kabila and his Rwandan and Ugandan allies.

In early August 1998 the newly formed Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) led by President Ernest Wamba dia Wamba took the town of Goma and began a campaign against Kabila, marking the beginning of the Second Congo War, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was formed by Uganda and Rwanda after they grew dissatisfied with the government (Conrad 1999). The core of the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was composed of former ADFL members, including many Banyamulenge (Tutsi Congolese), who already tended to ally themselves with Rwanda against the anti-Tutsi forces in the region.

Nevertheless, the Kabila forces managed to halt the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) advance with the assistance of outside states such as Angola and Zimbabwe, marking the onset of a full-scale regional conflict, during this period Congolese living in the Kivus increasingly came to view the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) as a brutal oppressor (Arnson 2005). Rwanda had nearly complete control of the organization, while the RCD continued to increase taxation with no noticeable improvement in infrastructure or basic services, The Rally for

Congolese Democracy's undisciplined troops, along with those of other armed groups was also responsible for acts of brutality against the population, Kivutians also criticize the dominance of Banyamulenge (Ntalaja 2002).

The Movement for the Liberation of Congo is a political party in Democratic Republic of the Congo. It was a rebel group operating in the Democratic Republic of Congo that fought the government throughout the Second Congo War; it subsequently took part in the transitional government and is now the main opposition party. During the war, the MLC was backed by the government of Uganda and controlled much of the north of the country, in particular the province of Équateur. It is led by former businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba, who became vice-president following the 2002 peace agreement. The town of Gbadolite is the headquarters of the MLC. The MLC was the primary instrument of Uganda during the war, as the Rally for Congolese Democracy was dominated by Rwanda. As part of the Inter-Congolese dialogue, Brig-Gen Malik Kijege of the MLC was named head of military logistics, while Maj-Gen Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa was named head of the navy.

Two of the DRC's ten military districts were also given to the MLC, and Bemba was allowed to appoint and dismiss the foreign minister of the DRC. This group still plays a very important role in DRC as a political party till date, Bemba, as the MLC candidate, came second in the 2006 presidential election, and the party gained 64 out of 500 seats in the parliament - the second highest number for any political party, in the 19 January 2007 Senate elections, the party won 14 out of 108 seats (Leader 2001). Fighting broke out in Kinshasa in March 2007 between the army and Bemba's guards, who were supposed to have been integrated into the army but had not been due to what were said to be concerns about Bemba's security, the army prevailed in the fighting, and Bemba took refuge in the South African embassy.

On April 8, the MLC released a statement in which it said that its headquarters had been occupied by government forces since the fighting and that it was being persecuted through arbitrary arrests and intimidation, On April 13, the party suspended its participation in the National Assembly but not in the Senate due to what it described as a "climate of permanent insecurity", this came shortly after the alleged looting of the home of a MLC member of parliament by government forces, On April 21, the party was allowed access to its previously-occupied buildings in the capital, which were found to have been plundered, On April 25, the party ended its boycott of the National Assembly after Kabila agreed to meet with representatives of the opposition (Tull 2005).

Following the killing of Daniel Botethi, a member of the MLC who was serving as Vice-President of the Provincial Assembly of Kinshasa, the MLC announced on July 6, 2008 that it was suspending its participation in the National Assembly, the Senate, and the Provincial Assembly of Kinshasa. The MLC ended this boycott after a week (Snow and Barouski 2006). Another important actor in DR Congo is transnational networks, both legitimate and criminal. The more legitimate interests are represented by transnational mining corporations, Mining transnationals from around the world have joined their South African counterparts in a new scramble for concessions and exploration rights all over Africa, they seek to exploit both the new opportunities of the post-Cold War era, such as the push towards privatization, and also Africa's possession of a large supply of resources, which by and large have been depleted in the developed countries (Ntalaja 2002).

In spite of the economic ruin of the country and its political turmoil, DR Congo is still attractive to mining transnational's because of its abundant wealth in minerals and the relatively high mineral content of Congolese copper, cobalt and gold ores, which is among the highest in the world. Thus, although their long-term interests require political stability, investors seeking mining contracts do not seem to shy away from war-ravaged countries with a fabulous resource endowment, like the Congo, where strategic minerals are found, Likewise, they have no

respect for diplomatic formulae such as national sovereignty and territorial integrity that may stand in the way of short-term profitability, they make deals with whoever controls a mineral-rich territory, including warlords and invaders, as they have done in north-eastern Congo with the AFDL, Rwanda, the Ugandan warlord Brigadier James Kazini, and the rebels of both the RCD and the MLC (Clark 2002).

### **Political and Socio-Economic Dimension of the Congo Conflict:**

The abundance of natural resources in the Congo has been the primary factor influencing the country's turbulent past and the profitability of resource extraction for the disparate actors involved in the war was responsible for perpetuating the 6-year conflict, and failure to adequately address and analyze the economic causes of the second Congo war is therefore little short of outrageous (Conrad 1999). Unfortunately, the problem of insufficient analysis of the causes and determinants of the Congo war is not restricted solely to the realm of media, but also includes scholarly explanations of the war that more often than not are suffused with familiar terminology borrowed from the discipline of political science which become unduly preoccupied with theoretical explanations of state behavior, and political order claims that in fact, hardly any other issue concerning the conflict in the DRC has attracted more attention by academics, the media and the wider public than the interplay of violence and economics, but if one peruses the limited literature on the second war in the DRC, it is clear that the explanations are found wanting.

Even among the best literature on the Congo war, one finds that habitual academic detachment which expresses itself in the form of fascination with the postcolonial traumas afflicting the DRC. This is not to say that most academic works to date have failed to provide thorough explanations of the political causes and consequences of the Congo war, but that the most neglected feature of the war, namely the importance of natural resources, is the one which might best expose the motivations of the numerous actors in the war to continue engaging in conflict (Tull 2005). In no way does the fact of placing the onus for the war on the lucrative resource extraction industry and its respective actors minimize the historical political precedents to the Congo war, but these political factors cannot be divorced from economic determinants, although the Second Congo War cannot be properly understood without clarifying the causes and effects of the First Congo War, war which arose in the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when the Former Government of Rwanda, having fled the country, re-established administrative control over an estimated two million Rwandan refugees within the borders of the DRC.

What is noteworthy about the first war is the speed with which the Congolese rebel group AFDL, backed by Uganda, Rwanda and Angola, was able to seize control of the mineral-rich areas of Shaba (formerly Katanga), eastern Zaire, Kasai and Kivu (Arnson 2005). The AFDL initiated a rebellion in early 1996 and by May 1997, its journey from the eastern peripheral regions of the country to the capital was complete. Mobutu fled to Morocco and Laurent Kabila declared himself president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, inheriting an external debt of \$14 billion and a formal economy which had shrunk by over 40 per cent from 1988 to 1995 (Moloo 2007). The rebellion demonstrated that mineral-abundant regions had developed autonomy from Kinshasa, largely as a result of the predominance of mineral extraction of the type described in previous pages, where giant mining consortiums exploited rich mineral fields in disparate regions of the country over the course of a century. The rebellion was also a consequence of state collapse under Mobutu, which enabled a web of complex power relations to prevail in peripheral regions in the absence of proper state sovereignty, but this in turn was provoked and aided by the supremacy of foreign interests long after colonialism had ended (Hochschild 1999). Interestingly, although Kabila considered himself a revolutionary, liberating the country from the cancerous and stagnating rule of Mobutu, his personal desire to maintain power was no different from Mobutu's, and in the years to come he consolidated rather

than dissolved the economic structure in place which gave a free hand to those who wished to continue appropriating the country's resources. If anything, a reciprocal relationship emerged between the rebel leader and foreign exploitative mining companies; Kabila recognized the importance of resource extraction to the success of his insurgency even before taking control of Kinshasa (Havermans 1999).

In April 1997, he allegedly signed contracts with De Beers, a South African diamond conglomerate which for years had enjoyed monopoly access to Congo's diamond fields under Mobutu, and with American Mineral Fields and Canadian-owned Tenke Mining Corporation, the latter eager to gain access to copper and cobalt reserves in Shaba province. Tenke was also given permission to buy diamonds in Kisangani, in return for supplying Kabila with cash and a jet for his private associates. In addition to the companies, the American government, initially responsible for installing Mobutu in power, was one of the Kabila's staunchest supporters, during the rebellion, an American diplomat and an ambassador frequently visited Kabila when the rebels were preparing to expand their regional insurgency with the aim of overthrowing Mobutu (Ntalaja 2002). When Kabila assumed power, the American government, in their unwavering support for both the Rwandan and the new Congolese government, went so far as to distort the number of refugees still remaining in Zaire, and instructed Kabila not to cooperate with UN investigations of the massacres of Hutu refugees during the ADFL rebellion, this sudden transfer of political support from Mobutu to Kabila on the part of mining companies and Western governments clearly indicates that economic incentives took precedence over concerns with democratic political legitimacy: Western countries supported a kleptocratic state under Mobutu until he was no longer useful after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War (Tongerren, and Veen, 1999). Thereafter, a more promising leader emerged who espoused a "free market" approach in favor of the interests of mining companies and Western governments alike.

Soon after taking power, Kabila's monopolization of power, frequent use of political repression, and final decision to distance himself from the external support of the Ugandan and Rwandan governments that were responsible for his victory in the first place led to an invasion orchestrated by Rwanda and Uganda in eastern Congo. In response, Kabila garnered support from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, and convinced the government of the Central African Republic to grant his troops access to its territory. As the war escalated, the vested interests of the intervening countries grew until the war became not only profitable but also necessary for the various participants (Galadima 2006). Among the participants in the war whose primary motives are said to be political in nature include the governments of Angola, Rwanda and Uganda. It is worth considering the various interpretations which examine political motives for the rebellion, for even if economic incentives took precedence over political motivations, simplistic analyses limited solely to the economic domain preclude a nuanced understanding of the entire conflict. Angola entered the war for the same reason it intervened in the 1996-1997 war: to defend itself against Jonas Savimbi's rebel movement, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) which had suspected ties to Rwanda and Uganda, and to maintain a regime favorable to its interests in Kinshasa.

The Angolan government's support for President Laurent Kabila came secondary to its internal political motivations and on two documented occasions, the government welcomed, if not ordered, the removal of Kabila (Afoaku 2005). It is widely held that Uganda and Rwanda initiated the rebellion with the aim of deposing Kabila and enforcing border security and by August 1998, their rebels had seized control of Goma, Bukavu, Uvira and the lucrative city of Kisangani. However, in the absence of a cohesive political ideology or interest uniting the various anti-Kabila rebels, the Congolese anti-Kabila Movement Rassemblement Congolaise pour la Democratie (RCD) as well as the Uganda-Rwanda alliance fragmented in the early stages of rebellion and the war was prolonged for eight years in a climate which precluded a definitive justification for any declared initial motives.

Political fragmentation even occurred within military contingents, in the Ugandan People's Defense Forces (UPDF), Ugandan soldiers were accused of taking sides with Hema communities against Lendu rivals, which alienated the Ugandan army from the Congolese a faction that had formed from the RCD aforementioned, Uganda's failure to unify the various rebel factions further demonstrates the absence of an overarching aim, and anticipates the carving up of rebel-held territory into virtual fiefdoms as each faction tried to take power in eastern Congo (McCalpin 2002). The remaining countries intervening in the war include Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia. Zimbabwe felt justified intervening in defense of the territorial sovereignty of a neighboring country and furthermore had the military capacity to do so, as did Namibia. South Africa did not contribute militarily, and failed to come to Kabila's defense during the war, but interestingly provided arms to both sides of the conflict and alleged moral support to the anti-Kabila forces. It is certainly true, as historian Michael Nest argues, that the immediate precedents to the war were in large part political in nature and encompassed a number of issues from Rwandan citizenship rights in the Congo to regime security and ethnic tensions, yet economic incentives cannot be ignored (Clapham 1998). African Countries Profited from the War, access to the DRC's gold and diamond fields was enormously profitable for both the Ugandan and the Rwandan economy.

Given that Uganda has no known diamond production, Ugandan officials were unable to provide data to the UN Panel of Exports on the quantity and profit of diamond exports, yet statistics provided by the Diamond High Council reveal that diamonds were exported from Uganda in the years which coincided with the second Congo war. Rough diamond exports from Uganda increased from 1511.35 carats in 1997 prior to the war, the equivalent of US\$198 302 dollars, to 1 024.46 carats in 1999, a value of US\$ 1813 500. Likewise, Ugandan niobium exports were zero in 1995, but fetched US\$780 000 in 1999, according to the World Trade Organization. Uganda effectively became a diamond and niobium exporting country, with no official evidence to explain how this occurred. Officials were able to provide statistics on the export of other minerals, including gold, coltan, tin and cobalt; the glaring discrepancies between the quantity of mineral produced and the quantity exported is alarming. For instance, in 1997, Uganda was producing 1.81 tons of tin and exporting 4.43 tons of tin. In 2005, gold was the third top Ugandan export, after coffee and fish, but domestic production of gold is negligible.

The increase in gold exports evidently increased as the Congo war escalated, reaching a peak of US\$ 59,900 000 in 2002 which constituted a shocking discrepancy of US\$59, 875, 183 between production and export. As can be observed in the table above, official exports began to fall after 2002, the year in which a transitional government was installed in the Congo following the assassination of Laurent Kabila, and the UN peacekeeping forces MONUC were expanded from 5537 international military personnel to 8700. Rwanda, like Uganda, has no known production of diamond, zinc, cobalt, manganese and uranium, but evidence obtained from the World Trade Organization, Belgium, and the Diamond High Council indicate that Rwanda exported a significant quantity of diamonds, receiving profits of \$US 720 425 in 1997, and \$US 1 788 036 in the year 2000. In the same period, Rwanda's coltan exports are said to have doubled and in the years 1999 and 2000 alone, with the Rwandan army allegedly extracted resources in eastern Congo estimated at \$250 million. Statistics on the profits garnered by the countries intervening in defense of Kabila are less extensive than those on the eastern regions of the country where Ugandan and Rwandan-backed groups were carrying out widespread atrocities, possibly because these countries were less invested in the clandestine illicit economy in minerals. Kabila himself gave his allies a share in the wealth of the country, including significant mining concessions to Zimbabwe (Havermans 1999). More than its fellow SADC members Zimbabwe and Namibia, Angola has an evident interest in the stability of the Congo, a country with which it shares a long land border of 2,511 kilometres. Having already intervened in 1997 in both Congos, by helping to put Kabila in power in Kinshasa and restoring the ancient régime of Denis Sassou-Nguesso in Brazzaville, the Angolan government was eager to establish its credentials as a regional power in central Africa (Ntalaja 2002).

Both Angola and Namibia followed Zimbabwe in advocating a military role for SADC in DR Congo. Zimbabwe took the initiative in making their intervention a collective defence action against an external threat through the SADC “Organ for Politics, Defence and Security”, then chaired by President Mugabe. These legal niceties were a convenient cover for Zimbabwe’s real intentions, which had to do with the economic and geopolitical interests of the governing elite. Zimbabwe’s governing elite was determined to make good on its investment in DR Congo. During the civil war in Mozambique, Zimbabwe had sent thousands of troops to help the FRELIMO government fight the RENAMO rebels. After the civil war (which ended in 1992), there were no dividends for Zimbabwe’s sacrifices, as South Africa, the very country that (under apartheid) had armed RENAMO and tried to destroy Mozambique’s society and economy, reaped the lion’s share of the benefits of peace.

Zimbabwe was determined not to be short-changed this time around. It hoped to garner some concrete gains from its military intervention in DR Congo. Zimbabwe had a strong military presence in the southern Congolese city of Mbuji-Mayi, and Zimbabweans were said to be airlifting diamonds home on a regular basis. With the complicity of some Congolese officials, several prominent Zimbabweans became owners of the two richest diamond mines in Mbuji-Mayi, under a company called Sengamines. While Zimbabwe as a state may not benefit much from the looting of DR Congo’s resources, individual members of the country’s elite have reaped the spoils of war. Besides Rautenbach and Emmerson Mnangagwa, Zimbabwe’s speaker of parliament, they include General Vitalis Zvinvashe, army commander during Zimbabwe’s 1998–2002 military engagement in DR Congo. His trucking company was used to carry supplies for Zimbabwean troops in DR Congo from Harare to Lubumbashi (Clark 2002).

Apart from the looting of resources by most of the states involved in the conflict there were also other negative impacts of this war on the country (Cornwell 2003). Rape as a weapon in Eastern Congo, the prevalence and intensity of rape and other sexual violence is described as the worst in the world. In October 2004 the human rights group Amnesty International reported that 40,000 cases of rape had been reported over the previous six years, the majority occurring in South Kivu. All armed forces in the conflict are guilty of rape, though the militia and various insurgent groups have been most culpable. Of particular medical concern is the abnormally high proportion of women suffering vaginal fistulae, usually as a result of being gang raped. The nature of rape in the conflict has, beyond the physical and psychological trauma to the individual women, contributed to the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV, in the region.

The issues of refugees and pygmies, who were believed to have been hunted down like game animals and eaten, there were also effects on the rise of child soldiers who were trained, not forgetting the psychological effects it had on the children. There were also legal consequences leading the International Court of Justice ruling that the DRC’s sovereignty had been violated by Uganda, and that Uganda had looted billions of dollars’ worth of resources. The DRC government has asked for \$10 billion in compensation. The devastating effects on the economy and social institutions have led to serious impacts on the Wild life of the region. In September 2005 a survey reported by the World Wild Fund for Nature showed the population of hippopotamuses in Virunga National Park’s lake Edward has plummeted to less than 900 individuals from an estimated 29,000 thirty years previously.

The decline is attributed to poaching for meat as well as the teeth, which are used to produce illegal ivory. Additionally, about half of the world’s 700 wild mountain gorillas live in the same park. Most importantly is the continuous death toll in the region even though war had officially ended years ago, people keep dying from hunger from wide spread famine and diseases, especially the women and children. Defense against rebel forces and access to the DRC’s rich mineral wealth have been the primary reasons for the six neighboring countries to enter the DRC war.

# THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF THE CONGO CONFLICT:

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## Section Outline:

- **The International Dimension of the Congo Conflict**
  - External Actors in the Congo Conflict
  - Role of External Actors in the Congo Conflict
- **Motivation of External Actors in the Congo Conflict**
  - Security and Political Motives of the External Factors in the Congo Conflict
  - Socio-Economic Motives of the External Factors in the Congo Conflict
- **Role of International Institutions in the Congo Conflict**
  - Southern Africa Development Community
  - African Union
  - United Nations

## **The International Dimension of the Congo Conflict:**

In analyzing the Congo conflict, a couple of issues beginning with the escalation of the conflict which led to external parties with different motives, and the role of international organizations and their responses to the conflict, this study will also consider the effects of the conflict on DR Congo till the elections held for a transitional government takeover, the above makes analyzing the Congo conflict very complex.

## **External Actors in the Congo Conflict**

The external actors involved in the Congo crisis were fighting on two sides, those of the Congolese government such as Zimbabwe, Angola, and to an extent Namibia, Chad, Libya, and Sudan some of which were temporary, and the anti-Kabila group which included Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi. They also fought this war with proxies, sponsoring rebel groups and militia groups to fight against the Congolese government, all states mention above played roles in the Congo conflict.

## **The Role of the External Actors in the Congo Conflict**

Rwanda reacted to the Congo crisis based on the evil genocidal Hutu rebels in Congo were constantly threatening the Rwandan territory which was still recovering from the genocide that happened a few years before the Congo conflict (Shako 2010). Rwanda played major roles in the Congo conflict including the role of partition and pillage, the conflict in Congo was ongoing, but was escalated to an international war with the involvement of Rwanda, backed by Uganda to try to fight and overthrow Kabila which could be understood as foreign invasion instead of civil war.

The above leads this study to the discovery that the Congo conflict was multi-faceted, because asides from the decay of state system in the Congo, political instability, and economic crisis which the state suffered at that time, Rwandan helped to escalate the war with the claims that most of the eastern Kivu in the Congo historically belonged to Rwanda, and that the Kabila government was helping to organize genocides against the Tutsi in the region by the Hutus. At this time, the so called Congo war was now a war between DR Congo and Rwanda backed by Uganda and Burundi to a lesser extent, because these countries were now enmeshed in the conflict and could not be extricated

without difficulty, this led to a great blunder by Kabila which made the people begin to believe that Rwanda had supported another Mobutu and began to retaliate, because he refused to restore the democracy to Congo, Kabila however began to support Hutu resistance forces against Rwanda (Breytenbach, Chilemba, Brown and Plantive 1999). At first this act seemed like a mere rebellion, based on the denial of Rwanda and Uganda to be involved militarily, but quite sooner it was clear that Rwanda and Uganda were ahead of the game, and a so called intervention was later discovered to be an invasion (Clark 2002).

Rwanda backed by Uganda also aided the supply of arms into DR Congo through the rebels, Both Rwanda and Uganda provide arms and training to their respective rebel allies which they used as proxies to fight against the Congolese government, to transport weapons to the rebels in the DRC, the authorities rely on private companies owned or controlled by Kagame's and Museveni's friends and relatives, they also utilize international connections made during the *Alliance des forces democratiques pour la liberation du Congo Zaire* (AFDL) war (Montague and Berrigan 2001).

Rwanda and Uganda continued to exploit gold and cassiterite in the northern and southern Kivu province, while irregular arms delivery came from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Sudan. Despite many international sanctions or national army operations, the rebels were strengthened and these arms continued to kill civilians (Fariala 2010). The increasing rate of combatant defected and temporary removal from many of the Rwandan rebel bases are only a partial success, considering the fact that armed groups have regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and continues to recruit new fighters and the spread by these rebels constantly contributed to the displacement of civilians, mass rape, collection of their property of the civilians, including food stuffs and clothing, poverty, disease and starvation (Shako 2010).

Unlike Mobutu, Kabila was not alone; he had the backing of Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Namibia, and Chad, although of all the countries above only Zimbabwe played a major role, this led to what can be referred to as a third party in the Congo conflict, the Angolan government sent troops to support anti-Kabila forces, and also to fight against the rebel leader who posed as a threat to the country, and once this threat was removed the Angolan government withdrew the troops and went back to try to settle the civil war that was on going in the country (Fariala 2010). Sudan just joined the war because of Uganda; it wanted to retaliate for the support that Uganda gave to the rebel group that fought the Sudan government during the civil war.

Zimbabwe however sent about 6000 to 10000 troops to the Congo; Zimbabwe has managed to negotiate important mineral-extracting concessions from the Kabila government. In return for supporting the man no one seems to like any more, Zimbabwe is seeing dollar signs; Zimbabwean troops are merely the price (Brown 1999). President Robert Mugabe also seems to have engaged himself in a prestige battle with former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, President Thabo Mbeki, as chairperson of the Southern African Development Community's security organ, Mugabe is thought to be in a pitched battle to wrench superiority in the region away from Mandela and Mbeki, and entrench himself firmly on the international stage (Leader 2001).

Rebel forces soon splintered as Uganda's national security interests began to collide with Rwanda's concerns about Tutsis and their enemies, the Interahamwe (Dunn 2003). At least three rebel groups were fighting in the region, not always against Kabila and his allies but against one another as well, the ex-FAR, consisting mainly of former Rwandan soldiers (presumably Hutus) are fighting against Rwanda; this group therefore does not really fight Kabila (Shako 2010). The Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba is based in the northern Equator province and is backed by Uganda, which wants to pile more pressure on Kabila to step down or secure its border. Finally, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) is involved, it is the largest group, but is now

split between the faction led by Ernest dia Wamba, based in Kisangani and also backed by Uganda (for the same reason as above), and Emile Ilunga, the new leader who is based in Goma in Kivu, but backed by Rwanda whose main concern is the interests of Tutsis (Wakabi 1999).

The above states that the international dynamics of the Congo conflict was the different reactions by all the involved states to the state of affairs in the Congo, that produced change and effects which are still felt till present day in DR Congo. Apart from the Congo conflict been multi-facet because of the different approaches the states involved took in participating in the Congo conflict. E.g. Rwandan had security reason for its involvement in the Congo conflict, but apart from these security issues, it also had historical reason which it backed with the eastern region of Kivu belonging to Rwanda, and also economic reason for participating in the conflict knowing what it stood to gain from the conflict situation in the Congo.

For countries like Angola and Sudan which joined the conflict based on invitation and security reason had to adopt various ways of achieving their desired goals, notwithstanding what it had to sacrifice such as the lives of soldiers and the money spent on deploying troops. Politically, Zimbabwe and Namibia joined the conflict based on invitation from Kabila to help defeat the anti-Kabila group, but Zimbabwe had an agenda of gaining regional respect and recognition. The complex international dynamic of this conflict made it very difficult for peace concessions to be carried out swiftly in the region.

### **The Motivation of External Actors in the Congo Conflict**

The motivation for the involvement of these external parties are not very difficult to place, judging from the fact that while significant number of soldiers from national armies have been trained and the rulers of those nations taking extreme risk to send them to open combat, also considering the expense of the equipment and training of the armies as a major form of investment by such poor states in the region proving to be more losses than gains, but these states still involve in this war because of what they stood to gain in the long-run, for these reasons decided to fight with loosely organized militias groups, untrained and undisciplined forces which greatly contributed to illegal violence such as rape and ethnic cleansing, making attempts peace harder to enforce, and the high death toll, the wide-spread of diseases and starvation thereby causing chaos in the region with longstanding effects, the motives these states fought for varied on all levels, from economic, political, financial, state security (Fariala 2010).

### **Security and Political Motives of the External Actors in the Congo Conflict**

Conflicts are often the consequences or result of the failure of states to provide stability and security for their citizens, and that development and peace processes cannot be effective in situations of threats, social disorder and violence, as a social necessity and inevitable aspect of the healthy functioning of the society, because conflict is an obstacle to progress due to destructive impacts (Ake 1996). Regime security had dominant influence leading to the First and Second Congo War can only serve as a starting point for analysis. It appears to be more suitable to acknowledge a mixture of motives held by most actors and to recognize that these motives underlay drastic changes due to altered realities during the wars, imperialistic motivations on behalf of Rwanda might have already played a key role during the first, but almost certainly the second war (Reno 1998).

At this point, the war has switched from been an active Congolese war, to involving dominant Rwandan and Ugandan machinations, Rwanda and Uganda invaded the Congo with some Congolese participation to partition and pillage the Congo, Rwanda also deemed if necessary to invaded the Congo based on reason that President Kabila's did not keep to the promise of eliminating the Congolese based Hutus which were a constant threat to the Rwandan

government (Tunner 2007). Once it is noted that regime security is of paramount concern and a motivating force behind foreign policy when regimes are really threatened, things become more complicated, just like in the case of Rwanda, its regime security led to its involvement in the first Congo war, and Second Congo War, where it played a very dominant role, and continued to fight a low intensity war even after the war had ended. When regime security is really threatened, some kind of legitimacy to self-defense is encouraged (Clark 2002). Rwanda also had its backing for security saying that the eastern part of the Congo which it invaded historically belong to Rwanda, all this moves taken by Rwanda backed by Uganda made it obvious that Rwanda was working with some Congolese authority who had other motives especially because of how rich the eastern Congolese region was in terms of mineral and natural resources (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraf 2002).

In the case of Angola, it was invited by president Kabila to be an ally to help fight the anti-Kabila forces, Angola accepted the invitation based on state security. It was unclear at first whether Angola's mission in the Congo was to act as a peacemaker, or support the Congolese government so the number of troops sent into Congo was not even specifically stated, but Angola's personal mission in Congo war led by former general Laurent Nkunda, was to eliminate a rebel group which was a constant threat to its government, as well as fight other rebel groups. The presence of Angolans soldiers in the volatile region would likely be seen as a provocation to Rwanda, which battled Angolans during Congo's devastating 1998-2002 war (Longman 2002).

Namibia, like Zimbabwe and Angola arrayed behind president Kabila, having no security interest in the DR Congo, but following the invitation by president Kabila, Namibia committed 2,000 troops to the cause; they were instrumental in defending the strategic towns of Mbandaka in the Northwest, and Mbuji Mayi, a diamond-mining center in the middle of the DR Congo (Ntalaja 2002). President Kabila allied with these countries above because it needed security in all ratifications, national integration, peace and peaceful co-existence both within and with its neighbours, for effective governance wherein socio-economic and political development can thrive, because while the anti-Kabila arrayed to remove Kabila from office, those who arrayed behind Kabila alone wanted stability and continuity (Leader 2001).

The above simply connotes that the Second Congo war is one which did not only involve states with security reasons, but also because of the internal security that was lacking in the Congo at that time, judging the fact that some internal members of the Congolese government were aiding Rwandan invasion because of their opportunistic drive especially in the eastern region of the Congo. The use of proxies in this war is another very important factor that cannot be ignored, Rwanda and its allies sponsored various groups which helped to create most of the crisis in the Congo giving them good excuses to be involved in the conflict. However, security provides the necessary pre-conditions for progress, political stability, economic prosperity and the overall socio-economic and human development, and when security is absent in a state, all the above listed would be wanting in the state, just like it happened in the Congo.

### **Socio-Economic Motives of the External Actors in the Congo Conflict**

When closely studied, it would be discovered that the Congo conflict was focused on gaining full control of the abundant resources of the country, the African Great Lakes states have largely paid their military expenses by the extraction of natural resources like diamond, timber and the extraction of minerals in the eastern part of Congo; these efforts have been directed by officers from the Rwandan and Ugandan armies, as well as some internal involvement by some Congolese leaders who have grown wealthy as a result. The Rwandan national army has become far less concerned about hunting down the people and groups in charge of the genocide, and more interested in protecting their sphere of control in eastern Congo, by levying high taxes on the local population and

confiscating almost all of the livestock and food belonging to the indigenes of the region (Taylor and Williams 2004). Competition for control of resources was so high between the anti-Kabila forces and has also resulted in conflict, in 1999, Ugandan and Rwandan troops clashed in the city of Kisangani, the RCD also split into two factions, greatly weakening the anti-Kabila rebel forces and limiting their operation to the eastern portion of the country.

However, the forces loyal to and allied with Kabila were too depleted and exhausted to take advantage of this (Rupiya 2002). Rwanda's decision to wage war for a second time in 1998 was largely due to its regime security. Firstly, security concerns did exist, but they were vastly exaggerated by the Rwandan regime, more importantly, the internal strife within the Rwandese ruling elite itself and already at the outset of the second Congo war, did continuing access to mineral resources figure high on Rwanda's agenda, as well (Etuket 2010). The four-year-conflict ripped Congo into rival groups, with rebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda controlling vast swaths of territory rich in coffee, gold and tin in the east. At the time, Angola and Zimbabwe sent tanks and fighter planes to back Congo's government in exchange for access to lucrative diamond and copper mines to the south and west (Shako 2010).

Zimbabwe like Angola was invited by the president of Congo, not having any interest of the security of the Congo a stake, but rather the invention of Zimbabwe was largely related to Mugabe's interest in playing a greater sub-regional role (Reed 1998). The war had been costly for Zimbabwe which was said to have spent an estimated \$300million, as well as forgone agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the granting of contracts, economic agreements and mining activities given to Zimbabwe by Kabila to help sustain its interest that failed to yield profit. Zimbabwe pledged an approximately 11,000 troops to Congo war, which was highly unpopular with economically depressed people of Zimbabwe (Rupiya 2002). The vast former Belgian colony's 1998-2003 war sucked in its neighbors, as foreign armies and rebel groups vied for control of the country's rich natural resources. The conflict wrecked infrastructure already weakened by decades of neglect and corrupt leadership and forced millions to flee their homes (Leader 2001).

The motivation of the external actors in the conflict is very obvious, because besides from all the stated reasons by all these states involved in this crisis, all of these states had other economic reasons for involving in this conflict. For the Rwandans backed by Uganda and Burundi, they wanted to establish buffer zones in eastern Congo to fortify themselves from the Hutu militia and former soldiers who perpetrated the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Rwanda therefore needed security in real sense but, drifted away from the security issues which made the country involve in the DR Congo conflict. Uganda on the other hand, though it entered the conflict to support its ally Rwanda, also wanted to create a buffer zone along its borders with DR Congo to deter rebels from easy access into its territory.

Angola also joined the conflict based on security reasons to protect and fight against a rebel group that was a threat to them from DR Congo, and constantly affected the peace in Angola. However, Zimbabwe and Namibia did not necessarily join the conflict because of security reason but accepted the invitation for political reason. Zimbabwe's motive was mainly to acquire sub-regional recognition among the South African Development Community (SADC) states, which it was chairperson; this was only possible if it had financial stability. The above makes the Congo conflict a power struggle along predominant ethnic and regional lines.

### **The Role of International Institutions in the Congo Conflict**

International institutions have become increasingly prominent both in facilitating conflict resolution between states, but also in dealing with intractable conflicts within states, they serve a number of basic functions that enhance the possibility of cooperation on global, continental or regional levels.

## The Southern African Development Community

The civil conflict in DRC is one crisis which reflects political infighting among the members of SADC. Indeed, the complexities of the war are as much due to the internal crisis within the DRC as it is to the external wrangling among different external actors (Fahey 1999). The DRC conflict highlighted the dangers and complications inherent in the in-fighting and the intricate political problems within the SADC, although the organization wanted to come with a credible policy that could help resolve the crisis, the various countries perception of their national interest and prestige overrode sub-regional interest (Malan 1998). To give an image of SADC support, a controversial meeting of Defence Ministers of SADC was convened in Harare, Zimbabwe, and approval of military support to Kabila was said to have been given. The actions of the ministers were neither unanimous nor clearly postulated and there were doubts as to the legality of ministers dispatching a military force to pacify a civil war (Winer 2002).

The Harare meeting was attended by five Presidents; other countries were represented at junior level, with South Africa sending only its acting High Commissioner to prevent further complications. President Mandela called for an urgent meeting of the SADC, to which he invited the Rwandan and Ugandan Presidents to talk about how peace concession could be reached, in the end, it was agreed that Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia send in troops to assist Kabila. While it may be too early to conclude the final chapter of the SADC's involvement in the DRC, there are nevertheless certain conclusions that can be drawn, perhaps; the most significant is that the SADC's military intervention in DRC has far-reaching implications for the region.

- First, it is important to note that, SADC was clearly not effectively prepared for the post-apartheid diplomatic realities in South Africa, rather naively it would seem, the countries made no allowance for a new form of rivalry and division that could emerge between them post-apartheid. When this eventually ensured, they were confused as to how best to manage it.
- Second, the intervention by some of the countries may have robbed the SADC of the opportunity to play any effective role in future diplomatic initiatives to end the impasse, as its neutrality could be guaranteed.
- Third, a clear division emerged within the SADC between those who favor diplomatic means to end disputes and those more inclined to resort to military means, under this crude division, countries such as South Africa and Botswana seem to be in the former, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia are in the latter group.
- Finally, the handing of the DRC crisis could have serious domestic implications for some of the countries, which in turn may affect regional stability. For instance, Zimbabwe's regional adventurisms could provoke a domestic backlash, especially as the economy is being weakened continuously and the leadership continues to lose touch with the socio-economic and military realities of the country (Abiodun 2000).

Although the South African Development Community tried to negotiate a peaceful end to this conflict since the beginning of the war, the methods that it used demonstrate the inadequacy of the efforts, beginning from the fact that, there was division among the SADC members, and growing tension between Mandela, and Mugabe (Brman and Sams 2000).

The prospects for SADC to play an effective role in resolving the conflict Diminished, as both men exchanged thinly-veiled insults, for example, Mugabe lectured Mandela saying "no SADC country is compelled to help a brother country, but those who do not want to help should keep quiet about those who want to do so". Mugabe concluded that "we must enlist the OAU which is an organ for conflict resolution; it is not possible to resolve it as SADC because we are divided" (Fahey 2000). Later that year, Mandela unexpectedly toned down his strong rhetoric

against Mugabe and announced that SADC unanimously supported the three SADC countries military intervention in DR Congo. The meeting was held in Durban, during the non-aligned movement summit, eleven of the fourteen SADC countries were present and nine out of the eleven were Heads of State, Mandela stated that “ it is quite responsible when a legitimate leader says “I have been invaded” and asks for support and its quite reasonable for countries to respond to that”.

This action taken by Mandela was not based on total agreement, but was to avoid jousting with Mugabe verbally in public, indeed, Mandela continued to champion a negotiated settlement, and this announcement was purely an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC (Longman 2002). However, Mandela’s efforts to resolve the conflict through diplomatic ways were not just undermined by the split within the SADC, but also by the active involvement of several factors outside of SADC supporting either Kabila or the rebels (Ntalaja 2002).

The above simply implies that the role of the South African Development Community in the Congo conflict was almost very insignificant, because of the major factor of disunity among the SADC member states. If not for the involvement of Zimbabwe and Angola, DR Congo would have been left with no regional support militarily, but with diplomatic efforts which would have taken a longer time to attain peace in the country and send out the uninvited states that participated in the war.

The SADC participation in the conflict was done very feebly, which helped to slow down the peace process. The division among the SADC members especially the leaders of the groups made invention slow and helped in contributing greatly to a major setback, and the chaos has caused the Congo to veer from its formerly promising path. The Southern African Development Community deserves a portion of the blame for this disastrous turn of events.

## **African Union**

The African Union (AU), has had limited success in dealing with regional conflict, as members are very sensitive about the protection of sovereignty, despite the creation of new powers and a formal dispute mechanism, the AU has been largely ineffective in managing African conflicts such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The organization has been preoccupied with efforts to resolve existing conflicts rather than trying to foresee and prevent new ones (Miall, Hugh, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse 1999).

The UN and sub-regional organizations like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have often taken the lead in managing conflicts in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Lesotho, and DRC. The African Union's marginal role thus far can be attributed to it being new and inexperienced in the field of conflict management, the sheer overwhelming scope of conflict across the continent, and longstanding financial, organizational, and mandate issues from the pre-1993 era (Muyangwa, Monde, and Vogt 2000).

However in respect to the Congo conflict, the African Union had to play a crucial diplomatic role in putting pressure that needed to be brought to bear, particularly in the case Rwanda, whose rhetoric and actions have been the most aggressive. Rwanda's president, Paul Kagame, the man who commanded the Tutsi army that stopped the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, has cited the security threat posed by the genocidal Hutu army and militia still at large in Eastern Congo and the genocide threat to Congo's small Tutsi population to justify Rwanda's incursions and support of pro-Rwanda militias there. However, the AU must see through the Rwandan discourse of genocide and national security to the network of economic interests acquired in the last two wars it has fought in eastern Congo.

Rwanda's principal fear is that its influence and interests which have been independently documented by a UN panel are threatened by Congo's checkered progress toward elections and stability (Reeds 1998).

By pressuring Rwanda, the AU will be asserting a leadership role in African conflict mediation; its leadership will be reinforced if its statements are supported by credible threats from Rwanda's important donors, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, to cut Rwanda's aid if it pursues this agenda; overambitious leaders will then know that the AU is more than just a talk-shop, and if the United States backs a regional organization like the AU and it succeeds, it will relieve pressure for it always to play a lead role in resolving future crises (Abiodun 2000). The African Union peace efforts was greatly supported and funded by other international organizations, because the international community expected the African Union to stand up to the task of ensuring peace was present in DR Congo, it was their obligation to support the AU in ensuring that the response is credible, knowing that the African Union was unable to take up such a task alone (Montague and Berrigan 2001).

With the support of the United Nations, the African Union chartered specifically called for the amicable resolution of disputes, and as a preventive measure, a commission on mediation, arbitration and conciliation was established to mediate disputes in the DR Congo, the African Union also agreed on a principle to establish a mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, in it, they agreed that conflict resolution and peace keeping were the most important and most effective areas for the African Union's activities in the short run (Malan 1998).

However, the method of mediation, arbitration, and conciliation adopted by the AU was not effective because it had no relation to the realities on ground and as a result it did not work effective. African leaders including that of DR Congo were turned off by the approach of the AU in handling conflict, based on its long and expensive judicial process, its use for the unplanned outcomes the good office committee and presidential mediation is faced with (Galadima 2006).

The African union from the beginning of the conflict also made attempts to resolve the DR Congo conflict at a meeting of African defense ministers in Addis Ababa, and also in Quagadougou were it made concerted efforts towards the resolution of the DR Congo conflict, there were equally meeting in Paris, Libya, and Rome and barely a year later the conflict had included various rebel groups and neighboring countries who were made to sign the Lusaka accords for the peace efforts of the AU to be well achieved (Mekenkamp, Veen and Tongeren 1999).

The above simply goes to show that, it is important to note that the AU's strategy for addressing conflict is apparently less successful, due to its inexperience and reluctance in conflict resolution, also the method of approach adopted by the AU in trying to resolve the DR Congo conflict as not appropriate for the realities on ground, and the AU needed to dig deeper in trying to resolve the conflict. The AU cause for less success in conflict resolution can greatly be linked to its in experience, lack of support and distrust among the AU member states, and to a large extent its dependence on international organizations and the regional bodies under the AU to resolve most of the conflicts in Africa not excluding that of DR Congo.

## **United Nations**

The role of the United Nations in the Congo conflict was very obvious, as usual the United Nation was play the role of a peace keeper, and trying to resolve the conflict in Congo, just that this time it did so reluctantly and feebly (Charbonneau 2008). The UN in intervening in the DR Congo conflict formed a peace keeping group which

was to monitor the peace progress during the second Congo war, though much of its focus subsequently turned to the Ituri conflict, the Kivu conflict and the Dongo conflict (Shako 2010). In 1999, Kofi Anan appointed the former Senegalese foreign minister Moustapha Niasse as his special envoy for the DRC peace process, he was assigned the task of establishing contact with DRC political and civic leaders and sounding out a possible UN role in promoting ongoing talks between countries involved in the conflict in Lusaka on reaching a cease-fire in the war, this act was sustained by a security council resolution adopted by early 1999, calling for peace talks, free elections, and deploying the presence of foreign troops in the DRC (Synders 2004). Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo and in English Mission of the United Nations Organisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was with the mandate to facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring with particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and demobilized child soldiers (Fariala 2010).

The UN first sent troops in 2000 although very weak and small, with a mere 5,500 troops and a weak mandate thus leading to its failure to stop fighting between the government in DR Congo and the rebel groups, and also failure to stop the exploitation of the DR Congo's mineral and natural resources by foreign countries and bodies (Ntalaja 2002). The reluctance and feeble intervention of the UN in the conflict was so obvious that some of the troops deployed to stop fighting and ensure that cease fire agreements were adhered to by the involved states were sent into DR Congo without adequate weapons and number. The time frame which the UN took to make decision in relation to this conflict was that which could be referred to as irresponsible, because the UN can be said to have been stalling to intervene in the conflict. The time gap between the sending of troops into DRC and the approving of the resolution to stop the illegal exploitation of the DRC's natural and mineral wealth was that which aroused the world's attention, although this heightened awareness of the exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in DRC in the context of conflict and in particular, its connection with the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (Ntalaja 2002).

However, all the actions taken by the UN found ways of only escalating violence in Ituri, the UN Security Council in March 2003 increased the number of personnel in the peacekeeping force MONUC's human rights component in order to enhance the capacity of the Congolese parties in investigating the serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights perpetrated on DRC territory since the outbreak of war in 1998 (Rupiya 2002). The United Nations in 2004 revised and updated the MONUC's mandate, had almost 17,000 troops in Congo DR, making it the largest UN keeping force in operation, struggling to prevent violence and protect the population of about 60million. The revised and renewed mandate of the MONUC includes;

- To contribute to arrangements taken for the security of the institutions and the protection of officials of the transition in Kinshasa, until the integrated police unit of Kinshasa is ready to take on this responsibility, and assist the Congolese authority in the maintenance of order in other strategic areas;
- To contribute to the improvement of the security condition in which humanitarian assistance is provided and assists in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; and
- To contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent, and peaceful election to take place.

Beyond the continuing violence in the east, MONUC has helped restore a measure of stability and democratic processes over the past decade to a country torn apart by years of civil war and revolts that resulted in the greatest human death toll since World War II (Winer 2002). The above connotes that the United Nations decided to get involved in the crisis a little late, but when it finally did although reluctant and feeble, it had good intentions

about stopping the conflict and making sure that the cease-fire agreement was followed by all the states involved. Formation of the MONUC is a good example of how willing the United Nations was to help stop fighting between the government and rebel groups, and also to stop exploitation of the DR Congo natural and mineral resources. The United Nations played a great role in the Second Congo War even when it was greatly criticized by states in the International System.

### **Findings of Research:**

The findings of this research in a broader perspective can be summarized into just a few points. The use of proxies in the DR Congo conflict was a factor which played out mostly by external states sponsoring rebel groups to help fight in Congo, because the instability in DR Congo was to their advantage. The exploitation of DRC resources through transnational networks was an intricate system of political economic and socio-cultural forces, not just the black markets, the networks formations within the shadow offer three basic characteristics: they operate outside the formal state systems, are international and they function not only by exchange and alliance but by internalized norms and cultures of exchange and alliance, Because they operate outside local governmental structures, shadow networks are not constrained by local laws, police or courts, but still, they source their legitimacy from the international system through a complex array of institutional dependencies and corporate manipulation.

Political, socio-economic and security motives being the major source of foreign intervention in DR Congo can be seen in the acts of all the involving actors, they all had reasons to back their involvement in the conflict, with internal government officials aiding and abating the invasion in the region which contributed majorly to slowing down the peace process by regional, continental and global organizations. The conflict in DR Congo was a very complex conflict because of the involvement of many actors with different reason for their involvement in the conflict.

## **CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH: RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION OF RESEARCH**

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### **Recommendations:**

The issues which the Congo conflict had to deal with were the issues of continual exploitation of mineral and natural resources, the use of proxies, state security, and political instability. Below would be few recommendations to try to prevent all these from happening in future conflicts

- There should be a development in the defense base of the Congo. An improvement should be made so in times of conflict no external intervention would be required.
- There should be an improvement in one of the arms of government so that in the long run, it would enhance their balance of power system, and make it possible for them to check each other for more effective administration.
- States should provide basic amenities for the citizens, in other to avoid divided loyalty, because when the citizens of a nation are poor, they would find other ways to achieve a particular standard of living. This would help avoid the use of proxies, if the citizens are comfortable, they would not get involved with other states.
- In situations of intervention, proper agreements should be laid out in other to avoid an invasion. Again, stiff penalties should be enforced by regional institutions, either economic or political in other to encourage states not to invade others

- Finally, the democratic system of government should be encouraged, because when the democratic peace theory is applied, states would hardly even go to war at all.

If the following listed above can be considered and adopted by states, it would reduce any chances of them being invaded, or even ever going to war with other states.

## Conclusion

The internationalization of the Congo conflict had a spillover effect there by involving external actors, which fought against the government to protect their various interests economically and financially. On the other hand, some fought with the Congolese government to gain political might and recognition in the region, as well as achieve political stability. However, it is important to note that, whatever states claimed to be their reason for intervening in the conflict they all had economic motives which they intended to achieve.

To achieve these objectives, these states fought with proxies by sponsoring rebel groups, continually exploiting the resources in the Congo through black market, and internal help from the political leaders of the Congo. The issues listed above made it difficult for international institutions to contain the DR Congo conflict. In concluding, I will like to state that no matter what claims all the external actors gave for their intervention in the Congo conflict, they all had selfish interests they all wanted to achieve, and their claims were just mere covers to enable them achieve their various objectives.

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