

GLOBALIZATION, STATES AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA:

A THIRD WORLD VIEW

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INTRODUCTION

The world is today a global village. A terrorist attack in the New York city of the United State of America on 11th September 2001 and an earthquake and its resultant tsunamis in the South-East Asian coastline on 20th December 2004 reverberated in every part of the world, involving the death of nationals of every continent, if not country. Thanks to the great advances in modern science and technology which have made it possible for continents and peoples to be interconnected, interact and communicate both among and between themselves in a matter of seconds. The development had enabled and indeed necessitated the reorganization of the production and distribution of goods and services, especially among and between transnational and multinational companies and institutions -the major agents and precursors of world capitalist system and globalization.

Different and identical goods and services are easily and rapidly finding their way across national borders and continents in what has come to be known as the global market. This, in turn, has led to a greater propensity and the need to exploit and utilize the world's human and material resources. Indeed, there is today hardly any part of the world that is isolated from the voracious impacts of the globalization process. All these have arguably propelled humanity to greater heights and socio-economic bliss. Nonetheless, an empirical and indeed a fundamental fact of globalization is that the benefits and problems generated in the process are not fairly shared among peoples and continents; for while some people and sections of the globe are enjoying the full benefits of globalization, others are suffering

unduly from the negative affects of the phenomenon.

In fact, one observable irony of globalization is that while Western Europe, North America and Japan are wallowing in the luxuries of the globalization process, the countries of the Third World, especially Africa are deeply enmeshed in socio-economic crises emanating essentially from globalization. For instance, in the area of environmental pollution and degradation, globalization and its attendant rush to exploit the natural resources of Third World countries by multinational companies, especially oil prospecting corporations and logging firms, have created so much havoc and destruction, which have left communities in these countries dehumanized. Worse still, governments in these countries, especially in Africa, by their policies and programmes would appear not only to be confused and helpless but also to be at the mercy of the forces and agents of these precursors and harbingers of crises and doom.

Several issues and questions arise from the foregoing. For instance, how did Africa find herself in this kind of quagmire? Again, why have relations between Africa and the outside world, especially the West, been characterized by the appropriation of the resources of the former by the latter? What is the correlation between globalization, governance and the nature of states in Africa? Most importantly, for how long shall Africa be in this unenviable situation; and what is the way forward? These and other related issues are addressed in this paper which has been divided into five sections namely, the introduction, a brief analysis of some conceptual issues of the paper, a descriptive analysis of states in contemporary Africa, an analysis of the roles and place of African governments and leaders in the globalization process and the conclusion which is a prognosis of the current state of affairs

in Africa.

CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS

Three concepts are central to this paper namely, globalization, governance and state. It may therefore be necessary to explicate them, albeit briefly, especially their usage in the paper. Perhaps, the most recent of these concepts is globalization, which has been described as "the main force propelling the world at the end of the 20th century" (D.O.Offiong, 2001:1). Literally speaking, to globalize is to make worldwide in scope or application. And globalization is the state of being globalized; while globalism could be viewed as a policy process geared towards the promotion of globalization (Webster Dictionary, 1977). Essentially, two things arouse academic interest in the concept of globalization and its impacts. On the one hand is the need to understand the nature of the social and economic changes brought about by globalization, which appear to be overwhelming all advanced capitalist countries. On the other is the feeling that the fate of the individual nation-states and indeed the comity of nations is increasingly being tied together, a perception underscored by the Western economic recession of the early 1980s, the re-emergence of the threat of 'nuclear Armageddon' sequel to the increased Soviet-American rivalry and the impending eco-crisis, among other developments in the 1980s (Offiong,).

Although several definitions of globalization abound in the literature, two strands of these definitions have been noted (J.H.Mittelman, 2000:5). One category are those definitions that emphasize great increase in interconnections and interdependence among states; a growing increase in trans-border movements and transnational flows, and the intensification of the processes in these interactions to the extent that the world is, in

many respects, moving towards a global enclave. A good representation of this genre is the definition put forward by W.K.Tabb (1999:1), which holds that "Globalization refers to the process of reducing barriers between countries and encouraging closer economic, political, and social interaction". A much more expansive, though similar, formulation is the one by the president of the Ford Foundation which holds that globalization "reflects a more comprehensive level of interaction than has occurred in the past, suggesting something different from the word 'international'. It implies a diminishing importance of national borders and the strengthening of identities that stretch beyond those rooted in a particular region or country (Berresford, 1997:1; quoted in Tabb, 1999).

The second category, which is more theoretical, emphasizes the compression of time and space. Among the leading proponents of this school include A.Giddens (1999), D.Harvey (1999) and D.Robertson (1992). In an attempt to differentiate between place and space, Giddens is of the opinion that the former is the idea of locale, or a geographical (that is, physical) setting of social activity; whereas with globalization the latter is restructured by social influences absent from the scene. Space is thus increasingly dislocated from place and networked to other social contexts across the globe. "Globalization can thus be defined as the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa" (Giddens, 1999:64; quoted in Tabb, 1999). Arguing in the same line but stressing the difficulty of specifying exactly what space one occupies when it comes to determining causes and effects, Harvey puts forward the "annihilation of space through time" (1990:299). Again, the marketplace for food, for

instance, is very different from what it used to be in the past, with local products being supplanted by national and global goods and services, transforming consumption patterns and price structures, which are integrated into world trade. Also proceeding in the same broad line of investigation, R. Robertson places more emphasis on cultural variations. As he posits, in globalization cultural processes are propelled by global consciousness, unlike in Giddens's scheme where emphasis is placed more on social technology.

Other strands in the liberal conception of globalism are the economists and political determinists, among which included some champions of globalization and some of its detractors alike. The former which consists mainly of the popularizers of the idea of global movements such as K. Ohmae (1990), J. Naisbitt (1996) and C.W. Oman (1994), among others, posit a one-way causality in the globalization process and tend to believe that assisted by advances in technology and telecommunication, marketization in itself is the moving force of globalization which they argue is transforming the world. For instance, C.W. Oman sees globalization as "the growth of economic activity spanning politically defined national and regional boundaries", (quoted in D.A. Offiong, 20001). According to this economist school of thought, increased movement actualizes globalization across sovereign and regional boundaries of goods and services, by way of trade and investments, and often of people through migration. The process is goaded by the activities of economic actors such as corporations, banks and individuals, usually in pursuit of profit and always pressured by competition. Political determinists, on the other hand, argue, as do the so-called realists and neo-realists, that states, rather than

markets, are the main purveyors of globalization. This line of thought has been elaborated more in later part of the paper.

Though J.H. Mittelman (2000) did not reject these shades of opinions on the subject, and indeed acknowledged their contributions, he nonetheless went ahead to propose what he called "a somewhat different concept", drawn from the experiences of the non-Western world and from the standpoint of those who are hurt by the globalization processes - trade union movements, people on the fringes of the society, the unemployed and underemployed in the various parts of the world, and the marginalized, especially women and children., in the developing countries (2000:3-6), As he posited:

As experienced from below, the dominant form of globalization means a historical transformation of: in the economy, of livelihoods and modes of existence; in politics, a loss in the degree of control exercised locally - for some, however little to begin with — such that the locus of power gradually shifts in varying proportion, above and below the territorial state; and in culture, a devaluation of a collectivity's achievements or perceptions of them. This structure, in turn, may engender either accommodation or resistance.

This paper shares fully the sentiments expressed in the above proposition, as it seems to view globalization from its holistic perspective. It also agrees with Mittelman (ibid: 7)

that globalization is not a fully fledged paradigm, but a domain of knowledge and a critical approach that explains the complexity, intricacy and variability of the ways the world is structured and managed, and, by extension, to assess "reflexively the categories used by social scientists to study this distinctive correlation of both integrating and disintegrating processes". However, it needs to be added that the approach and the investigation of this domain of knowledge must be put in their proper and historical perspective. It is therefore in this regard that it is posited here that it is not possible to study and analyze a global phenomenon such as globalization without reference to such historical phenomena, as capitalism, imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism, among others and the relationship between them and the globalization process. For instance, though McGrew (1996) is right in his observation that the increasing awareness of global interconnectedness was greatly enhanced by advances in telecommunication, especially the electronic media, which today bring distant events to the instant attention of their audiences, thereby establishing a sense of a globally shared community, the so-called globally shared community is a curse for some while a blessing for others.

And here lies the contradictory character of the globalization process. On the one hand, it offers major innovations and benefits, including gains in productivity, technological advances, higher standards of living, more jobs, broader access to consumer products at lower cost, widespread dissemination of information and knowledge, reduction in poverty in some parts of the world, and a release from long standing stereo-types in many countries. On the other hand and concurrently, so many communities, countries, regions and even continents are paying high prices for being integrated into or for sharing in the

current global political economy. Thus, expressed or tacit acceptance of being encompassed in globalization entails a lessening, or in some cases a negation, of the quantum of political control exercised by the encompassed, especially in the least powerful and poorest communities and states of the global political economy. Moreover, the penetration of world markets and increased polarization on a world level erode cultural traditions, giving rise to new hybrid forms (Mittelmam, 2000:5).

It is therefore hardly surprising that capitalism, with its inherent exploitative tendencies in addition to its domination and control of the world political economy, has exploited the advantages offered by the globalization process to ensure that the remotest areas of the world, especially Third World countries, are brought within the purview of its operation and domination. The main essence is to explore and exploit the human and material resources of these societies essentially for its own benefits, through the use and application of its agents and organs. It is in this context that Offiong (2001) views globalization as "the consummation of the internationalization of capitalism and its associated institutions and the subjugation of the peoples of the globe, which began several centuries ago". And as Issa G. Shivji (2005:13) further observed "Globalization, as all serious studies show, is a process of further intensification of imperialist exploitation through deepening the integration of the world economy in the international financial capital". In this paper therefore, globalization would be regarded as an advanced phase of capitalism or the latest phase of imperialism.

Government or governance, which is one the oldest concepts in the social science discipline, need not take much of our time here. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to discuss

the basic outline of the concept. Government, which can simply be defined as a legal entity or body of individuals formally invested with the authority to exercise the power of the state in contemporary society on behalf of the rest of the people, has been conceptualized from two main platforms namely, the mode of formation and system or style of governance, depending on the ideological background of the scholar. On the one hand are the liberal or bourgeois group of scholars (J. Locke, 1947; J.J. Rousseau, 1950; R.Michels,1962; G.Mosca,1939; V.Pareto,1968; etc.) who believe that those invested with the power of the state should be individuals with immense intelligence and knowledge of the intricacies of the workings and mechanisms of the state with the highest stake in the system and who can devote enough time, resources and energy to the management and operations of the state and the system in order to ensure their stability and progress.

This caliber of individuals, they argue, is few in the society. Consequently, utmost care must be taken in the process of selecting or electing them and therefore the process must not be left in the hands of the uninitiated, the poor and the uninformed with little or no stake in the stability of the system or the society. Indeed, the poor masses, this group of scholars and their adherents maintain, are very happy and infact eager to be guided and governed by the few in the society that whatever this minority decides are easily accepted by them. It would therefore be foolhardy and indeed dangerous to involve the masses in the intricate and difficult management of the affairs of the state.

On the other hand is the radical or Marxist group of scholars (K. Marx and F. Engels, 1977; V.I. Lenin, 1985; O. Nnoli, 1986, C. Ake, 1985; etc.) who insist that if indeed it is accepted

that governance is a social contract and a business that involves the welfare and future of all and sundry in the society, it would be preposterous for the business to be left in the hands of a few. Rather, those who manage the affairs of the state and society must emanate from the broad spectrum of the civil population, representing the various interest groups and social formations in the society including the workers, their numerous organizations and other professional bodies, the women and their various associations, artisans, petty traders and their various groupings, the youths including student unions and other related bodies. These groups must not only elect their representatives to the various organs of government (both local and national bodies) from among themselves, but also must be empowered to participate in the decision-making processes of the government. And this can only be done if the institutions and organs of governance including the electoral bodies, the judicial and legislative arms of government and political parties are democratized. It is not a formal idea of democracy as established only in law but a practical democracy where the process of nominating candidates for elections and the election itself are made to reflect the wishes and sensibilities of the electorate.

Our idea of government in this paper shall not be in tandem with its classical or liberal notion as reflected by the former group of scholars. On the contrary, the view of government in this discussion shall be in line with that of the latter group of scholars. It is therefore in this wise that government would be viewed here as a body set up by the class that dominate and control the society to administer the state on its behalf. Therefore, any action it takes (including the initiation, formulation and execution of policies and programmes) is geared, first and foremost, towards the protection of the interests of

members of the class that set up the government. Changes of government in most contemporary African societies arise as a result of disagreements among the dominant though minority class; or disagreement between the dominant class or factions of it and its metropolitan masters (C.Ake, 1973; and T.Turner and P.Badru, 1985).

These changes can be brought about either through the use of force and violent process, as in military coups d'etat when the disagreement is fundamental and cannot be settled statutorily among the various factions of the class; or in the use of non-violent means and the so-called statutory processes, such as the manipulation of the rituals known as electoral processes. While this latter kind of changes of government only entail changes in the key personnel or individuals who run the government and perhaps superficial changes in the methods or style of governance as have always been the case in many African countries the former kind of changes of government (that is, change of government through violent or military coups d'etat) may lead to a change in the class that dominate and control the state, which are rare in Africa. In this case, there would be fundamental changes in the society including radical changes in the methods, focus, direction and purpose of governance affecting socio-economic, cultural, production and distribution relations in the society.

On the issue of the state, it should be stated immediately that it is not only possible and indeed very difficult to delve into a full discussion of the concept here. What has been done is to make an outline and a brief analysis of the concept. As a very dynamic and complex concept, the state can be said to be ubiquitous and therefore always encountered in every academic discussion and analysis of social issues or in social

engineering and governance. Indeed, as Lenin (1975:2) observed, the state "is such a fundamental, such a basic question of all politics" and governance that it is hardly avoidable in any discussion. It can therefore be asserted that the nature and character of the state determine the focus and direction of governance including the type of policies and programmes it initiates and implements in any society.

Expectedly therefore, the state has been viewed from very varied perspectives. However, two broad views of the state is discernable in the literature namely, the liberal or orthodox and the Marxist or radical perspectives. Among the bourgeois scholars, there is hardly any agreement as to what constitute a state or when it came into existence. Indeed, some scholars of the liberal school of thought who have generally defined the term to mean a system through which resources and values are allocated in the society (D. Easton, 1985) have even tended to drop the usage of the term as an organizing system. But as Easton, the chief proponent of this movement even admitted, this has hardly solved the problem and the controversy surrounding the meaning of the state. And so the quest for an agreeable meaning of the state continued prompting the International Political Science Association to choose as the theme of its 1985 World congress 'The Changing State'. But in spite of controversy and lack of consensus among the bourgeois school on the concept of the state, certain elements unite them on the subject. The most important of the element is their general view of the state as a neutral body entrusted with the mission of reaching and protecting the consensus of interests of the people, fostering equity and maintaining law and order in the society (E, Ekekwe, 1986).

Two main groups of thought are discernable within the liberal school with regard to how this consensus of interests is usually arrived at in the society namely, the elitist and the pluralist traditions. While the elitist school insists that this consensus is represented by the elites in the society and view governmental processes as means through which compromises and consensus are usually reached among the contending elite groups (R.Michels, 1962: 85-105); the pluralists on their part maintain that consensus and harmony are normally reached through negotiation and bargaining among the various groups which represent the various interests in the society (D. Easton, 1965). With regard to the place of the masses in the scheme of things, the elitists consider them too atomized, too disorganized and too mechanical all of which invalidate their ability to be of any use in the process of governance. On their part, the pluralist school believes that the interests of the masses are easily taken care of under the shades opinions and interests during the negotiations and bargaining among the groups in the society.

When subjected under close observation, the views and arguments of these schools of thought throw up more problems and unanswered questions than they have attempted to solve. And these problems and issues have been highlighted by scholars (J.J. Walker, 1966:285-295; Klaus Von Verme, 1976; and S. Cassese, 1976). However, all stated and considered, the liberal conception of the state is fraught with all sorts of problems and weaknesses. Nonetheless, it has provided a useful guide for ensuring equity, fair play and justice among states in international relations, especially the

criteria which any geo-political entity must satisfy before being accorded a place among the comity of nations in the global state system (O.U. Nnadozie, 2006:36-45). But within the states themselves, it has left many unanswered questions, particularly with regard to processes of governance and public policy.

The other school of thought - the Marxist perspective - places a very high premium on the concept of the state. Indeed, as pointed out earlier, the state as far as radical scholars are concerned are hardly avoidable in any social discuss. This is why Lenin (1975:2) observed that "Everyday, in one connection or another, [scholars] will be returning to this question: What is the state, what is its nature, what is its significance ..." and how did it emerge? It is perhaps necessary also to note that just like their liberal counterpart, the Marxist scholars are firmly agreed on a unified concept of the state. But this disagreement notwithstanding, there are two things which are agreed upon by every scholar and student of the Marxist persuasion concerning the state. First, they all agree that the state is a product of class struggle, and historically has not existed. The second is that the state in every class society corresponds to the interests of the dominant class, and so rejects the neutral conception of the bourgeois scholars and their adherents. However, disagreement among scholars of the Marxist political economy arises mainly with regard to the process by which this correspondence is achieved and the degree of autonomy of the state from the class struggle, especially in core-capitalist societies.

Marx and Engels - the primogenitors of Marxism - developed their theory of the state from Hegel's dialectical conception of history and development, but rejected 'the reality of the ethical idea' and 'the image and reality of reason' as Hegel conceived the state. As Engels

stated, the state is "a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel" (quoted in Lenin, 1984:10). The progressive scholars maintain that the state is not only an agent of class rule, and an organ for the suppression of one class by another, but also an instrument for the maintenance of socio-economic and political order; or status quo ante; or better still, an agent for the mediation of conflicts among class in the society. But this function is not that of an unbiased umpire. Rather, it is a function biased in favour of the dominant or ruling class. It is an 'order' or 'stability' geared towards favouring those who own and control the means of production and distribution in the society, and therefore meant to create and maintain the necessary conditions for private accumulation and for the control and domination of labour by capital. This domination and control are also reproduced at the political level. As Engels further elucidated:

Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonism in check, but because it arose, at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of those classes, it is as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class... The ancient and feudal states were organs for the exploitation of the slaves and serfs; likewise, the modern representative state is an instrument of exploitation of wage-labour by capital... (quoted in Lenin, *ibid*:16)

The point must be stressed however that the interests of the state coinciding with those of the bourgeoisie must not be assumed in capitalist societies. In other words, it must not be taken

for granted that in capitalist societies the state is simply a tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie or faction(s) of it. This is because the capitalist state is relatively autonomous of the ruling class or faction(s) of it, its control of the state notwithstanding (N. Poulantzas, 1973:245). As a matter of fact, autonomization of domination is specific to the capitalist state as it is intrinsically linked to the capitalist mode of production. Once capitalist production relations are established, they are reproduced automatically at other spheres of life (E. Arghiri, 1979:123). This is because, as Ake (1985:106) stated, under capitalism people are first and foremost commodity bearers even when that commodity is only labour power and social life is > dominated by market relations. However, the critical and indeed decisive characteristic of the state in capitalist societies is public or political authority which is always the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. And every organ of the state including the bureaucracy, the army, police, the courts and the legal system and prison, etc, are of class character (R. Miliband, 1973; and N. Poulantzas, 1976).

STATES IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA

Perhaps one way to begin the discussion is to note that whereas contemporary states in Europe developed autochthonous, their counterparts in Africa emerged as a result of the European imperialists during the colonial period. As O. Nnoli (1986:36) put it, whereas in capitalist societies of Europe "the state was the classic state in the sense that it was the instrument of the capitalist class to maintain its domination over other classes", the states in Africa had two main tasks namely, the establishment of capitalist relations of production in such a manner as to guarantee super profits to the European

capitalists, particularly of the colonizing powers; and to subjugate the people of the colonies in such a way as to; make it easy and cheap for the European colonialists to exploit the human and material resources of the colonized. It is this twine task of the colonial state that underpins the character of both the colonial and the neo-colonial states in Africa. A fundamental aspect and indeed one consequence of this characterization of the colonial state in Africa, as noted in the last section, is its overdeveloped nature as it had to intervene more directly, more actively and much more extensively in the economic, social, cultural and political lives of the people than was the case in Europe at an equivalent historical epoch.

Moreover, and again unlike in Europe, in Africa the civil society closely associated with the institutions of state power and which supported and reinforced each other had not taken place. In other words, quite unlike in Europe where the capitalists captured social power prior to their capturing state power, in colonialAfrica the state was introduced in the midst of pre-capitalist social formation andrelations of production. Consequently, the foundation of the colonial state was very weak. It therefore had to depend on the metropolitan power in order to enable it maintain dominance over the colonized.people in order to carry out its other obligations, especially its imperialist functions. Thus, the colonial state was not only artificial but also fragile "not because its boundaries were not 'natural' in the sense of following the boundaries of pre-colonial societies but because its power depended on external forces" (Nnoli, 1986: 64-65).

The fragility of the state in Africa became very glaring in the period after flag independence. This is reflected in the relative ease and promptness with which African

leaders invite external assistance to deal with even routine matters of the state, including budgeting and monetary policies. By this time, the twine-tasks of the colonial state - a definite even if corrupt variety of capitalism as the dominant mode and relations of production and distribution - had been entrenched; while the generality of the people, especially the educated elite have been coerced, intimidated or manipulated into not only accepting but also internalizing capitalist values and norms of the erstwhile colonial powers. In addition, a complacent, client and pliable governing class have been nurtured and co-opted into the established order not only to ensure the safety of the statuesque but also to maintain the network of nexus established between the neo-colonial states and the metropolitan power-centres. It is this whole gamut of elements as outlined above that makes the conceptualization of state in the post-colonial Africa much more complex and difficult than that of its metropolitan counterpart.

A fundamental fact that must be pointed out in this ubiquitous concept known as the state, particularly its capitalist category is that the capitalist form of state found in Africa and most other Third World societies is different from their counterpart in developed capitalist societies of Western! Europe, North America and Japan, and that the conceptualization of the former is more complicated than that of the latter (B. Turok, 1980:45; A.B. Bridges, 1973; and E.Ekekwe, 1986).

This complexity arose mainly from the historical background of the states found in Africa and other underdeveloped societies, otherwise known as neo-colonial capitalist or peripheral capitalist states, especially the existence of pre-capitalist mode of production and the

intimacy between the economic and political spheres of states. Two distinguishing features have been noted between the states found in African societies and their counterparts in industrialized societies also known as metropolitan or core-capitalist states. These features are the underdeveloped nature of the former and their very low level of autonomy or total lack of it, as opposed to their core-capitalist counterparts in advanced capitalist societies (Hamza Alavi, 1972; John Saul, 1974; Colin Leys, 1978; and W. Ziemann and Lanzendorger, 1977).

Another problem in the conceptualization of states in Africa is the role the state plays in the rearguard battle between the national bourgeoisie and international capital for capital accumulation (E.Ekekwe, 1986; James Petras, 1977; and C.Ake, 1985). Due to their background; especially their lack of capital and complete ignorance of the whole gamut of capitalism, coupled with the metropolitan control of the economy of African states, sometimes by being directly in charge of production, the local or indigenous bourgeoisie often had no choice but to not only learn the system fast but also to rely heavily on the state for a foothold in the economy and find other ingenious methods of enhancing and protecting their position and interests (O.U. Nnadozie, 2004:42-45; and Basil Davidson, 1977). As it has been stated with particular reference to the African situation:

None of the new states had a capitalist system of their own. None of them possessed a capital-investing middle class. But their governing elites have no trouble in understanding the ways and wherefores of what is expected of them... which clearly was to grow into the dominant bourgeoisie, and as quickly as possible. There is one way for them to do that... this was accumulate by whatever

means there were at hand... small time has passed before the manipulation of public power for personal enrichment began to display an ingenuity that was often remarkable and that aspirants could warmly admire. But the vast majority of the people could not aspire and, came increasingly to dislike what they saw (Davidson, *ibid.*).

However, due to its low level of autonomy, the state is not capable of mediating effectively in this struggle. Rather it turns itself into an agent of the local bourgeoisie as observed above, but for which for various reasons including its very origin, the nature of production and the extremely underdeveloped nature of the productive forces in the societies, the state and the indigenous dominant class cannot successfully unite for long in the struggle. Due to the dependent nature of the neo-colonial African states on their metropolitan counterparts, vital policies and decisions of governance cannot be taken without reference to them or their institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and WTO. And this process only serves to further the grip of international capital on African states, thereby further deepening their dependent character on international capital and also worsening their fragility and helplessness at international arena. Sometimes, however, the local bourgeoisie could attempts to redefine the terms of its dependence and by so doing set conditions which enable its members to increase their accumulation of capital, such as the indigenization and import-substitution policies and programmes of some African states including Nigeria and others, in the seventies and early eighties. But whatever gains they make in the process are largely temporal and always at the expense of the exploited and subordinate class(es) in the societies (B. Onimode, 1981;

and H. Asobie, 1988).

Hence, although the neo-colonial African states may appear to be in the hands of the local ruling class or factions of it, this is only a charade as it cannot escape being dictated to by international capital. The African states which are at the periphery of international capitalist system may foster or frustrate the indigenous dominant class or faction(s) of it but short of putting the direct producers into power. Their servitude to their metropolitan masters is always dangling over their head (A.T. Gana, 1985). And while extracting concessions from their imperial mentors, the local ruling class always share with it an interest in maximizing the exploitation of the African workers and rural dwellers and peasants, the slogan of which include the need to maintain production, labour discipline and stability (J. Petras:13; and O.U. Nnadozie, 2001), The relation between the peripheral capitalist states in Africa or the indigenous capitalists is generally more agreeable than conflictual.

On the other hand, the relation between the African neo-colonial states and the subordinate classes is, as usual in capitalist societies, one of master-servant type. It is at best characterized by manipulations, stick and carrot and deceit, but more often than not by intimidation, repression and exploitation. And this kind of relationship is, to a large extent, characteristic of the relation between the African bourgeoisie or states and the metropolitan bourgeoisie or core-capitalist states. Therefore, though it could be said that the neo-colonial African states are agents of the local dominant class or faction(s) of it in the society being controlled and manipulated by its members, it is more appropriate

perhaps to state that they are primarily instruments of international capital. And as a scholar rightly observed, the "primary role of the [African] state is to establish, maintain, protect and expand the conditions of capitalist accumulation in general, without which neither foreign nor [African] capitalist can prosper"(Bjorn Beckman, 1982:45).

The situation in Africa is a vicious cycle, in which the domination and appropriation of the resources of African states by international capital and their agents breed poverty and underdevelopment and consequently powerlessness, all of which further push the African states and indeed the Third World countries to depend more and more on the advanced capitalist countries, particularly the Group of Eight - the wheel-dealers of world capitalism and globalism. The current world capitalist economy could therefore be described as a death trap in which the Third World countries, particularly Africa find it difficult, if not impossible, to extricate themselves. They are helpless and forced to remain within the system perhaps, not out of choice or happenstance but out of circumstances properly thought out and designed for them by the imperialist powers even before their emergence as flag sovereign states. It would appear, as it seems today, to be beyond their capability to change. Under this framework, globalization is simply the advanced form of neo-colonialism or the most current phase of imperialism, in which the remotest and remaining virgin areas of Third World countries, especially Africa are opened up and brought into closer contact with the world capitalist system and market (the intricacies and vagaries of which these poor and hapless African peoples and countries hardly understood) for adequate domination, exploitation and appropriation.

Under such a political economy, the activities of governments in Africa, including the formulation and execution of policies and programmes are often externally generated and directed. This is because not only are many African governments and leaders installed and protected by the metropolitan powers but it is from the metropolitan centres that the course, pace and direction of the whole gamut of vital government policies and programmes are determined. It is this mottle of international and local socio-economic and political forces and processes the nodal points of which are the fragility and non-consolidatedness of the African states, dependent and pliable dominant class, the underdeveloped nature of the productive forces in the society and the over-politicization and personalization of public and political offices and policy-making processes that condition and explain the activities of African governments and leaders.

GLOBALIZATION AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA

It is obvious from the discussion and analysis so far that the state is the most encompassing of the tripod concepts on which this paper is anchored. For instance, it is the character of the state that determines, ab initio, the nature of government in the society, and its roles, direction and pace in the globalization process. Indeed, it is very tempting here to agree with the state-centric approach which claims that the state is the underlying agency or power that nurture and propel globalization. However, it must be quickly added that the state is also affected, like in any phenomenon, by the globalization process. For instance, the traditional notion of the state as a sovereign entity is gradually being called to question as globalization speeds up population movement across national borders and perceptively erodes the ability of the government to control its citizens. Yet, the state still remains a

central player and indeed the foremost actor in both the national and international arena, not only in terms of the responsibility of its government to the citizens, but also with regard to its government ability to implement both national and international obligations, including rules and regulations that govern the production and distribution of goods and services.

Nevertheless, in spite of the centrality of the state in both national and international system, it is still doubtful whether it can, per se, execute these roles and obligations, as referred above, except through a body or an agency - the government - set up for that purpose. It is only through the government of the day that the state can actually execute its functions, obligations and commitments, whether at the local or international level. Taken in tandem with our earlier conceptualization of government, it becomes clear that government in any society represents the state at any point in time and through its activities, policies and programmes reflect the true image, values and interests of the state and therefore the dominant class in the society. It is in this wise that the various governments in most African societies find themselves complimenting each other not only in the globalization process but also in other capitalist and imperialist-induced policies and programmes introduced and implemented by them since the end of the colonial era.

It is perhaps germane at this juncture to stress that globalization, per se, is not bad. As already noted, it has helped and is still helping humanity to attend greater heights both socially and economically. Nobody can fault the advancement and benefits it has bequeathed to humanity. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is the absurdity with which the benefits and problems of globalization are shared; for while some parts of the world and, groups of human race are more or less anchoring and monopolizing the benefits, others are

generally afflicted by its ills. It is in this regard that the criticism of globalization as a socio-economic and political phenomenon based in this paper - a socio-economic movement which is supposed to be of immense benefits to humanity had been circumvented by imperialism and international capital into a blessing for some people and countries and a calamity or curse for others. It is in this context that the former Secretary-General of the United Nations Organizations (U.N.O.) Boutros-Ghali (1996:3) characterized globalization as failing to reach all people in a positive way. He noted that too many people in the Third World countries are excluded and are unable to access the prosperity which globalization offers (UNCTAD). While Western Europe, North America and Japan are luxuriating in the abundant benefits of the new global socio-economic order, the countries of the Third World, especially Africa, are deeply unmeshed in socio-economic and political crises and dilemma arising from the globalization process.

But how did Africa find itself in this kind of predicament, and what part have her leaders and governments played and are still playing to ameliorate or worsen the problems? Though the greater part of these questions especially the former have been addressed in the discussion .and analysis so far, it is still necessary to explicate the roles which African leaders and governments play, especially in the globalization process. As noted earlier, the roles and functions which African governments and leaders play today in the globalization process and the structures and processes employed were initiated and prepared for them during the colonial period. Infact, some of African leaders and governments, or at least their predecessors, participated directly in the initiation and creation of the institutions and processes with which African governments and leaders operate today. These

include the military establishment, the police, courts, the civil service and parliament, among others, some of which have only undergone, at best, little or superficial changes even today.

Unlike the former type (the colonial system), which was maintained essentially by military force, the current neo-colonialism, which is characterized by foreign investment and asymmetrical trade, is maintained through a more sophisticated admixture of socio-cultural, economic, political, and technological and ideological manipulation, intimidation and domination (I. Galtung, 1971). Structurally, it is characterized by what D. Nabudere (1978) described as multilateral "imperialism". This is a system in which every imperialist power cooperate with each other to dominate and plunder the resources of Third World societies, instead of each of them carving out a sphere of influence for itself as was the case during the colonial period. Under this system, global capitalist institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F.), the International Bank for Reconstruction (IBRD), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO), among others, are established ostensibly to advance loans and other socio-economic assistance and credit facilities to member states (which include both the industrialized and underdeveloped countries), but primarily to co-ordinate and harmonize the competitive and contradictory economic and monetary policies and programmes of imperialist powers, particularly the Group of Eight (G.8). It is these global capitalist organizations backed by western powers especially the U.S.A. that provides the structural framework for multilateral imperialism to thrive and flourish. Under this imperialist framework, globalization is geared towards a global trading

system, multilateral trade liberalization in government policies and programmes. Thus understood, the globalization process is directed at the removal of obstacles in terms of policies and programmes which impede the movement of goods and services across national as well as regional boundaries (Oman, 1994). Within this international capitalist framework, African governments and leaders and indeed other Third World governments and leaders are allowed easy access not only to these international finance institutions but also to the governments and leaders of the industrialized capitalist powers. This strategy is done to achieve two main objectives. The first is to ensure that the states and members of the dominant class or faction(s) of the former are permanently tied to and kept within the ambit of the global capitalist political economy. The second is to ensure that the latter keep a close and watchful eye over the activities, including policies and programmes, of the former. This also accounts for the current practice by the Group of Eight (G.8) to occasionally invite a select-group of African leaders and heads of governments to attend their annual meetings, definitely not as participants or equals but as supposedly interested observers. The practice is intended to enable the African leaders and heads of governments to have a (false) sense of belonging to the top echelon of world leaders - the wheeler-dealers of global capitalist system.

Back at home, that is, within the African countries the essence of governance is essentially reduced to the twine task of serving and protecting the interests of the members of the local governing class and those of their foreign or international mentors, with the latter, as usual in dependent capitalist states, having the upper hand and consequently dictating the tune. Every policy, programme and project that is initiated and pursued is

primarily designed to satisfy the interests of international capital. This process is achieved through a network of means and strategies that complement each other. One of these methods and indeed a fundamental strategy which dates back to the pre-independent period is to ensure that the 'right' and 'acceptable' individuals and groups always emerged as heads or leaders of African governments. This is achieved through a variety of means, including sponsorship of candidates to the highest office in the land and the manipulation of elections in favour of chosen candidates. A good example in this regard include Nigeria where the British did everything possible to ensure that an acceptable and a trusted political party - the Northern Peoples' Congress (N.P.C.) and its candidate (Alhaji Tafawa Belewa) emerged to head the government at the end of formal colonial rule in 1960. Where an unacceptable African leader or group for whatever reason(s) emerges, particularly through military coups d'etat, every effort is made to effect a change in that leadership or government., including the use of unconstitutional methods. This process, the variety of which has been affected in Asia and Latin American countries such as Cuba among others, has been employed in many African states including Burkina Fossa (which resulted in the elimination of Thomas Sankara), Guinea Bissau, Libya (which failed to eliminate Mamma Kaddafi), the Democratic Republic of Congo (that led to the elimination of Patrick Lumumba), and a host of others. Once a pliable and subservient leadership is assured in a particular African state, every other thing falls in place as the Western powers follow it up with other complimentary strategies.

One of these complimentary strategies is to ensure that African professionals trained in western institutions and groomed in the philosophy of Bretton institutions (World Bank

and IMF) are appointed or seconded to head strategic institutions and organs of government in African countries. Such organs of government include finance ministries, Central Banks, security organs and petroleum resources ministries (for the OPEC countries of Africa), among others. The next thing is to get them to initiate and adhere strictly to the implementation of policies and programmes designed by the aforementioned Bretton institutions including the World Trade Organization, among others, so as to guarantee the philosophy of 'open' or 'market economy' in the respective African states. This is done even when such policies and programmes are causing hardship and pauperizing the populace leading often to riots, strikes and civil disobedience, especially by African workers and civil society groups. Examples in this regard include the import-substitution and indigenization policies, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the commercialization and privatization programmes, deregulation of the down-stream sector of the petroleum resources of member states of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the current Africa's so-called response to the globalization process - the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD).

Those who criticize NEPAD (see Adedeji, Nabudere, Mafeje, Olukoshi and Mkandawire, among others, in Nyong'o, et. al., 2002) insist, for instance, that there is nothing new in the programme; but more importantly, that NEPAD is unsustainable, as it is neither determined by the African people nor directed to their needs and problems. It is in this context that A. Adedeji metaphorically described the major objective of NEPAD as the strengthening of the grip of imperialism on the African continent 'by tying the African canoe firmly to the West's neo-liberal ship on the waters of globalization' (cited in

LG.Shivji, 2005:14). And if one may borrow Shivji's metaphor, it may as well be added that international capital is providing the rope painted in the colour of African development. Again, the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros-Ghali (1996:3) has rightly observed that the market economy which is the engine of the globalization process is, by its logic, driving large numbers of people particularly in the underdeveloped countries, into deeper poverty and despair. Certainly, Africa is the most vulnerable continent in this regard.

Globalization under the current international political economy is certainly hurting rather than helping African states and economies. This is because under the current state of their underdeveloped and disjointed economies, African states are not capable of participating positively and meaningfully in the globalization process and cannot derive any enduring and meaningful benefit from the process. As Calhoun, et. al. (1997) pointed out, though globalization has knit the world more closely together in some respects, it has also divided not only the population of many countries into winners and losers, but also divided the continents and "regions of the world into winners and sad losers", (cited in D.A.Offiong, 2001:3). African states are the worst hit among the losers. Under the globalization process, multinationals - key agents of globalization - operating in Africa make super-profits not through greater efficiency but by putting countries and people against one another in a 'race to the bottom'(Ibid.).

Under the garb of operating 'market economy' and goaded by I.M.F. and the World Bank to attract foreign (mainly Western) investors into their countries, African states throw their economies open to shylock-oriented multinationals by offering them mouth-watering

facilities including cheap labour, low taxation and the least regulation of their operations. It needs to be stressed at this juncture, as Offiong (2001:237) reminded us, that though the World Bank and the I.M.F.

parade themselves as development agencies, they are first and foremost financial capitalist institutions lending out money to make profit. It is therefore very doubtful if any of these institutions would finance any project or programme that is not going to yield them some profit. And if profit motive is the driving force of capitalism we need not be reminded that profit maximization remains the *raison d'etre* of any businessman or institution. Though individual African economies may occasionally show signs of expansion, this is only temporal and at great cost of falling standards of living among their people in the long run. As Offiong (2001:3) put it:

In the poor and weak countries of Africa the multinationals dictate the conditions and terms under which they want to invest. If the host country insist on too many limits on which business can do (including export profits), they can quite easily take their investment elsewhere. Capital is the wealth supporting business and can and does flow rather rapidly across national borders. This appears to be -the experience that African countries -witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s and particularly in the early 1990s . . .

Yet, there are still other ways which African governments and leaders employ to ingratiate themselves with the western powers - the powers behind globalization. One is the invitation usually extended to them to serve as advisers and consultants to African

governments and government institutions and agencies. These perhaps account for the ubiquity of the nationals of imperialist countries notably the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Japan, etc. in African seats of power including key institutions of government, such as financial institutions and finance ministries, and security and military establishments. Another strategy involves entering into business partnership or signing so-called bilateral agreements with multinational companies and firms often as technical (usually senior) partners. Under this method, African governments sign all kinds of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with foreign companies and international finance institutions usually in the lucrative sectors of the economy, the terms of which are usually always lopsided in favour of the multinational firms and international organizations involved. A typical example in this regard is the MOU signed in the late 2004 between the Federal Government of Nigeria and Virgin Atlantic of Britain to take over the operations and management of the Nigerian national carrier - the Nigerian Airways - under a new name, Virgin Nigeria. Under this agreement, Virgin Atlantic would monopolize the lucrative routes of the Nigerian Airways, including New York, London, Jeddah, Dubai and Johannesburg for seven years in the first instance. This agreement, which has long become operational, has been characterized as "selling away the birthright of Nigerians for a mesh of porridge" by the Nigerian government (O. Ayorinde, 2005; and D. Oyewale, 2005). Similar agreements dot not only the socio-economic and political landscape of Nigeria but indeed many African countries, especially in the most juicy and lucrative sectors of their economies including the oil, banking and telecommunication industries.

In the process of implementing these policies and programmes, the African

governments and leaders place their members and cohorts strategically so as to ensure that the fallouts from the in the name of gains and benefits to the economy accrue primarily to them, while at the same time pauperizing the generality of the population. These policies and programmes therefore essentially serve as instruments through which the members of the dominant class in Africa or faction(s) of it build up and consolidate their economic power and through this further strengthen their grip on the state. In the final analysis, the policies and programmes serve dual purposes, beside the original and main goal of ensuring a firmer grip on the African economy by the metropolitan powers. On the one hand, they enable the members of the local governing class to consolidate their domination of the society. On the other hand, these externally generated and foreign-controlled and directed policies and programmes further impoverish the already dehumanized and forlorn African masses.

The increase in the blatant manipulation of public offices for personal aggrandizement resulted to what B. Davidson (1977), as noted earlier, described as "an ingenuity that was often remarkably" but which "the vast majority of the people would not aspire and came increasingly to dislike..." Consequently, the hope and expectation which the African people had placed on the ability of their leaders and governments to generate appropriate policies and programmes capable of bringing succour and relief to their problems and plight began to give way to despair and disillusion; while the dividends of independence and happiness which the people expected from these policies and programmes began to give way to suspicion and disbelief. The members of the African ruling elite came to regard the state and its organs as instruments of their will. They

privatized them including the processes of governance and exploited them for their personal gains, as well as used them oppressively to absolutize their power (C. Ake, 1994:7). Thus, distrust if not hatred set in among the people towards their government and leaders. Every change of government brings about an increase in corruption among political leaders and government functionaries, particularly the embezzlement of public funds.

Governance becomes synonymous with self-enrichment of a few who control the instruments of the state. The result has been a marked division of the society into the 'haves' and the 'have-nots', with the former (a very minority) living in undeserved affluence and stupendous wealth, while the rest starve and live in abject poverty and indignity. One inhumane government or rather dictatorship (irrespective of civilian or military) gives way to a worse one. The generality of the people who are ignorant of the system appear overwhelmed by what is going on, especially the behavior of their leaders, and seem to have taken a passive, if not supine attitude to the whole issue of governance; while most of the articulate and knowledgeable ones among them would appear to have adopted the posture of 'sidonlook' (O.U. Nnadozie, 2004) or 'who will bail the cat'.

The situation is no doubt partly traceable to the forces of globalization currently sweeping through the continent, and which as Boutros-Ghali (1996) stated, can and do cause a state, particularly poor ones to "fail, leaving its people without government to protect them...." Though, in theory, governments do exist in Africa, in practice the governments (which -are supposed to work for the interests and dignity of their

people) connive and collude with the forces of globalization to exploit and dehumanize their citizenry. Under the current dispensation in Africa, therefore, politics and governance have become a ding-dung affair, reduced as it were, to primitive accumulation and thus the survival of political occupants and their perpetuation in office at all cost - metamorphosing into the trend in Africa known as the sit-tight syndrome.

In the process, African leaders and governments become increasingly insecure and consequently strengthen the coercive instruments of the state, especially the security apparatuses around them/They are further isolated and consequently alienated from the people and are increasingly becoming unpopular. And in the process of manipulating political and public offices for the security and survival of incumbents, governance and government institutions and processes become increasingly personalized. Retention of public or political offices and promotion has come to depend more on the assumed loyalty of the individual to the leader. This, consequently, has affected the key organs of the state including the army, the police, and bureaucracy, which are weakened, further worsening the fragility and unconsolidatedness of the state. In the event, public servants and career officials become cynical and demoralized and spend most of their time and energy on chasing promotions and spoils of office (Nnoli, 1986), rather than the initiation and implementation of people-oriented policies and programmes for good governance. It is therefore not surprising that decades after independence, as C. Ake (1994) noted, states in Africa far from being reassuring presence have remained threats to everybody except a few who control or have access to them.

As African governments and leaders become more isolated from their people and therefore increasingly insecure, they depend more on their metropolitan mentors for survival. The result is a further tightening of the noose on the necks of African governments and leaders by the western powers, as they exert more pressure on them to, on the one hand, abandon indigenously-engineered and pro-people policies and programmes, while on the other, to embrace western-directed and anti-people policies and programmes in order to win more support and confidence. This was the fate of the Lagos Plan of Action, which though pro-Africa in both content and direction was shamefully abandoned by African heads of governments because of lack of endorsement and support by their imperialist masters (C.Ake, 2001:18-41; and I.G.Shivji, 2005:5). As governments and leaders in Africa yield more and more to these pressures and promptings, the gap between them and their people, especially the civil-society groups continually widens.

The result is the unavoidable fragility of the states in Africa, which further deepens and entrenches their dependence on the metropolitan powers. In the circumstances, African governments and leaders become more pliable and readily and easily dance to the tunes, whims and caprices of international capital as they literally cede their states and economies to the forces of globalization and the so-called market forces. It therefore needs to be emphasized that this trend must either be reversed or continued at the peril of African future and destiny. In order for Africa to avoid bleak prospects in the 21st century, its leaders and governments must take its destiny in their hands.

For a start, two fundamental things must be done. In the first place, African

governments and leaders must look inwards and co-ordinate their policies and programmes in collaboration with the countries and regions of the South with similar and identical problems and needs. As Martin Knor (2005:101) rightly stated, "Greater collaboration among regional institutions of the South (for example, ASEAN, SARC, SADC, Mercosur, Caricon, [ECOWAS], etc.), especially in sharing of information and coordination of policies and positions, would be beneficial". This is the approach which Africa and the rest of the South must not shy away from, as it would not only enable them to widen their horizon and broaden their policy options, but also strengthen their bargaining power and speak with one voice at international fora. Secondly, African government, and leaders must work towards the establishment of a much more favourable and friendly international environment, starting with the democratization of international relations and institutions. This would enable African countries, and indeed the countries of the South to take an active role in the decision-making processes of such bodies as the UN and its agencies, the World Bank, IMF, WTO, among others, which should also be made more accountable to the public and the local communities. As the most universal and democratic forum, the UN and its organs should be strengthened and given the chance and resources to maintain their identity, perform the duties and have their approach and development focus reaffirmed (Khor: 100-104).

Meanwhile, African states and leaders need to focus their attention and energy towards the development of socio-economic infrastructural facilities and policies geared towards clean and friendly environmental practices. This is a sine-qua-non to their participation in the globalization process. However, for this to happen, there is the urgent

need for the democratization of their governmental processes and institutions. Iripict, African leaders have no choice over the issue, as their economies lack the necessary wherewithal namely, sophisticated technology, highly skilled manpower, competitiveness and a viable physical and institutional infrastructure, among other things, to partake meaningfully in the globalization process and be integrated into international political economy.

The current attempt to incorporate African states into the global economic system through coercion, intimidation or bribing of their governments and leaders is not only very premature but also disadvantageous to her peoples and economies. If Africa must therefore join the current global political economy, she must be allowed to do so at her own pace and terms and at the behest and dictates of African needs and interests.

CONCLUSION

Let us begin this conclusion by making a few observations. The first is that is not realistic to assert, as the agents and apologists of international capital would want us to believe, that both the industrialized capitalist countries and Third World states "share a common destiny" (Offiong, 2001:245). This is a propaganda usually peddled by Western powers and their agents and which, as earlier noted, is meant to give a false sense of belonging and brotherhood to the African and other Third World leaders, governments and states. The leaders and governments of the industrialized capitalist world in their sober and quiet moments do not believe in this notion; nor is there any evidence, either in their socio-economic policies or in their cultural and political programmes to convince anybody but their agents and 'apologists otherwise. It would

therefore be naive for an- discerning mind to fall for such a cheap propaganda.

Secondly, though there is no doubting the fact that solutions to the twine, daunting and demoralizing problems of mass poverty and debt burden require a collective or continental approach, as acknowledged by many scholars and policy-makers, the approach is still fraught with many problems in its implementation. For instance, it is generally known that any attempt by Africa or Third World countries to forge a united front in order to confront their common problems, either at the regional, continental or global/south-south level has been met with outright hostility by western powers and creditor-nations. This is because of their awareness of the power such a collective approach would muster. Therefore, any product of such an approach would be sabotaged by Western powers. A good example here is the Lagos Plan of Action which, as already noted, never bore any fruits due to lack of support and indeed hostility by Western powers. Moreover, on the issue of debt, it is a common knowledge that the western creditors have always insisted on a case-by-case approach, which greatly weakens the negotiating power of individual debtor states. Furthermore, most Africa leaders and heads of government have been propped up or sponsored and backed by western powers or their agents in their political or professional careers. Consequently, the hands of most of them are, ab initio, tied and therefore in a disadvantageous position to bargain with the creditor countries and agencies. The critical question now is what is to be done (B.Turok, 1987)? Two possible scenarios or courses of action can be sketched, one of which must invariably be pursued. One is to assume that the current plague, as it were, in which Africa is bedeviled is incurable, and therefore terminal. In

this case, the situation can only be managed until African countries are formally ceded to and declared adjuncts of Western powers, similar to the event of 1884/85 in Berlin, which led to the partition of Africa among the European powers and its eventual colonization by them. The alternative is to assume that in spite of the daunting and seemingly insurmountable nature of the current situation, Africa can still be rescued from the debacle. If the latter option is opted for, as the result of the former is better imagined than experienced, it becomes imperative to reiterate the underlying problem facing Africa today, which is the issue of governance and leadership. Before any head start can be made in the development process of Africa, governance must be premised on empowering the people to take their destiny into their own hands. And the current crop of African leaders who are both the products and beneficiaries of the current political economy, as shown in this paper, are the least placed to do this,

This is the minimum on which the struggle to overcome African dependency and underdevelopment and liberate her from the shackles of imperialism and forces of the current globalization process can be anchored. This is the second phase of the struggle, which started during the colonial period but got stalled shortly before and after independence in different parts of Africa. Tactically, the struggle to enthrone this kind of government needs to be nationally based (B. Turok: 163), though its continental and indeed international dimension must constantly be borne in mind. This is because each African country has its own peculiar and specific socio-cultural characteristics and historical antecedents which must be understood and properly harnessed for the success of the struggle. It also takes into cognizance the character and depth of state repression in each African country.

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