

## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 Background to the Study

Defence Strategy reflects a combination of the development, deployment and use of armed forces to achieve national objectives of defence and security of national interests, aims and objectives of a state (Onyemaechi, 2000:15). National security is a concept employed by the military in the defence of a nation. This concept is primarily concerned with the preservation of sovereignty and the independence of nation-states. National security is closely related to, often equated and juxtaposed with, and in fact has evolved from the idea of national interest (Omede, 2012:294).

According to McGrew (1988:101), the security of a nation is predicated on two central pillars. One hand, it entails the maintenance and protection of the socio-economic order in the face of internal and external threats. On the other hand, it entails the promotion of a preferred international order, which minimizes the threat to core values and interests, as well as to the domestic order.

In Nigeria, this onerous task of keeping the country one rests with the Nigerian military which comprises of the three services: The Army, Navy, and Air force, all under the ministry of defence (MOD) through their respective services. Others include the Para-military services such as Office of the National Security Adviser, Ministry of Police Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Police formations and command, and Police service Commissions, having their respective agencies and departments. These arrangements have evolved from series of reorganizations from colonial times in size, strength and scope of activities,(Anyanwu, Egwaikhide and Aiyedogbon,2012:93). With a total Strength of eighty thousand (80,000), with no official reserve, The Nigerian Armed Forces has over the years, acquired

considerable stock of weapons of offense and defence, and has been engaged in series of military exercises aimed at boosting the combat readiness and war preparedness of its officers and men.

The defence thrust concisely includes; the Protection of Nigerian territory, Peacekeeping in the West-African sub-region and Africa as a whole; Assisting the civil authority to sustain democracy and contribution towards peace (1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Section 217).

Although the main functions of the military is to protect the nation against external aggression or threats, occasionally the military may be required to assist the civil authorities to deal with internal violence and suppress internal tension. For instance, the military may be required to assist the police in restoring law and order in any part of the country. Section 217 (c) 1999 constitution forms the basis of involvement of the military in internal security operations in Nigeria. It provides thus in relation to the functions of the military in Nigeria: “suppressing insurrection and acting in aid of civil authorities to restore order when called upon to do so by the President but subject to such conditions as may be prescribed by an Act of National Assembly”.

Section 8(1) of the Armed Forces Act provides that the President shall determine the operational use of the Armed Forces. Operational use is further defined thus:

“In this section, “operational use of the armed forces” includes the operational use of the armed forces in Nigeria for the purpose of maintaining and securing public safety and public order”. The security challenges witnessed in the country have called for more of military intervention in the form of internal security operations and it has been observed that the military is increasingly involved in internal security operations (Okoli, A. & Orinya, S. 2013:21).

To accomplish these objectives, the Federal government through the annual budget, allocates funds for the Nigerian Defence, which is usually the bulk of the federal Government budgetary provision especially after the Nigerian civil war (Akpa, 1997:25)

The thirty months Nigerian civil war (1967-1970 )and extended periods of military rule created conditions that sustained the military's rising claims on national resources. There were few opponents of defence spending, given increasing national security challenges and Nigeria's self-image as regional leader and power broker. The main reason for the sharp rise in defence spending in the 1970s was the large post war military establishment and the associated costs of foreign arms procurement, military housing construction, substantial salary increases, expansion of the officer corps, and the retirements and self-promotions after the 1975 military coup ([www.Nigdemographfactoranddefencebudget](http://www.Nigdemographfactoranddefencebudget) retrieved on 30/12/14).

Defence spending as a percentage of total federal spending surged from about 6 percent before the war to 43 percent in the last year of the conflict. it fell to 10.3 percent in 1974 and increased to 11.99 percent in 1975. However, it declined to about 11.21 percent in 1976, soared again to 14.69 in 1977. Ten years later it fell to 9.79 percent, 2.45 percent in 1992, peaked at 9.10 in 2002, 7.23 and 7.74 percent in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Defence spending in 1988 and 1989 was about N1.3 billion and N1.7 billion, but high inflation reduced its real value by at least 30 percent. Capital expenditure nominally trebled, from N256.6 million in 1986 and 1987 to N750 million in 1988 and 1989. This increase reflected new investments in equipment, construction, and other long-term capital improvements, although at levels substantially lower than in the early 1980s. The N2.1 billion defence budget for 1990, however, represented a real growth of 16 percent over 1989. ([www.Nigdemographfactoranddefencebudget](http://www.Nigdemographfactoranddefencebudget) retrieved on 30/12/14).

In the years preceding the Fourth republic, Abacha/Shonekan/Abdulsalam (1993-1999) regime expended 24.10 percent on capital military expenditure(milex) and 75.9 percent on recurrent milex and in the Fourth republic, the civilian administration of Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) for a period of 8 years, spent 17.44 percent of her total milex on capital milex and 82.56 percent on recurrent milex, while Yar'adua/Jonathan (2008-2010) had so far spent 34.67 percent on capital milex and 65.33 percent on recurrent(Anyanwu, Ekwaikhide and Aiyedogbon 2012:98). Jonathan administration (2011-2014) spent N314 billion in 2011, N326 billion in 2012, N364 billion in 2013 and N340 billion in 2014(Statisense, 2015:5).

As in most Third World states, Nigeria's military spending was dedicated largely to recurrent costs of salaries, allowances, training, and other personnel-related overhead expenses. Such operating costs ranged from 55 to 88 percent of the defence budget almost every year since independence. The Capital expenditure, always less, is also lopsided as its allocation of resources favours buildings and other civil engineering projects against the equipment of the armed forces towards professionalism such as Developing the Defence Industry Corporation of Nigeria(DICON) to be more responsive to military materiel needs (Imobighe,1981:26).

Nigeria's first attempt at domestic production in the defence sector started with the establishment of the Defence Industries Corporation(DIC) by a 1964 Act of Parliament. In itself a purposeful blueprint by first republic politicians, it was actually the threat of the civil war in 1966 and the disappointment of traditional arms suppliers which rushed the blueprint from the deliberations of decision makers to the production lines of the Ordnance Factory in Kaduna, Northern Nigeria." Initially designed to produce small arms and ammunition, it started with assembling the Beretta small arms range, the rifle and 9mm sub-machine guns. Its attempt to manufacture 9mm Pistols and the 12 bore double barrel short gun marked its 'end'. This relatively impressive start which peaked during the civil war was reduced to near

complete inactivity shortly after the war ended (Fayemi, 1994: 266), until recently when President Goodluck Jonathan commissioned DICON's tactical ballistic (bullet proof) vest factory complex, a joint-venture undertaking with the Israeli firm, Maron-Dolphin to produce ancillary military wares, in order to position DICON into spearheading a Military Industrial Complex(MIC) 48 years after its establishment that will Incorporate the manufacturing base of the economy and enhance massive employment creation for the youths (Osazuwa, 2013).

Despite huge spending on defence and national security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives and properties continues unabated in different regions of the country. In the late 1970's to the present, there has been a persistent outbreak of ethno-religious violent attacks across the country. Notable among these are: the Maitasine riots of 1978 (Kaduna) and the same Maitasine uprisings of 1980, 1981 and 1984 in Kano, Yola and Maiduguri; The Musa Mankini riots in Kano in the 1980's, the 1999 and 2000 Kaduna sectarian riots, the September 2001 Jos riots, the October 2001 riots in Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states, the 2002/2003 Tarok farmers versus Fulani herdsmen riots in Jos, the 2004 Telwa Christians/ethnic Tarok versus ethnic Muslim Hausas in Central Plateau state, the 2004 Christian attacks on Muslims and the April 2005 riots in Jos, the Boko Haram uprising of 2009 and the recent Hausa Fulani versus indigene Christians sectarian massacre in March 2010 at Dogo Nahawa South of Jos (Okechukwu and Anyadike, 2013:1-2). Also, the activities of nefarious groups (ethnic militias) that ascended since the enthronement of civilian rule in 1999 has also heightened insecurity cases in Nigeria like kidnapping in the South- East geopolitical zone, politically motivated killings by unscrupulous groups, ethno-religious uprisings in Jos, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, as well as the incessant and often coordinated bombings in some terrorism infested states of Northern Nigeria by Boko Haram (Nwangwu and Ononogbu, 2014:130).

Thus, it has been so far established that national security in defence strategic terms entails more than just annual budgetary allocation to national defence sector or militarizing the Nigerian state. In so far as national security is national development and the national defence sector protect national security, they should also contribute to this development particularly in socio-economic terms rather than solely depending on it. Consequently, the study will focus on an analysis of defence strategies and its impact on national security in Nigeria.

## **1.2 Statement of the problem**

Security or National security in Nigeria as this paper intends to study is a condition that every sovereign state pursues without reservation. As it is evident from time antiquity that conflict or threat to life and property is inevitable in every human society, it becomes a priority of every state to guarantee the safety of her citizenry, their property and her territory at large.

National security in Nigeria has been in a quagmire over the years due to many factors ranging from defence budget borne out of routine rather than a proper articulation of defence and security needs, administrative bottlenecks, corruption, Lack of indigenous arms industry, lack of coherent defence policy and to mention but a few. The spillover effect of these inadequacies has made life difficult for the citizens as security is a condition that affects all aspect of life ranging from the economic, social, political, to the religious aspect. The inability of the Nigerian state to ensure security in the country has predisposed her to some challenges such as Sectarian insurgency(Boko Haram), militant uprising(MEND),regional policing(OPC and MASSOB) etc.

Even with the enactment of the National Defence policy draft in 2006 which is a short term policy framework for defence that analyses the risks and challenges facing the Nigerian military and the scenarios for the deployment of forces, which specifies the management and organization of the armed forces alongside various aspects of resource support such as defence infrastructure, research and development, defence budget and reform signposts in the armed forces, the import of civil-military and media relations in peace and war times, it is evident that the defence strategies embarked upon thereafter has been counterproductive.

It is against this backdrop that this paper chooses to analyse the security situation in Nigeria having the following research questions in mind;

- 1 Does the budgetary allocation to National defence sector guarantee internal security in Nigeria between 2008 and 2017?
- 2 Does the establishment of Military Industrial Complex lead to an increase in economic security in Nigeria between 2008 and 2017?

### **1.3 Objective of the Study**

National Security entails a condition in which citizens of a country enjoy a free, peaceful and safe environment and have access to resources that will enable them to enjoy the necessities of life; thus, the security of a state directly translates to its ability to protect its citizens from external threats. It also facilitates individuals and groups in carrying out their legitimate businesses without significant undue hindrance and these cannot be properly achieved without planning and laying strategies on the part of Government.

This study is therefore divided into two objectives;

The first is the broad objective that is to evaluate defence strategies and national security In Nigeria between 2008 and 2017, while the second is the specific objectives which are;

To attempt to carry out a surgical analysis of Nigeria's defence budgets with the aim of putting these budgets in their true geopolitical as well as internal security perspectives

To take critical look at Nigeria's Military Industrial Complex with a view to proffering some suggestions as to how to accelerate the pace of the nation's self-sufficiency in high tech defence production that will create massive employment for the civilians in the long-run

#### **1.4 Significance of the Study**

Defence Strategies and National Security is not novel in study range but as opined by Anyanwu, Egwaikhide and Aiyedogbon, (2012:98), the Nigerian Military Sector, which is responsible for defence is the most understudied aspect of the Nigerian economy. National Security literature tends to emphasize the importance of external security in terms of regional and interstate threats and dwells on the inevitability of systemic forces to the detriment of internal sources of threat, (Fayemi, 1994: 23). For instance, The Nigerian military has engaged in peacekeeping operations in foreign countries on a number of occasions and has been commended for its noble conduct during those occasions. Sierra Leone, Mali and Liberia are very good examples. It is wondered why this is not the case when internal security operations are concerned. The problem of high handedness and insensitivity to the nature and characteristics of civilian dominated areas are always pointed as a flaw to internal security. A number of features are associated with the military engagement in internal security operations most of which are negative.

This study is therefore motivated by the strong desire to highlight the paths yet to be followed by the Nigerian Government and defence sector in curbing internal insecurity to the barest minimum.



Theoretically, this study is to provide the framework for analysis of the factors militating against the failure of Nigeria's defence strategies in solving national security challenges.

Practically, this study aims at providing solutions to the Government and national defence sector in Nigeria on ways to quell insecurity and set Nigeria on the glorious path of rapid socio-economic development.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

Among all the features of the state as espoused by liberal scholarship, "Sovereignty" which means the monopoly over the legitimate use of force by the state to protect her territory both from external aggression or internal uprising remains the most pervasive hence, the concept of security or national security. Based on this background, this chapter of this work is therefore concerned with reviewing extant literature regarding Nigeria's security strategies or responses towards ensuring national security, with emphasis on her budgetary allocation to defense agencies on the one hand and establishment of local defense industries or military industrial complex on the other hand.

Consequent upon this, the bulk of the literature that shall be reviewed will be done having the following points in mind;

- Budgetary allocation to Nigeria defense sector and internal security in Nigeria
- Establishment of military industrial complex and economic security in Nigeria

For this review to be able to establish a clear nexus between budgetary allocation to defense agencies and the development of local defense industries vis-a-vis how they implicate on national security, it is pertinent to review the meaning of the concept of security or national security.

### **Understanding security and national security**

The term security has been used to mean protection against or safety from a future risk of severe deprivation, injury or death and requires rules, order and impartial adjudication and application. Security according to Achumba, Ighomereho & Akpo-Robaro (2013) refers to

a situation that exists as a result of the establishment of measure for the protecting of persons, information and property against hostile persons, influences and actions. It is the existence of conditions within which people in a society can go about their normal daily activities without any threat to their lives or properties. It embraces all measures designed to protect and safeguard the citizenry and the resources of individuals, groups, businesses and the nation against sabotage or violent occurrence (Achumbo et al, 2013).

Security is the protection against all forms of harm whether physical, economic or psychological. It is however argued that security may not be absence of threats or security issues but the ability to rise to the challenges posed by threats with expediency and expertise.

Security cannot therefore exist without provision for national security. Aggressive and repressive states can be major sources of human insecurity and a greater source of human suffering. According to Robert-Okay (2013), National security on the other hand is concerned about those “governmental institutions that seek to ensure the physical protection and safety of their citizens, their equal access to the law and protection of from abuse”. There are two sets of government systems and institutions concerned with national security. The first component consists of the traditional instruments of national security, namely: the criminal justice system (police, justice and correctional services/prisons) the military and the intelligence community. The second and more important, relates to the nature of governance, its institutions and rules, norms and values that underpin it – as well as the efficacy thereof (Thamos, 2008)

In the words of Atoyebi, (2003), “National security refers to the absence of threats to core values and the prevention of public disorders”. He further explains that Security could be seen at two levels, namely;

the state and individual. Individual security has to do with core values such as job security, social security, and security against national disaster whereas at the state level, security connotes the safeguard of the territorial integrity of the state against internal and external aggressors (Atoyebi, 2003).

Thamos (2008) noted that national security is to feel safe, which safety should stand guaranteed by the political dispense in such a way that wars may be less likely and the normal conditions among states may prevail. National security also envisages preparations for all sorts of defense which may appear as preparedness for war. Nweze (2004) conceptualized national security as the preservation, protection and the guarantee of the safety of life, property, wealth of the citizenry and measures to guard against threats to national sovereignty. It equally implies freedom from danger to life and property and people

to pursue legitimate interest within the society (Bassey, 2004). To corroborate the above views on national security and more or less giving it a summary like definition, the radical approach to national security as championed by the neo-Marxist scholars like Okwudiba Nnoli, Esko Toyo, Assisi Asobie, Claude Ake, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Ogban Ogban-Iyam, amongst others relates national security to the satisfaction of basic human needs. These needs include the provision of social services (food, shelter, education, health), the right to a sustainable environment, the protection of cultural and religious identity, and so on.

It is pertinent to note at this point that the scholarly views to the concepts of security and national security as espoused above are not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. All the views above tilts towards one direction of seeing security and national security as an ends or given conditions instead of a means through which stability and peace could be ensured.

Consequent upon these vagaries, we shall give little attention to security situation in Nigeria over the year that has prompted the increase in government financial and industrial strategic expenditure towards ensuring security in the country within the period under study.

## **SECURITY CHALLENGES CONFRONTING NIGERIA STATE**

Nigeria over the years has been faced with severe security challenges. Some of the security challenges are discussed thus:

### **Kidnapping and Hostage Taking**

This commenced in the South-south region of Nigeria and it had cut across Niger-Delta states. Kidnapping and hostage taking are notorious act in Oil rich Niger Delta. Agu and Nwajiri (2012;6) in Oluwafemi et al,(2014) argues that it has been used to address wanton

neglect of their communities by successive government. This is why Nwankwo (2012) in Oluwafemi et al,(2014) also observe, that for South-East, kidnapping and hostage taking are now tools for settling personal and political scores. Youths in the region utilized the tools to make huge amount of money as they call the families of their victims to pay millions of naira for ransom. Politicians equally use it to deal with their opponents and perceived enemies leaving citizens in fear. Many officials of multinational oil companies in the region have been victims thereby portraying Nigeria as an unsafe area.

### **Hired and Political Assassinations**

This is another nefarious security challenge grappling the Nigeria State. It is another dimension to the security crisis that is stretching the country to its limit. A cursory look at Nigeria democracy since 1999 reveals many unresolved high profile killings. To exemplify this, former Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Chief Bola Ige was killed on 23 rd December 2002 in his home at Ibadan. This marks the first scenario after the rebirth of democratic rule. It is unfortunate that the government has failed to fish out the perpetrators. Dikko, National Vice Chairman of Peoples Democratic Party was murdered in a cold blood while travelling in 2004, Ayo Daramola and Engr. Funso Williams, Peoples Democratic Party's [PDP] gubernatorial aspirants in Ekiti and Lagos State were assassinated while Philip Olorunwibe, Kogi State chairman of State Independent Electoral Commission was killed in 2004 (Nwanegbo & Odigbo, 2013:4). More so, Harry Marshall, the National Vice Chairman of All Nigeria Peoples Party was also murdered, the former Nigerian Bar Association[NBA] chairman of Onitsha in Anambra State Barnabas Igwe and his wife were gruesomely murdered on 1st September 2002.though this list is not exhaustive but it can picture clearly the scenario of insecurity in Nigeria posed by kidnapppers and assassins. Hence, assassination has posed serious security challenge to successive Nigerian government, as there are reports of more cases of killings for rituals and money purpose.

## **Ethno-Religious Violence**

Ethno-religious by this paper refers to a situation where relationship between members of one ethnic or religion group, multiethnic or multi-religious society is characterized by lack of cordiality, mutual suspicion, fear and a tendency towards violent confrontation (Salawu, 2010; 346). Ethnic cum religious violence has always been a troublesome tension facing Nigeria security. Northern Nigeria States and Plateau state in particular has become the hotbed of ethnic and religious violence with regular report of maiming and killings of innocent citizens which informed the emergency rule during Obasanjo led administration. Religious intolerance has been identified as the prominent causes of ethno-religious crises and the incidents have been noticeable in Nigeria times without number. Ethnic and religion connections now determine who gets what in Nigeria. Such crises have occurred in other parts of the country like Shagamu [Ogun State], Lagos, Abia among others. Salawu is of the opinion that a major cause of present day ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria has to do with accusation and allegation of neglect, oppression, dominations, exploitation, victimization, discrimination, marginalization and host of others. In recent times, Nigeria National security had been threatening by a religious gang that believed that western education and culture were forbidden [Boko Haram]. This group has killed many innocent citizens and even security operatives to the extent that Nigeria security agencies including the military could not manage their attack. The unavoidable fact is that the activity of Boko Haram has now acquired international response since its attack on the United Nations Headquarters in Abuja in 2012.

## **Smuggling and Trans-Border Crimes**

Another big security challenge threatening Nigeria is the smuggling and trans-border crimes. Smuggling and circulation of contraband goods like small arms and light weapons, human

trafficking, drug trafficking lead to other threats to Nigeria internal security. (Ngoa, 2012). opines that these hinder the social and economic development of not only Nigeria but the continent of Africa (Ngoa, 2012). Smuggling encourages proliferation of arms, ammunition and compounded criminality in Nigeria. Porosity of Nigeria borders instigate smuggling as Nigeria has over one thousand illegal routes through which aliens from neighboring country can trek-in into the country. This equally informs the high rate of crime and public disorder in Nigeria. The influx of non – Nigerians and illegal immigrants mixing up with the teeming unemployed youths in Nigeria calls for Nigeria Immigration Service and Nigeria Custom Service to double their effort in the course of discharging their statutory duties. Some Nigeria borders are demarcated with drums and logs of woods that show the state of our borders. In spite of joint patrol and task force at the borders, security personnel are not enough to manage both regular and irregular route of entrance into Nigeria state.

### **Political Violence**

Political violence in Nigeria has aggravated to other aforementioned security challenges in Nigeria. Political violence could be attached to over – enthusiasm and desperation by political gladiators to win elections to public office by all means. Since 1999 when Nigeria returns to civil rule, electoral violence appears to have presumed a devilish dimension. This had given birth to political assassinations and other threats to security.

### **Armed Attack and Robbery**

With the number of security formations put in place by Nigeria Government, there is no fact to show any applaud able drop in the incidents of armed robbery. Thus, with the increase in security outfits and private security organizations, cases of armed attack are on the increase. It seems Nigeria security agencies are helpless in the face of rising wave of criminality in

Nigeria. In 2011, in the first half of the year, about 5,000 cases of armed robbery were recorded, 2700 arrested, 700 killed, 800 assorted weapons recovered from hoodlums (Abolurin, 2011; 189). The fact above reveals the wave of the menace. In fact annual report of National Bureau of Statistics has proved the trend. The situation now is such that every Nigerians now reside inside barricaded compound with personal security device or self-employed guards. There are other challenges like subversion, sabotage and public infrastructure vandalism and host of others.

Consequent upon these wanton security challenges, the government has been devising various strategies to nip them in the bud ranging from increase in defense and security budgets, revamping of the defense institutions and industries, increase in the recruitment and enrolment of defense and security personnel etc. it is on this note that we shall be reviewing Nigerian government Budgetary allocation to Nigeria security and defense agencies as it affects national security.

### **Budgetary allocation to National defense and internal security in Nigeria**

As a result of the challenges studied in the foregoing section of this work, Eme and Anyadike, (2013), opined that Nigerian leaders have decided to tackle them by raising her defense and security budget. In their words,

Nigeria ranks 57 in the global rating on military expenditure. It occupies the seventh position in African while it is regarded as the largest spender in the West African sub-region. The ranking was based on Nigeria's military expenditure in 2009, which also made her the seventh largest spender on the African continent.

Going further, they explain that the country spent \$1.864 billion or N233 billion in 2009, representing 0.90 percent of the Gross Development Production (GDP). This is why they argued that Defense is a critical sector and has enjoyed favorable consideration in funding,



especially in recent years. For instance, the sector got N264 billion in 2010 and this rose to N348 billion in 2011 budget.

Unlike other sectors of the economy, military expenditure in Nigeria has gone up by over 50 percent compared to other sectors in recent times. Consequent upon this, analysts suggest that the rising budget spending for security over the years could have been influenced by a good number of reasons. For instance, in 2008, the policy thrusts of the budget as presented by the late President Umaru Yar'Adua to the legislature on November 8, 2007, was supposedly reflected in "N444.6 billion for security and the Niger Delta." It would appear that the mega figure was aimed at political correctness and possibly intended to show new commitment heights for security and the development needs of the Niger Delta. This is why Eme and Anyadike, (2013) opine thus;

justifying the need for the bogus budget, analysts at the time said perhaps, it was also intended to signal to the international community that Nigeria is sparing no expenditure in ensuring peaceful co-existence among the citizenry and the interest of the businesses. It also enjoyed incentives because most of its goods are imported. These imports are exempt from import duties, Value Added Tax (VAT) Under the Common External Tariff 2008 to 2012 (CET) Eme and Anyadike, (2013).

Defense funding in Nigeria is superior to many sectors and in most African countries, especially in line with security responsibilities. Giving fresh insight on the budget allocations for security and defense, Mr. Bright Okogu, Director-General, Budget Office, a quasi-governmental agency under the presidency, noted that within ECOWAS, Nigeria's defense spending is the largest. According to him, "It is five times greater than the spending of Cote d'Ivoire and almost 15 times the size of Ghana's spending" (Oladesu,2012:43). Allocation to the key government ministries and agencies under security and defense got the lion's share of the 2012 budget when compared to 2011 and 2010 shows that from 2010 through to 2012,

Nigeria would just spent around \$84 billion, of which \$16 billion would be for security. The list below shows the Security Votes in Nigeria between 2008-2013:

#### Budget Allocations for Security/Defence from 2008-2013

- 2008: N 444.6 billion (Umar Yar'Adua)
- 2009: N 233 billion (Umar Yar'Adua)
- 2010: N 264 (Umar Yar'Adua)
- 2011: N 348 billion (Goodluck Jonathan)
- 2012: N 921.91 billion (Goodluck Jonathan)
- 2013: N1.055 trillion (Goodluck Jonathan) Adapted from Eme and Anyadike, (2013).

Having come thus far in this analysis, it is important to reiterate the essence of this paper which is to determine the role budgetary allocation as a defense strategy play in ensuring national/ internal security in Nigeria within the period under review. On this note therefore, with the findings provided above which reveals an exponential increase in defense budgetary allocation to defense and internal security within the period under study, the literature reviewed above tend to submit that the increase in such allocation to defense and internal security has reduced internal security threat but on the contrary, given the increasing violence of the Boko Haram Sect, it is evident that there is no commensurate decrease regarding security threats in Nigeria. To substantiate this assertion, Nwangwu and Ononogbu (2014; 130) Further reiterates that:

the crisis of national security has culminated in unprecedented diversion of scarce capital in the national budget for the procurement of sophisticated military hardware. This has correspondingly denied capital projects in the education, health, agriculture and construction sectors the needed attention. According to the 2012 Report of the Central Bank of Nigeria, in the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 fiscal years, the total expenditure earmarked for both internal security and defense in the approved budgets were \$292.7 billion, \$276.5 billion, \$422.9 billion and \$563.2 billion respectively. Despite huge spending on defense and internal security in Nigeria, wave of insecurity of lives

and property continues unabated in different regions of the country.

Reasons for this assertion will be understood within the context of the second theme to be reviewed, and the backdrop will be further justified by the wanton and incessant mayhem which the Boko Haram sect has been unleashing on the Nigerian state especially since 2010 to the present moment hence, a weak militarily industrial complex.

Placing the above views side by side, while some scholars are of the opinion that budgetary allocation to defense and internal security guarantee national security, others are of the view that it has not done so over the year. In-between these views this paper has discovered a wide gap in the appropriation of the defense budget over the years which is tantamount to insecurity and weak military industrial complex. In other words, it is against this financial misappropriation and budgetary deficit by the Nigerian state towards her defense agencies in ensuring security in Nigeria that prompts the second theme to be reviewed.

### **Establishment of military industrial complex and economic security in Nigeria**

The concept of a Military Industrial Complex was a useful vehicle for understanding the success of the military establishment in receiving unprecedented government budget allocations in the US and other advanced economies during the Cold War. According to Dunne and Skones (2009), it is a problematic concept theoretically but retains some useful descriptive value particularly in assisting in an evaluation of the changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War. For a quick understanding of the concept of Military Industrial complex as it relates to this study, we shall in this section be juxtaposing the development and sustenance of MIC in Brazil, India and South Africa with that of Nigeria with the sole aim of unraveling the weaknesses inherent in that of Nigeria which implicates on her Economic Security. The choice of the three countries to be reviewed alongside Nigeria is hinged on the fact that they all are post colonial states, unlike Nigeria; they have been able

to evolve a viable and sustainable defense and military industrial complex that have been able to stand the test of time. Moreover, before delving into this review, it is pertinent we have a clear understanding of the concept of Economic Security. According to Neu (1994), “Economic security is the ability to advance economic interests in the face of events, developments or actions that may threaten or block these interests”. He further notes that these challenges or obstacles may be foreign or domestic in origin, intentional or accidental and the consequence of human or natural forces (Neu, 1994). Economic security further depends on a state’s ability to shape the international economic environment to its own liking for example, by playing a major role in establishing the rule that govern international economic relations and by using economic means to influence the policies of other countries. Economic security also requires possessing the material resources to fend off neo-economic challenges. Among other things, one must have the economic wherewithal to support an adequate military. Economic security is just one out of the many dimensions of national security. According to Tadjbakhsh (2008,) national security covers critical dimensions, viz: Economic security, Food security, Health security, Environmental security, Personal security, Community security, Political security. Further explanations on the seven (7) dimensions of human security are provided but with economic security being of paramount interest to this study, Tadjbakhsh (2008,) defines it as a security that requires an assured basic income for individuals, which manifests “as provision of productive employment opportunities and adequate remuneration. Unemployment, economic hopelessness and chronic poverty are threats to economic security”.

Consequent upon the foregoing, the question remains ‘how does the development of military industrial complex as a defense strategy affect economic security in Nigeria within the period under review?’ this will be revealed in the review below.

## **Background to the concept of military industrial complex**

The military–industrial complex, or military–industrial–congressional complex, comprises “the policy and monetary relationships which exist between legislators, national armed forces, and the arms industry that supports them. These relationships include political contributions, political approval for military spending, lobbying to support bureaucracies, and oversight of the industry” Kurth (1999).

Whilst the term originated in the 1960s and has been applied since, Kurth (1999) further notes that:

the concept of co-ordination between government, the military, and the arms industry largely finds its roots since the private sector began providing weaponry to government-run forces. The relationship between government and the defense industry can include political contracts placed for weapons, general bureaucratic oversight and organized lobbying on the part of the defense companies for the maintenance of their interests.

For centuries, many governments owned and operated their own arms manufacturing companies—such as naval yards and arsenals. Governments also legislated to maintain state monopolies. As limited liability companies attracted capital to develop technology, governments saw the need to develop relationships with companies who could supply weaponry. By the late 19th century the new complexity of modern warfare required large subsets of industry to be devoted to the research and development of rapidly maturing technologies. On this note therefore, Kurth further states that “Rifled, automatic firearms, artillery and gunboats, and later, mechanized armour, aircraft and missile required specialized knowledge and technology to build. For this reason, governments increasingly began to integrate private firms into the war effort by contracting out weapons production to them”. It

was this relationship that marked the creation of the military–industrial complex. The idea of a MIC in recent time was first introduced by President D. Eisenhower, during his admonition/farewell address to the nation in 1961. He maintained that:

In the councils of government, one must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military industrial complex. The potential for a disastrous rise of unprecedented power will persist, but we, as a nation must not allow the weight of this power endanger our democratic process. We must take nothing for granted and it is only an alert citizenry that can compel the proper meshing of strong military machinery with our methods/goals of peace in order for security and peace to prosper together (Eisenhower 1961:1035)

Since delivering this speech, the term military industrial complex has been used to relate the existence of armaments industry to the economic and manufacturing base of the state. However, with the differing views with regards to MIC, understanding the concept is subject to different interpretations. Looking at the example of MIC in Russia (formerly Soviet Union), it was highlighted that there were high levels of policy influence within the military and the industry rather than hijacking the foreign policy by a collective interest. According to Weber (2001:13), the MIC refers to the cooperative relationship between the military and the industry that produces the military equipment. Koistinen (1980:1) on the other hand, views MIC as an accepted process by which other institutions, most especially the military and other business ventures work together to provide the state with the business capabilities of war. The differing definitions on the subject matter of military industrial complex shows that there is no universally accepted definition. However, for this study, MIC will be defined as “the broad spectrum of relationship and support between the military and other strategic non-military establishments that are involved in the research and development of services critical to the sustenance and boosting of the state’s capacity to meet its security needs” (Aminu 2012:57). In clearer terms, it is the cooperative relationship between the producers and consumers of military goods and services. On manufacturing, it refers to the “process and

combination of machines, tools and labour to produce goods for use and for sale. It can also be seen as the range of human activity from handicraft to high-tech, but is mostly commonly applied to industrial production of which raw materials are transformed into finished products for immediate use” (Aminu 2012:57-58). The vast nature of manufacturing industries is of high importance to the development of the economy of any state and to this end, it is critical to job creation as well as provision of services to other sectors of the economy. In light of this, manufacturing industries provide important material support for national infrastructural development hence ensuring the economic security of a nation.

### **Brazil’s Military Industrial Complex**

There are several views on the military industrial complex of Brazil. According to Aminu (2012), “While some opposing analysts argue that Brazil focused solely on commercial considerations before incorporating the defense production in the national arsenals, others claim that the emergence of a defense industry in Brazil resulted from the need to project its national power, national interests and national image on a global scale”. The varied opinions of the above analysts have provided an inference on the origins of the defense industry in Brazil which are based on a combination of geopolitical, military and commercial roots. Between 1960 and 1980, Adoba, (2012) notes that

the Brazilian armed forces and private industries combined their efforts in order to enlarge the military industrial base of the country and as a result of this, over 100 joint ventures with the European firms were established and co-production agreements between the US, Italy, France and the UK on the incorporation of components to produce home-made goods were signed. Adoba, (2012,4-5).

However, Clovis, (1986) maintained that “the process of transferring technology was inefficient because incorporating the imported components precludes the transfer of technical know-how and manufacturing technology to produce the same components”. However,

regardless of the inefficiency in the transfer of technology which was as a result of the incorporation of joint foreign ventures, the spin-offs have been more beneficial to Brazil (Clovis 1986:102). “On the upsurge of arms production, Brazil used its civilian components in manufacturing of weapons through a technological-adaptation process. Here, the collaboration between the civilian and defense industry played a major role for the simple designs and low prices of the Brazilian made weapons on the international market” (Clovis 1986:103). The Brazilian government, earlier on signed a legislation of tax reduction, access to bank finances and subsidies into law in order to encourage military exports. With this industrial policy, “the institutionalization process of integrating the defense industry into the state economy was successful” (Katz 1984:79). On this note therefore, Adoba, (2012:5) further reiterates that “the state ownership of the defense industries in Brazil is almost negligible with 51% going to the air force and 49% to private shareholders. This shows that the Brazilian defense industry was not developed separately from the rest of the economy as Brazil ensured that its industrial policy led to the creation of military research institutes linked with the private institutes which became instrumental to the process of transferring technology. Between 1967 and 1978, resources were provided to research and development in the weapons industry which led to the emergence of several local firms and the development of complex weapons systems. The Brazilian government subsidized indigenously produced equipment in order to make the market competitive and favorable towards Brazil which transformed the state into an international commercial partner. Perry and Weiss indicated that the defense industry of Brazil could not have reached its current heights without relying on the supplies of the domestic defense market. The export subsidies accelerated the acquisition of technology which provided the Brazilian weapons market as an alternative market in the supply of weapons, of which countries within the Middle East and Africa were major buyers of these weapons. Of the total production, about two-third comes from indigenous designs,



one-third comes from licensed firms outside Brazil and in total, over 500 manufacturers of defense related equipment are resident in Brazil. The model of developing the military industrial complex in Brazil involved several foreign collaborations combined by license systems of technology transfer; hence, the model employed illustrates the importance of mobilizing industrial resources by purchasing licenses, adapting civilian technology, the need for a government led industrial policy and cooperation between research institutes. This model therefore demonstrates the political will of a government to develop the military industrial complex of the state.

### **India's Military Industrial Complex**

On India's military industrial complex , Adoba (2012:6) asserts that the practice has been used as the benchmark for other countries and came about after the country adopted three strategies which it used to strengthen its military capacity. These strategies in turn helped to meet the needs of the national interest by importing conventional weapons and establishing nuclear and space programs, which all culminated in the development of a strong Military Industrial Research Complex (MIRC).

The development of the MIRC was in three phases:

- The Organization Phase (1949-1962)
- The Consolidation Phase (1963-1971) and
- The Diversification-Re-evaluation Phase (1972- date)

During the organization phase, India focused on the development of its research institutes, public sector institutions and military ordnance factories. The consolidation period saw the increase in the defence budgets by multiple folds as the production sector and the financial investment began to yield positive results from the phase to the diversification and re-examination periods. In the last two decades, India has established thirty-three ordnance

factories, nine public sector undertakings and thirty-four major research and development organizations, all run and financed by the government.

In addition, Long (1984:159) reveals that India has built helicopters, aircrafts, armored personnel carriers (APCs) and produced advanced electronic equipment and this has increased the number of jobs by adding 59% of employed workers to the work force which have in turn produced 44% of the goods. The workforce receives half of the capital provided by the government in the development of the MIRC. The government owned defense public sectors produce 50% of the output, employ 33% of the workers and they in turn receive some amount of the capital of the complex. As of 2006-2007, India had about 40 major defense research and development organizations which are exclusively devoted to the military research. This research and development organizations employ 25,000 people, 6,000 scientists and has been deemed as the largest civilian research organization. Since the government supports over 85% of all research centers in India, it can be concluded that about  $\frac{1}{4}$  of all the research in India is devoted to defense purposes. The Indian government employed the resource mobilization model and covert system of technology transfer without any foreign collaboration in the development of her defense industry. This model shows the importance of having a sufficient infrastructure and skilled manpower on the ground and like Brazil; it demonstrates the political will of the government to develop a strong military industrial complex.

### **South Africa's Military Industrial Complex**

During South Africa's colonial era, the colonial government established the Armaments Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR) as the main industry responsible for its weapons production. ARMSCOR had several research departments that conducted regular military research alongside the National Council for Scientific and Industrial Research and

this has placed an indigenous need for the manufacturing of weapons in South Africa on a limited scale for decades. A restriction was placed by the United Nations on ARMSCOR's activities which led to an embargo on its arms production, thereby leading South Africa to resort to local means of weapons production and a recruitment program to attract research technologists. ARMSCOR exercised control as the manufacturing arm of half of the weapons produced through its subsidiary companies. They had over fifty contractors and 400 subcontractors involved in the manufacturing of weapons. The South African model involved much foreign collaboration from France and the United Kingdom by using a combination of investment and license systems of technology transfer. This illustrates the importance of mobilizing industrial resources by purchasing licenses and establishing local facilities, recruitment exercises and specialized manpower. Also, it illustrates the need for the establishment of a Defense Production Mobilization Commission. This model demonstrates the political will power of the government to develop a strong MIC in order to increase the state's capacity to promote national security.

The above analysis of the BIS countries appears to be a representative sample of the types of defence that should be available in other developing countries. These models suggest that the establishment of an indigenous defense industry requires the integration of all the industrial and technological capabilities of a nation. The difference in the industries derives from the difference in size, industry structure, degree of government participation and the capabilities of respective national industrial and technological infrastructures. While Brazil's industry has been dominated by the private sector, the South African industry is divided between the public and the private sector while India is government controlled. In all cases, it is evident that the political will of the government in developing a viable MIC is strong. While the equipment procured from outside were modified and improved upon, policies were enacted in order to encourage domestic innovations and industries were driven by a high

sense of political will, patriotism and commitment. Also, research and development institutes were adequately funded and staffed with experienced specialists/ across the three case studies, it is evident that the existence of vibrant manufacturing industries was crucial to the evolution of indigenous technologies in order to foster the growth of defense industries which would not have survived if the manufacturing industries had collapsed, hence, every thriving economy requires a vibrant manufacturing sector that would be crucial to the survival of defense industries and MIC'S.

### **Nigeria's Quest for Developing a Strong Military Industrial Complex**

Since the attainment of independence in 1960, the Nigerian armed forces have been actively engaged in peacekeeping missions alongside the United Nations, a civil war that lasted for 30 months and the recent internal operations of flushing the Boko Haram insurgents out of Nigeria. Notwithstanding these engagements, Nigeria has been sanctioned a couple of times because some of these engagements were deemed to abuse human rights and during this period, Nigeria focused more on her traditional suppliers in Europe and America for her defense needs at a great cost (Adoba, 2012:7). Nigeria had long recognized the importance of a strong MIC as a critical factor in sustaining a buoyant economy and in her efforts to attain self-sufficiency, she collaborated with external suppliers and foreign firms in order to enhance the industrial potential of the Country with positive spillover effects in her desire to build a strong MIC in response to the challenges of national security. The Nigerian government established several military establishments and manufacturing industries like the Nigerian Machine Tool Industry (NMTI), the Ajaokuta Steel Complex (ASC), the Delta Steel Company (DSC), Project Development Agency (PRODA), the Nigerian Air Force Training

Group (NAFTG) and the Nigerian Naval Engineering Collage (NNEC) With these industries in place, although some of the aforementioned industries are out of order, the Nigerian government moved quickly in the early years to establish various industrial establishments to server her armament requirements, one of which was the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), established in collaboration with the Messrs Fritz German Company which focused on the operation, maintenance and control of factories in Nigeria for the manufacture, storage and disposal of ancillary weapons such as the German Beretta Rifles, submachine guns 7.62 and 9mm ammunition etc. However, the government failed to continue funding these operations as a result of the corrupt practices and hence contracted the Messers Fabrique Nationale (MFN) of Belgium which was again stalled as a result of lack of funding. DICON which was set up at the same time as its Brazilian counterpart was yet to develop into a vibrant military conglomerate, while Brazil had gone light years ahead by producing high grade equipment in the ranks of ships and aircrafts. Beyond DICON, Nigeria collaborated with foreign firms like the Peugeot Automobile and the Leyland Nigeria limited to produce cars and trucks respectively. In the maritime sector, the government contracted a UK firm to construct two naval dockyards and one shipyard which are in Lagos and Port Harcourt respectively and were tasked with the responsibility of repairing ships and refitting naval and merchant vessels, but again, due to lack of funds, these dockyards focus mainly on the repair of ships. Notwithstanding this drawback from DICON, local production of some components were achieved to a feat and hence, it is evident that Nigeria recognized the importance of building a strong MIC as a harbinger for the attainment of an improved national security, (Adoba,2012:8).

### **Current State of Manufacturing in Nigeria in comparison to the BIS Countries**

Sangosanya (2011:4) affirms that the state of Nigeria's manufacturing industries can easily be glanced from available facts that capture the nature of the overall manufacturing sector which

has deteriorated in the past three decades although these industries still play a crucial role in the Nigerian economy as they contribute to the Gross Domestic Product. As of 2009-2012, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria had closed down 820 manufacturing companies as a result of poor performance which has affected its contribution to the GDP. This can be seen in comparison with the BIS Countries in the table below:

Years	Brazil	India	South Africa	Nigeria
2009	23%	16%	18%	3.68%
2010	23%	16%	18%	3.79%
2011	23%	16%	18%	3.91%
2012	23%	16%	18%	4.03%

*Table 1 shows Nigeria's manufacturing as a percentage of GDP in comparison to the BIS Countries (Aminu 2012:71)*

Nigeria's technological base is weak because of the lack of investment in research and development. The manufactures highly depend on the import of equipment which is not sustainable due to foreign exchange limitations. Also lacking is adequate work force necessary to guarantee competitiveness in the current global economy. This therefore implies that there are not growth-propelling resources at the disposal of manufacturing firms in Nigeria and over the years has deteriorated in its growth mechanism. This weakness has led to the closure of these industries and has hampered on the growth of the defence industry which in turn engenders the gradual evolution of a strong MIC in Nigeria. Therefore, it is pertinent for Nigeria to ensure concentrated efforts in multi-sectoral interventions in the manufacturing sector such as the –

- Chemical and pharmaceuticals;
- Products, basic metal, iron and steel and fabricated metal;
- Food, beverages and tobacco;

- Textiles, wearing apparel and leather footwear; and
- Non-metallic mineral products.

The above are a clear representation of the manufacturing sector where Nigeria needs to develop comparative advantage. These core areas have proven to have the highest potential to provide raw materials for other key industries in the long run, including the defence industries. To achieve a strong military industrial complex that can contribute to the promotion of national security, the government needs to evolve and implement measures that will aid in the resuscitation of the ailing industries and the establishment of new ones in order to build a robust and vibrant economy.

### **Gap in literature**

Defence Strategies and National Security is not novel in study range but extant literature regarding Nigeria's budgetary allocation to national defence agencies vis a vis the establishment of Military Industrial Complex (MIC) in the country has been sparse. Notwithstanding the attempts made by literature reviewed above to unravel the trajectories of defence spending in Nigeria over the years, its much emphasis on viewing defence and national security as a condition that can be achieved only through a militaristic or combative approach remains worrisome. Scholars like Okwudiba Nnoli, Esko Toyo, Assisi Asobie, Claude Ake, Okechukwu Ibeanu, Ogban Ogban-Iyam, amongst others concentrated on how budgetary allocation has fared over the years, but gave little or no attention to the need of having a systematic plan for the establishment of a viable defence industries and complexes. It is upon this backdrop that this study places the gap in literature and further suggests that

instead of warring over the level of defence spending in Nigeria, which have been more on magnitude, concerted effort should be geared towards striking a balance between the recurrent and capital expenditure in the sector so as to make for a secure and stable socio-political economy.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**

According to Obasi (1999:43) “by theoretical framework, we mean a device or scheme for adopting or applying the assumptions, postulations and principles of a theory in the description and analysis of a research problem.” In a sample sense, however, the theoretical framework means explanations adopted to explain tentatively, the phenomenon under study from existing theories or perspectives/orientations and models in the field of study. A good scientific research starts and ends in the theory. This fact cannot be underestimated while conducting a scholarly and scientific research as conducted in the social sciences.



We shall adopt **THE MARXIAN THEORY OF POST- COLONIAL STATE**, In this study as the theoretical framework of analysis. According to young (2001:383-426), post colonial theory as a political discourse emerged mainly from experiences of oppression and struggles for freedom after the "tricontinental" awakening in Africa, Asia and Latin America; the continent associated with poverty and conflict. Postcolonial is a means of defiance by which the exploitative and discriminative practices , regardless of time and space can be challenged.

According to Ezeani and Ezeibe (2011:232) in their analysis of the Marxian theory of post-colonial state, they described the Marxian conception of the state in the words of Lenin (1984:10-11) that the state is the product and manifestation of the irreconcilability of class antagonism. The state, which arose from the conflicts between classes, is a form of rule hence the state is the most powerful, economically and politically dominant class. These dominant classes devise new means of holding down and exploiting the dominated class. This buttresses the argument of Marx and Engels (1971:38) that the executive of the modern state is but a committee for the managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie. This indicates that the state is not class neutral though it emerged to mediate and moderate class struggle (Ezeani 2008:3).

Ezeani and Ezeibe (2011:232) opined that other third world scholars (Alavi, 1973:146-147; Ekekwe 1986:12; Ake 1981 and Miliband 1977:109) have further considered the peculiarities of the postcolonial state. Alan (1973:146-147) noted that the main attribute of the post-colonial state is that the state is an instrument of class domination and that the state and its apparatuses are used as the main instruments of primitive accumulation by the local dominant class and foreign collaborators.

Similarly Ekwewe (1986:12) rightly noted that:

Whereas the state in the advanced capitalist formations functions to maintain the economic and social relation under which bourgeoisie accumulation takes place, in the periphery of capitalism, factors which have to do with the level of development of the productive forces make the state, through its several institutions and apparatuses a direct instrument for accumulation for the dominant class or its elements.

In addition to the above, Ake (1981:128-129) noted that at independence, African states were immersed in the class struggle instead of rising above it. The indigenous bourgeoisie, which took over government at independence, lacked a source material base and hence used its political power for accumulation. This tendentially made control of government/state power attractive and highly contentious.

Miliband quoted in Ezeani and Ezeibe (2011:233) similarly adumbrated that the state in Third World is the source of economic power as well as instrument of it; hence the state is the major means of production. Those in control of state power employ more and more hands in defence of the state than in industrial production and national economic development. Hence, National interest is equated with national security and survival of the state. It mattered less that the state is sustained by force. Ake (1996:16) summarizes that in post-colonial Africa, the premium on power is exceptionally high and the institutional mechanism for moderating political competition are lacking. Thus, political competition assumes the character of warfare.

This theory thus, provides complex and comprehensive conceptual understanding of post-colonial Nigeria, whose increased military spending is targeted at building a strong defence for the government in power in managing the war between political enemies and ethnic groups. The unique nature of the post-colonial states such as Nigeria therefore lies primarily on the fact that the states serves as a major instrument of capital accumulation and that those that control the government tendentially increase the military spending to build

strong defence for their continual domination and capital accumulation. Education, health, information communication, industry and other sectors of Nigerian economy are marginalized as government seeks survival and continuity by voting the largest poll of national treasury for national security/national interest (state survival). This implies that Nigeria is a militarized economy and that national security will guarantee economic development. After about five decades in increased military spending in Nigeria at the detriment of other sectors of the economy, the security threats and challenges of Nigeria (border conflict, Niger Delta militancy, ethnic and religious conflicts) have more than increased and economic welfare/growth stagnating and at worst regressing. The Nigerian Government Procures arms from foreign countries or erstwhile colonial masters, thus helping develop their economy at the expense of Nigeria's economy

### **3.2 HYPOTHESES**

A hypothesis (plural hypotheses) is a proposed explanation for a phenomenon. For a hypothesis to be a scientific hypothesis, the scientific method requires that one can test it. According to Obasi (1999:30) "a hypotheses is simply a tentative statement which is open to confirmation or rejection when exposed or subjected to empirical verification. It is an unsubstantiated generalization whose validity remains to be tested". Hypotheses propose a tentative relationship among variables, that is independent and dependent variables. The Hypotheses of this study are:

1. The budgetary allocation to national defence agencies did not improve internal security in Nigeria between 2008 and 2017.
2. The establishment of Military Industrial Complex (MIC) did not lead to economic security in Nigeria between 2008 and 2017.

### **3.3 THE RESEARCH DESIGN**

A research design is a systematic plan to study a scientific problem. The design of a study defines the study type (descriptive, co relational, semi-experimental, experimental, review, meta-analytic) and sub-type (e.g., descriptive-longitudinal case study), research question, hypotheses, independent and dependent variables, experimental design, and, if applicable, data collection methods and a statistical analysis plan. Leege & Francis(1974) writes the research design is a blue print that leads the researcher to plausible answers to research problems by enabling the researcher to determine how much of the observed variance of the dependent variable can be attributed to other substantive variables, that is, extrinsic effect, and the research design itself, that is, intrinsic effects. While for Anikpo (1986) “a research design is a plan or structure of any aspect of the research procedure”.

Asika (1991:27) defines research as

Structuring of investigation aimed at identifying variables and their relationship to one another. This is used for the purpose of obtaining data to enable the researcher test hypothesis or answer research questions.

This research work on Defence Strategies and National Security will be based on Ex-post facto research design. An ex-post facto design or after-the-fact research is a quasi-experimental study examining how an independent variable, present prior to the study affects a dependent variable. It is a category of research design in which the investigation start after the fact has occurred without interference from the researcher

### **3.4 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION**

The method of data gathering for this study is qualitative method, specifically, documentary method. In qualitative method, information is gathered in form of words, pictures, descriptive, narratives and numerals from both primary sources like unstructured observations, interview schedules, focus group discussions, etc, and secondary sources such

as documentary studies of official documents, library materials, internet websites, books, journals, etc.

For Iwueze (2009) qualitative method aims at understanding through examination, description and interpretation of documented evidence, data and Information from secondary sources. Nze (2009) enumerates three main qualitative methods of data collection, which are interactive interviewing, written descriptions and observation.

### **3.5 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS**

The method of data analysis adopted in this study is qualitative-descriptive analysis of documentary study of official documents like country websites, internet sources, books, journals etc. Nwana, (1981:177), defines document as “any written material (whether handwritten, typed or printed) that was already in existence which was produced for some other purposes than the benefit of the investigator”. Similarly, for Obasi, (1999:170-173), “documents are published or unpublished materials on activities of public and private organizations and found mainly in libraries, archives and in such public and private.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **BUDGETARY ALLOCATION TO NATIONAL DEFENCE SECTOR AND INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

#### **4.1 CONCEPTUALISATION AND OPERATIONALISATION OF NATIONAL DEFENCE MANAGEMENT**

National defence is generally concerned with the Armed Forces capability to deter aggression by land, sea and air and promotion of internal security in order to enhance the achievement of national objectives. Defence is defined as the making of strategic plans to ward off enemy attack or prevent aggression. It can also refer to military measures and manoeuvres for protecting a state, its core values and national interests from internal and external threats, (Mbachu,2011:148).

Defence management covers the strategic, operational and tactical plans put in place to ensure the success of deterrence and defence or even war. Generally, management is defined as the act of getting things done through the instrumentality of others. Thus, military success is dependent on teamwork by both the civil and military arms of the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Ministry of Defence is the headquarters and the central coordinating body for the operations and administration of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Honourable Minister of Defence (HMOD) as the head and the Chief Executive Officer. The HMOD is vested with the request authority for managing the three services (Army, Navy and Air Force) through their respective Council/Boards, acting through the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The civil arm of the Ministry of Defence is headed by the Permanent Secretary, who is the principle policy adviser to the Honourable Ministry of Defence. Both arms work closely together to achieve the overall national defence objectives and function according to constitutional provisions.

Thus, the Ministry of Defence is responsible to the Federal Government for the formulation and execution of defence policy. The Ministry is the political administrative and operational headquarters of the Armed Forces. The Statutory functions of the Ministry of Defence, as spelt out in the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 15, vol. 76 of 3rd March, 1979 are as follows:

- i. Armed Force Development Projects;

- ii. Clearing of Foreign Military Aircraft and Warships;
- iii. Defence;
- iv. Procurement of Defence Equipment;
- v. Welfare of Ex-Service Men;
- vi. Liaise with Armed Forces of foreign countries;
- vii. Recruitment of Local forces, including armed forces and cadets;
- viii. Matters of policy establishment, recruitment, finance, training and operations connected with the Nigerian Armed Forces;
- ix. Resettlement scheme for armed Forces' Ex-servicemen; and
- x. Relations with Armed Forces Institute of Nigeria (AFIN), Defence Industries Corporation (DICON), Military Pension Board (MPB) and the Nigerian Legion.

#### Command and Control

The political control and authority are clearly spelt out in the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The National Defence Council is created to act on behalf of the President who is commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces in formulating the defence policy.

The composition of the National Defence council is as follows:

- |                                 |   |                 |
|---------------------------------|---|-----------------|
| 1. President/C-in-C             | - | Chairman        |
| 2. Vice President               | - | Deputy Chairman |
| 3. Minister of Defence          | - | Member          |
| 4. Minister of Foreign Affairs  | - | Member          |
| 5. Minister of Internal Affairs | - | Member          |

6. Chief of Defence Staff - Member
7. Inspector General of Police - Member
8. Director General, State Security Service - Member
9. Such other members as the president may appoint.

The function of the National Defence Council is to advise the president on matters relating to the defence of the sovereign and territorial integrity of Nigeria. The council meets when necessary.

### **Operationalisation of National Defence Management**

Mbachu, (2011:149), writes that the Minister of Defence, acting on the advice of both the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) (the office of the Chief of Defence Staff was established in 1980 by Shehu Shagari Administration) and the national Security Adviser (NSA) will translate the defence policy into military strategy, plans and programmes. Then, the CDS will ipso facto translate the military strategy into mission statements while the Service Chiefs articulate their various contingency plans based on the approved missions in line with the command doctrine. The Services various headquarters pass the directives and contingency plans to their brigade commanders who in turn break these plans into specific instructions and task that are then passed into their formations and units for execution.

The formulated policy is then passed on the national Assembly for approval and adoption, after the recommendation of Sub-Committee on Defence. After the approval, the document which is now known as the National Defence Policy is sent back to the President for his signature. Thereafter, he passes the Defence Policy to his HMOD for implementation.

### **Organization of Ministry of Defence**



The Ministry of Defence (MOD) is structured into seven (7) Departments comprising three(3) Common Services Departments and four (4) Operations Departments as follows:

(i) Common Services Departments:

(a) Department of Administration and Supplies;

(b) Department of Finance and Accounts; and

(c) Department of Planning, Research and Statistics.

(ii) Operations Department

(a) Department of Joint Services;

(b) Army Affairs Department;

(c) Navy affairs Department; and

(d) Air Force Affairs Department.

The three common services departments provide essential services to the Ministry. Each is acting in its area of jurisdiction at the request of the operations department. Each operations department has as its duties; policy execution, policy initiation and policy development in its area of concern. Each takes care of the issues of common concern to the services. Each department is structured into divisions headed by Deputy Directors. Each division again is divided into branches in sections and headed by an officer on Grade Level 14. In addition, there are four (4) units, which work directly with the Minister or the permanent secretary. They are as follows:

The Internal Audit, protocol, press and public relations, and the Legal Units. We shall list below the major functions of the Departments in the areas of defence resource management.

## The Department of Administration and Supplies

This department is responsible for:

- i. Establishment matters;
- ii. Appointment, Junior and Senior Staff Committee;
- iii. Staff training and welfare;
- iv. Secretariat of the Ministry's personnel management and its committees;
- v. Maintenance of personnel records
- vi. Liaise with relevant bodies outside the ministry e.g the federal establishment and pension office; etc;
- vii. Budgeting for recurrent and capital expenditure;
- viii. Procurement of supplies such as stationery; office equipment, materials, furniture, etc.
- ix. Stores;
- x. Management of equipment, furniture, office space, etc.

## Department of Finance and Accounts

The Department of Finance and accounts is responsible for:

- (i) Revenue;
- (ii) Financial administration;
- (iii) Accounts; and

- (iv) Liaise with relevant bodies outside the Ministry such as the Ministry of finance and Economic development, central Bank of Nigeria, office of the account-General of the federation, etc.

#### Department of Planning, Research and Statistics

This department is responsible for:

- i. Development of rolling, medium and perspective planning for the ministry;
- ii. Monitoring and evaluation of plan implementation;
- iii. Secretariat of the ministerial tenders board;
- iv. Research into the sectors over which the ministry has jurisdiction;
- v. Research into the internal organization and operational modalities of the ministry;
- vi. Setting and monitoring of performance and efficiency targets for the various subdivisions and staff of the ministry;
- vii. Regular collection and processing of data and statistics relating to the ministry; and
- viii. Management of the ministry's records and information resources such as the registry; library computer services and, when established, the Data Bank.

#### Joint Services Department

The Joint Services Department is responsible for;

- i. The Secretariat for the Boards of the NDA, the AFCSC and the National Defence College (NDC). The department represents the ministry on the board of the defence industries corporation of Nigeria (DICON), and ensures the follow-up and implementation of decisions of the 4(four) bodies;

- ii. Processing the training requirements of the Armed forces personnel, as well as training and technical assistance requirements for other African countries.
- iii. Providing the secretariat for the Ministry of Defence Committees on all disarmament matters and with DHQ representing the Ministry on the United Nations Conference on Nuclear, Chemical and Biological weapons negotiations;
- iv. Representing the Ministry on all Joint Commissions and Ministry cooperation negotiations between Nigeria and other countries, including UN sponsored peace-keeping or peace enforcement missions like United Nations Mission in Ivory Coast; and
- v. Processing payment of compensation on acquired requisition, accommodation and rent for the military.

#### Departments of Army, Navy and Air Force Affairs

Each of these three (3) departments does the following for its respective service:

- i. Provision of secretariat for the service' Board/council;
- ii. Monitoring of the defence projects as they relate to the particular service;
- iii. Vetting of the Armed Forces Tenders board (AFTB) memoranda for the Army, the Navy or the Air Force as the case may be, and participation in the service tender board meetings;
- iv. Processing of END USERS request for each service for equipment, logistics support or training, etc., and
- v. Processing of contractor's claims etc.

#### Legal Unit

The legal unit performs the following functions:

- i. Representing the military or any of the services or organs of the military in any civil action pending in any court of law in the federation. It also represents the officials of the ministry, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force in civil actions where the action complained of are performed in the course of their normal involving the ministry or any arm thereof, as well as the services, organs and parastatals;
- ii. Rendering of advisory opinion on all matters referred to it for legal opinion, e.g., contract, torts, personnel, compensation/rent for acquisition and requisition, international relations, military parastatals before all arbitration tribunals set up in or outside Nigeria to determine any issue where the interest of these bodies is at stake.

#### Press and Public Relations Unit

This unit which is attached to the Honourable Minister's office is responsible for formulating and articulating effective strategies for achieving vibrant press and public relations for the ministry. It monitors all manners of public opinion and reactions to the ministry's policies, plans and projects and responds to them promptly. The unit is responsible for projecting the policies, activities, programmes and plans of the Ministry through press releases and statements, public lectures, brochures and posters, etc.

#### Internal Audit Unit

This unit is responsible for complete and continuous audit of the accounts and records of revenue and expenditure planned and allocated as well as unallocated stores in line with the provision of the financial regulations. Other ad hoc assignments carried out by the Internal Audit unit include;

- i. Verification of promotion arrears of teachers;
- ii. Investigation into alleged cases of fraud;

- iii. Developing and auditing the books of accounts and records at MOD liaison office, Lagos; and
- iv. In collaboration with the services and the office of the Accountant General of the Federation, the Internal Audit carries out detailed auditing and review of the accounts and records of the directorate of military pension.

#### **4.2 THE MILITARY BUDGETARY PROCESS**

On the military budgetary process in Nigeria, Omitoogun and Hutchful,(2006:165), asserts that the formal process of budgeting for the Ministry of Defence is not very different from those of the other ministries. Like other ministries, the MOD has to respond to the BCC, and its long-term programmes must be included in the National Rolling Plan before they can appear in the annual budget. The only difference from the other ministries is in decision making on strategic procurement, which is left to the military hierarchy. The Chief of Defence Staff leads the decision-making process, which is organised in Defence Headquarters.

As a result of the long years of military rule, and the pervasive corruption that it engendered, the military budget has been of great interest to civil society, especially the media and academia. The military budget is one yardstick by which civil society and the critical citizenry measure the seriousness of the government's commitment to social and economic development; it is continually compared with the budgets of other sectors in the 'gari versus gun' debate. In addition, defence contracts have been some of the most attractive for businessmen and corrupt officials alike. Military governments focused on the military budget for security reasons. Indeed, the last three military heads of state held the defence portfolio personally. As a consequence of these factors, the military budgetary process has

been subject to multiple sources of control: from the three services, from the MOD and from the government.

Since the end of the civil war in 1970, the MOD has consistently received one of the highest budgetary allocations. This is perhaps because the MOD is one of the few ministries to be funded solely by the federal government, whereas most other federal ministries have analogues in the states.

### **The Formal Process**

Like the national process, the military budgetary process consists of four broadly defined phases: formulation, approval, implementation (including strategic procurement), and auditing and reporting. The process is organized by the ministry's Budget Planning and Implementation Committee. This committee is headed by the Permanent Secretary and includes the directors of the three service departments, who are usually civilians, the ministry's Director of Finance, the heads of finance of the three services and a representative of Defence Headquarters.

#### **4.2.1 The Formulation Phase**

Budgeting in the Ministry of Defence is a year-round occupation. In the absence of a government White Paper on defence, each arm of the military produces its budget proposal based on perceived needs, in line with the Budget Call Circular. These are then coordinated through the office of the Chief of Defence Staff in Defence Headquarters. Each service has a Planning Board, the membership of which includes the MOD's service director. The Planning Board aggregates submissions from the units to make the service's budgetary estimates. Since

the National Planning Commission involves the services in the formulation of the National Rolling Plan, much of the military capital budget is simply extracted from the rolling plan. This covers mainly construction work and the refurbishing of equipment, not the more strategic acquisitions. At every point in the budgetary process the ceilings provided by the FMF and the government's revenue forecasts guide staff. Each unit and level in the service has to defend its budgetary proposals before the next higher level.

In addition to the three services, agencies to be budgeted for include the MOD itself and its Joint Services Department, the Command and Staff College, the National War College and its Centre for Peace Research, the National Armed Forces Rehabilitation Centre, the Directorate of Military Pensions, the Defence Intelligence Agency, defence missions and the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON). The proposals from the services and agencies are submitted to the Joint Services Department in the MOD for harmonization. The estimates from the services are then combined with those of civilians at the ministry and forwarded to the FMF as the military budget estimates. At the FMF, the MOD team, usually led by the Permanent secretary, has to defend the ministry's budget estimates, especially when the budget ceiling is exceeded, as is usually the case. After leaving the FMF, the budget passes through the Presidency and the Federal Executive Council, usually with no alteration, before it is sent to the National Assembly.

#### **4.2.2 The Authorization Phase**

After the Appropriation Bill is presented to the National Assembly, it is considered in committee. For budget purposes, all committees become subcommittees of, and function according to the rules of, the Finance and Appropriation Committee of the House of Representatives or the Senate. Since 1999 the Defence Committee of the Senate has been



further divided into three subcommittees to oversee the three services of the Nigerian Armed Forces. Each of these service subcommittees discusses and approves the budgetary estimates of its service. The same process takes place in the House of Representatives. The Defence Committees' aggregated draft is then forwarded to the Senate's Finance and Appropriation Committee. In the course of examining the details of the budget, the Defence Committee can call the Minister of Defence and officials of the MOD to defend the ministry's estimates.

#### **4.2.3 The Implementation Phase**

Once the budget is approved, funds are disbursed in the manner indicated in the Appropriation Act. Allocations are normally released quarterly. The FMF produces the breakdown of the budget as approved by the National Assembly for each ministry and agency. Upon receipt of the approved budget, the Funds Allocation and Budget Committee of the MOD reappraises the budget against the ministry's proposals and, where funding falls short of expectation, recommends a reordering of priorities within the budgetary limits. Similarly, the services appraise and reorder their priorities. The implementation of the MOD's budget is as in other ministries, the only significant difference being that the MOD keeps only the capital budget (including funds for the procurement of strategic military weapons), passing the recurrent budget to the services. However, in practice, the ministry merely controls the money while the services execute the capital projects themselves. This practice has been common for several years with a concerted effort to change the situation and for the ministry to assert itself in the process only being made since 2003. The Accountant-General sends internal auditors to the MOD whose task is to ensure that financial regulations are followed in the disbursement of funds and that proper records are kept.

Strategic Procurement

The Services Chiefs Committee, consisting of the Chief of Defence Staff and the three service chiefs, is responsible for joint strategic and logistic planning and makes the major decisions involving strategic acquisitions. The strategic procurement process begins within the services when they define their respective equipment requirements. Generally, the need for equipment can be said to result from 'technical advances, Combat Development concepts, enemy capabilities, obsolescence of an existing equipment, experience gained during operation or training and information from friendly user countries. Once equipment requirements have been identified, the Equipment Committee is requested to undertake a preliminary study of how the need can be satisfied in terms of technical possibilities and cost. If this study is favourable, the next stage in the process involves requesting the relevant service's Department of Staff Duties to prepare in conjunction with the potential user what is called the General Staff Target (GST). The GST usually reflects the end users' requirements for the equipment to be purchased. The GST is passed on to the service chief for examination and approval. If approved, it is then passed on to the Equipment Committee for a feasibility study based on the GST and on a comparative analysis of the available technologies, cost and time, problem areas and production cost estimates. The Equipment Committee decides whether to proceed with the equipment purchase or not. If the decision is to proceed, user requirements are prepared with details of the expected characteristics and performances, which also serve to justify the need for and choice of equipment. Estimated cost, technical details and other factors are included in the user requirements. Once the choice of equipment is approved, a trial is carried out in the presence of the MOD representative in charge of projects for the service, since the ministry will finance the project. The final decision lies with the Procurement Committee of the MOD, which includes representatives of the services, relevant parastatals and the National Assembly. Once a weapon system has been decided upon and approved, its cost is included in the MOD budget estimates.

#### **4.2.4 The Auditing and Reporting Phase**

Spending in the military sector is monitored in various ways. Internal auditing is undertaken by the Audit, Monitoring and Evaluation units of the Ministry of Defence, which monitor the finances and projects of the armed forces. The Auditor-General conducts an annual general audit. The National Assembly also has a role in supervising military spending. This involves regular debates as well as visits to and monitoring of defence projects by the Defence committees of the two houses.

A major feature of the audit process in Nigeria is delay. Before the audit process began again in 1999, the last audit of the accounts of the federal government was in 1991. The MOD, which has been one of the biggest spending ministries, has one of the highest numbers of abandoned projects. Most of the infrastructure of the armed forces is in a deplorable condition. In addition, a 2001 report showed that the armed forces owe over 1.7 billion naira (c. \$12 million) in utility bills accumulated over the years. It is clear that, despite annual budgetary provisions and fund releases, responsibilities such as these have not been fulfilled. Corruption is rampant and there are few processes to ensure accountability. The many years of military rule have led to impatience with due process and the tendency is to bypass or ignore vital institutional arrangements in order to achieve usually selfish ends.

The formal system described above is based on legal and procedural regulations that apply internally and at all levels. Apart from the many articles of the constitution that regulate national planning and budgeting, other regulations include the FMF's Guide to Budget Procedures and the National Assembly's parliamentary procedures and practices. It is clear that since the return to democratic rule the process is at least nominally followed. However, there are obvious bureaucratic and political influences that impinge on the budgetary process.

### **4.3 FACTORS AFFECTING DEFENCE BUDGETING**

Imobighe (1981:13) enumerates three factors or variables as particularly important in the collection of resources to defence. These are:

- The nature and severity of the perceived threat;
- The state of the economy; and
- The structure of the decision-making.

#### **4.3.1 The Nature and Severity of the Perceived Threat**

This is a very important factor affecting defence resource allocation, it involves the all-important question which is; what do we need defence for? In other words, the very basis for building up a country's defence is for no other reason than to guard against threat. Whether or not a country will devote more resources to defence at any given time will depend on the leaders' perception of threat. The more their perception of threat, the more their perception to devote more resources to strengthening the armed forces rather than for the provision of bread and butter for the populace. There can be no doubt that decision-takers are continually faced with the compelling huge to devote more resources for the provision of bread and butter for their citizens. Nonetheless, in the face of real threat, they would rather want to divert more resources to ensure that the people are not placed in a situation where the bread and butter are available, but there is no secured atmosphere to enjoy them.

The important point about threat is that, it is usually the decision takers' perception of the security situation that matters. Of course, a well articulate public opinion could help them in arriving at their decision.

### **4.3.2 The State of the Country's Economy**

Economic considerations affect defence in two important ways. First, it helps to determine what a country wants defence for. This is so when defence capability is pursued with an intent to protect the country's trade and investments.

Second – and this is particularly relevant for purpose of resources allocation – the economic situation often determines what level of defence a country will have. This point comes out clearly when people talk of affordable defence preparedness. Thus, a country with very low economic base cannot talk of huge defence build-up without drastically affecting its development of other vital sectors of its economy.

### **4.3.3 The Structure of the Decision-Making Process**

The structure, as it is perceived here, relates to the various stages of the budgeting process the calibre of personnel involved, the level of decantation within the system etc; as well as the level of penetration by the military industrial complex. The structure could also help determine whether the proper focus is given to the country defence planning or not.

Where the structure is such that there is proper division of labour and effective co-ordination, as well as the right calibre of personnel at the various stages of the budgeting process, the level of efficiency is bound to be high. Such a personnel who by virtue of their training, orientation and experience are such that will apply the right indices of defence budgeting to arrive at objective deductions, as well as make the right choice out of the various alternatives for meeting the desired goal.

Finally, the level of penetration of the system by powerful lobby groups like the military industrial complex in the industrial countries could help to determine the flavour of

the entire defence budgeting process. What takes place in these countries is a coalition between the military industrial complex of the industrialized countries and the middle men contractors of the former. The influence of the contractor industrial complex could be particularly pronounced if there is no specialized body with a military mind within the system to critically rationalize the weapons-system acquisition process.

#### **4.4 ANALYSIS OF BUDGETARY ALLOCATIONS TO NATIONAL DEFENCE AGENCIES AND INTERNAL SECURITY CHALLENGES BETWEEN 2008 AND 2014**

Okechukwu and Anyadike,(2013:24), in a budget breakdown of 2012 asserts that President Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria proposed N4.74 trillion total federal government budget, representing 6% increase over 2011 budget, to the Joint session of the National Assembly. The budget is premised on a benchmark oil price ofUS\$70/barrel. President Jonathan said the share of recurrent expenditure in the 2012 Budget proposal is 72%, and 74.4% in 2011. He also disclosed that Capital expenditure has an allocation of N1.32 trillion representing a 15% increase over the amount approved in the 2011 Budget ,adding that the “the emphasis is on the completion of critical infrastructure projects.” Allocations to key ministries and government agencies are as follows: Security - N924.91 billion(defence-326bn ); Power -N161.42 billion; Works - N180.8 billion; Also, Education [excluding Universal Basic Education Commission, Petroleum Technology Development Trust Fund (PTDF) & Education Trust Fund] - N400.15 billion; Health - N282.77 billion; and Agriculture & Rural Development - N78.98 billion. Others are: Water Resources - N39 billion; Petroleum Resources – N59.66 billion; Others are Aviation - N49.23 billion; Transport - N54.83 billion; Lands & Housing - N26.49 billion; Science & Technology - N30.84 billion; Niger Delta –

African N59.72 billion; Federal Capital Territory Administration (FCTA) - N45.57  
 Communications Technology - N18.31 billion.

	<b>Army</b>	<b>Navy</b>	<b>Air force</b>
<b>2008</b>	<b>56bn</b>	<b>30bn</b>	<b>26bn</b>
<b>2009</b>	<b>65bn</b>	<b>34bn</b>	<b>53bn</b>
<b>2010</b>	<b>75bn</b>	<b>45bn</b>	<b>58bn</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>121bn</b>	<b>74bn</b>	<b>83bn</b>
<b>2012</b>	<b>122bn</b>	<b>69bn</b>	<b>64bn</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>130bn</b>	<b>73bn</b>	<b>78bn</b>
<b>2014</b>	<b>132bn</b>	<b>70bn</b>	<b>73bn</b>

**Table 4.2 budgetary allocation to the three main services (2008-2014)**

**Source: Statisense, 2015**

From the table 1.1 above, The Federal Government spent a total of N152 billion on defence in 2008 comprising of capital military expenditure(milex) of 131,936,000,000(86.80%) and recurrent milex of 20,064,000,000(13.20%). Total milex for 2009 is N201billion; capital milex of 165,885,300,000(82.53%) and recurrent milex of 35,114,700,000(17.47%). In 2010, Total milex was N292billion; capital milex of 217,540,000,000(74.50%) and recurrent milex of 74,460,000,000(25.50%). Total milex for 2011 was N314billion; capital milex of 288,785,800,000(91.97%) and recurrent milex of 25,214,200,000(8.03%). in 2012, Total milex was N326billion;capital milex of 291,215,800,000(89.38%) and recurrent milex of 34,784,200,000(10.67%).Total milex for 2013 was N364 billion; capital milex of 300,045,200,000(82.43%) and recurrent milex of 63,954,800,000(17.57%). In 2014, total milex was N340 billion; capital milex of 305,728,000,000(89.92%) and recurrent milex of 34,272,000,000(10.08%).

Table 1.1 equally shows the structure in percentage terms. Between 2008 and 2014, capital expenditure constituted an average of 14.64 percent of total expenditure while recurrent expenditure constituted 85.36 percent. This means a very high proportion of total

expenditure was absorbed by the recurrent expenditure. This explains why new equipment could not be easily bought and old ones properly maintained. All these had a negative effect on the combat readiness and emergency response of the armed forces in the preservation of internal security

According to El-Rufai,(2012), the analysis of 2012 defence spending goes thus:

The bureaucracy overseeing the whole defence establishment consisting of the ministry populated mostly by politicians and civil servants, and the Defence Headquarters, where passed-over generals, admirals and air marshals are warehoused, along with other officers and men will consume about N25.9billion of the budget, or about N342,000 to service each soldier, airman and rating in the Armed Forces...

The Nigerian Army's 60,000 officers and men are distributed across five divisions and an elite brigade listed here in accordance with the order of battle in case of conflict (1) Presidential Guards Brigade, Abuja (2) 82nd Division, Enugu (3) 2nd Infantry Division, Ibadan (4) 3rd Armoured Division, Jos (5) 1st Mechanised Division, Kaduna and (6) Lagos Garrison now renamed 81st Division. The major equipment of the Army include battle tanks, reconnaissance vehicles, personnel carriers, Howitzers, field guns and rocket launchers, as well as anti-tank guns and surface to air missiles. A large percentage of these are aged and out of service, and need urgent updating and replacement. The total budget of the Army is N122.4billion, nearly a third of the total defence budget but only N5.77billionis for acquisition of equipment and weaponry, while N116.7billionis for recurrent needs. The average direct cost per head of our soldiers and men is some N1.61 million compared with between N7-10 million for the Air Force and Navy (see below) indicating an urgent need to right-size the Army to free up resources for operational equipment, tools and training.

The Defence Industries Corporation (DIC) in Kaduna was set up in the 1960s to undertake local manufacture of equipment, arms and ammunition for the country. It did well until the mid-1980s when it became better known for furniture-making and salt manufacturing than military production. A similar facility in Brazil manufactures a broad range of military hardware for domestic needs and exports. This year, DIC is allocated N4.6 billion out of which about N3.5billion will go into development of advanced armament applications. This is a positive development.

The Navy's capital budget is nearly twice that of the much larger Army, because operating largely in the creeks and on the Atlantic Ocean can be pretty expensive. The Navy's total budget is N69.2 billion with about N59billion going towards personnel and overhead costs. The Navy's ships are all aged and overdue for replacement... each naval personnel will cost the treasury about



N9.89 million this year...The Nigeria Air Force has its tactical air command in Makurdi with Russian MiG-21 fighter jets, maritime squadrons in Benin with Dornier 128 and 228 aircraft, military transport group in Lagos with C-130, special forces group and combat squadron in Port Harcourt with Mirage 35P, weapons school and training squadron in Kainji with Alpha jets, flying training schools and command in Kaduna with Air Beetle and Dornier aircraft, and Mirage 34 for the flying school in Enugu. Most of these aircraft were acquired in the 1970s through to the 1990s and therefore overdue for updating and replacement.

The Air Force has been earmarked a total of N64.3billion comprising N49.2billion for staff costs, N9.1billion for overhead and nearly N6billion for acquisition of operating equipment and weaponry. Whether the amount, less than \$40 million this year will begin this needed process of updating and replacement is open to debate. Each Air Force personnel will cost the Nigerian treasury about N7.15 million this year. When one carefully peruses the capital budgets of the DHQ and Army, most of the capital spending is going towards buildings, some ammunition and vehicle spares. This year, we are not buying any equipment for the armoured, artillery and other mechanisation needs of the Army – at least not anywhere in the Budget. The Navy and Air Force are slightly better. The Navy is buying two (yes only two) offshore patrol vessels and six coastal patrol boats and some spares. The Air Force intends to acquire 12 Augusta 109 helicopters, some uniforms, the reactivation of C-130, G222, Alpha Jets and maintenance, and some buildings. No new fighter jets this year!

The rest of the defence budget is for training (N14.79billion), pension, insurance and resettlement (N56billion), barracks development and defence missions (N11.1billion) and the cost of deploying soldiers currently in 34 out of 36 states and the FCT (N17.1billion).

A breakdown of the 2013 security budget shows that the Defence Headquarters is to spend N150 million on travelling and training. Nigerian Army is allocated N130 billion, N7.1 billion of it is for overheads, N116.2 billion for personnel and N6.7 billion capital costs. Nigerian Navy has total allocation of N73 billion out of which N13 billion is for capital expenditure, N52.9 personnel, N6.8 billion for overheads and N58.4 billion for recurrent expenditure. The Airforce will spend N78.762 billion next year and N64.7 billion of it is for personnel cost, N6.9 billion for overheads, and N7.1 billion will go for capital expenditure. The Nigerian Army will spend N510 million on motor vehicle maintenance, N887.7 million office and residential quarters maintenance and a total of N2.1 billion on training and travels.

N1 billion is allocated for procurement of various types of ammunition for the army while production of armoured personnel carriers will cost N350million. The Navy is proposing N10 billion to purchase ships, N1.973 billion on defence equipment and another N1.3 billion on training and travels; N90million on generators. For the Air Force, N1.5 billion will be spent on travels and training, while rehabilitation and repairs of defence equipment got N3.7 billion. The Defence missions has a total of N10.3 billion out of which N539.6 million will go for purchase of secured communication equipment for the missions, (Okechukwu and Anyadike, 2013:25).

Security has to take the lion's share because of the threat of Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants and increasing spate of insecurity and wanton destruction of lives and property by criminal which are on the rise. Ordinarily, security is the primary responsibility of government. What remains to be seen is how a sector's appropriation that accounts for more than those of twelve ministries combined would ensure public safety and stop the country's drift towards the Hobbesian Age, where life is nasty, brutish and short.

The insecurity of lives and property between the years 2008 and 2011 has been unprecedented; the nation witnessed bomb explosions and unwarranted deaths. Despite the huge budget set aside for the rehabilitation of the Niger Delta militants, the problem is yet to solve. Soldiers, Joint Task Forces and the police continue to stalk people on the streets on a daily basis, making the country look like a state under siege. Provincial militia groups keep mutating while national cohesion recedes faster than the gunshots from the creeks. However, we are worried that the huge investment made on security pales into insignificance as basic infrastructure becomes a pipe dream and growth becomes an unattainable desire. Security is a desideratum for achieving the developmental goals of Nigeria; therefore, more support ought to be provided for the police, defence and other counter-terrorism outfits.

The 2014 budget of N340bn for Defence was a little lower than the last year, which was 364bn despite the security challenges that the country is faced with, people fearful of becoming victims of crime has increased from 72% in 2011 to 75% in 2012. Robbery has increased from 11% in 2010 to 17% in 2012. Demand for bribe according to the Foundation had increased from 20 per cent in 2011 to 24 per cent in 2012, while kidnapping and wanton bloodshed tendencies (as manifested in Mubi, Allu recently) have risen tremendously and yet the defence budget and police as well, was reduced. This step in speculative terms indicates that extra budgetary allocations were made surely, as the reduction is coming at a time when the fight against terrorism is at its peak.

This pathetic situation of internal security is critically examined under four case studies in the next section.

#### **4.5 THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

Nwagboso (2012:250-253), outlined four major case studies of internal insecurity in Nigeria as follows:

##### **i. The Niger Delta Crisis**

Conflict in the Niger Delta arose in the early 1990s due to tensions between the foreign oil corporations and some Niger Delta's minority ethnic groups who felt they were being exploited, particularly the Ogonis and the Ijaws (Osungade, 2008). Thus, ethnic and political unrest continued in the region throughout the 1990s and persisted despite the enthronement of democracy in 1999. However, competition for oil wealth in the region gave rise to agitations, violence and subsequent extra-judicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine Ogoni leaders by Abacha's regime (Ogbodo. 2010:1). This action by Abacha's administration was condemned

not only by many Nigerians, but also the international community. Consequently, the international community expressed her anger by imposing several sanctions on Nigeria during this period. Thus, the inability of the government particularly during the military era to address the root causes of the agitation (environmental problems, poverty, unemployment, lack of basic amenities, etc.), in the Niger Delta region, resulted in proliferation of ethnic groups causing the militarization of nearly the entire region by ethnic militia groups. The agitating group includes the movement for the survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP), founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa. As part of measures to address the root causes of agitation, violence and conflicts in the Niger Delta region, the government established some institutions or agencies to douse the tension in the area. This includes the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC), Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and Ministry of Niger Delta (MND). In spite of these intervention regimes, the conflicts and insecurity in the Niger Delta region persisted. Rather, the region witnessed severe security threats and emergence of other agitating groups affiliated to the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). The emergence of MEND and other agitating groups in the struggle to addressing the injustice by the Federal Government against the region exacerbated the security problems not only in the region, but also in the entire Nigerian state. These include Niger Delta People's Volunteer Force (NDPVF) led by Mujahid Dokubo-Asari and Niger Delta vigilante (NDV) led by Ateke Tom (Amaizu, 2008). The leaders of these agitating groups are from Ijaw nation.

However, the two groups (NDPVF and NDV), dwarf a plethora of smaller militias supposedly numbering more than one hundred in the Niger Delta region. These groups comprised mostly the disaffected young men from Warri, Port Harcourt, Yenegoa and their sub-urban areas (Aderoju, 2008:120). Against this backdrop, daily civilian life was disrupted, forcing schools and economic activities to shut down (Aderoju, 2008:542). Similarly,

properties of indigenes of the area worth millions of naira were destroyed. To arrest the challenges of insecurity in the Niger Delta, the Federal Government of Nigeria applied minimal force in a bid to ensure that these militias drop their arms and end their hostilities against the government and the people of the area. In August 2008, the federal government launched a massive military crackdown on militants (Amaizu, 2008:11). Thus, military patrolled waters, hunted for militants, searched all civilian boats for weapons, and raided numerous hideouts. Also, on May 15, 2009 a military operation undertaken by a Joint Task Force (JTF) was put in place by the federal government against MEND and their affiliates in the Niger Delta region (Onoyume, 2008:5). These actions by the federal government were in response to the activities of the militia groups which adversely affected both the residents of the area and the Nigerian economy (Onuorah, 2009:2). Paradoxically, rather than the measures put in place by the federal government to address the challenges of insecurity in the Niger Delta, the situation led to incessant kidnapping of not only the foreign oil workers, but also the indigenes and residents of the region. Hence, on June, 2009, the Nigerian Government under the leadership of Late President Umaru Yar'Adua, announced the granting of Amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta region (Rotimi, 2009). The militants were given between August 6 and October 4, 2009 to surrender their weapons to the federal government in return for training and rehabilitation. During the 60 day period, the militants led their groups to surrender their weapons which included rocket-propelled grenades, guns, explosives, ammunition, gunboats, among others. Although the federal governments' Amnesty Programme reduced the rate of militancy in the region, the incessant kidnapping activities in the Niger Delta region ultimately had a spill-over effect in some states in the South-East geo-political zone of Nigeria.

## **ii. Kidnapping in the South-East Zone of Nigeria**

Kidnapping as a social problem is the act of illegally taking somebody away and keeping him as a prisoner in order to get money or something in return for releasing him. The history of kidnapping in the South-East zone of Nigeria could be traced to hostilities, conflicts and violence in the Niger Delta region. In the South-East zone, especially in Abia and Imo States, kidnapping activities were mainly targeted at prominent indigenes and residents of these states. This situation was pervasive shortly after the 2007 general elections in Nigeria. This is partly because, the youths that were used as political thugs by politicians during the 2007 general elections in these states subsequently engaged in kidnapping as means of livelihood after the elections. Indeed, confession by those apprehended indicated that some politicians in these states supplied guns to youths for the purpose of rigging the 2007 general elections. Unfortunately these guns were not retrieved at the end of the elections. Consequently, kidnapping later turned to profitable business mostly among the youths in Abia, Imo, Ebonyi and other states in the zone. Thus, the increasing rate of kidnapping activities in Abia State, particularly in Aba metropolis, resulted in several foiled attempts to kidnap the Abia State Governor, Chief Theodore Orji in 2008 (Nwogu, 2008). Thus, from 2007 to 2010, several prominent men in Aba and its environs were kidnapped for ransom. This adversely affected the economy of Abia State as many businessmen and manufacturing companies relocated to other states like Enugu and Anambra. Also, this pathetic situation got to a crescendo, when school children were kidnapped in Aba in 2010. However, the kidnapping of school children in Aba, as well as common men in the metropolis forced all the commercial banks in the area to close down for several days in 2010. It is pertinent to note that prior to this period, many commercial banks were robbed in Aba, which is the commercial nerve of Abia state. In rural areas, kidnapping of traditional rulers and poor people were also rampant. Worse still, people were kidnapped while attending church services and village meetings (Ajani, 2010). To address the spate of kidnapping in the South-

East zone particularly in Abia state, the federal government deployed soldiers to Aba metropolis and its environs. This bold step taken by the government is put in clear perspective by Okoli (2009) who states that:

Governor Theodore Orji of Abia State formally invited the Army to the State to assist in the fight against crime and criminals, especially kidnapers. Their Governor said the menace of kidnapping seemed to have overwhelmed the police...

The action of the government in response to kidnapping, no doubt, minimized the reported cases of the menace, especially in Aba and its environs. This was partly as a result of intensive attacks launched by the army at the hideout of kidnapers in Ukwu West Local Government Area of Abia State (Sampson, 2010).

### **iii Jos Crisis**

The Jos crisis is another internal security threat to Nigeria which some observers have described as sectarian violence. This pathetic situation which took a radical dimension from 1999, has been a complex one. According to Oladoyinbo (2010):

...the crisis in Jos, Plateau State is a very complex one... it is tribal, religious and social...we discovered that politics is the major cause of some of these crises that erupted in that part of the country... there is no need for some people to use all means to dominate others or use people to subjugate others...the government in Nigeria has no courage...the government is not the solution but rather the problem...the government knows those behind all these riots, those importing arms into this country...

Thus, the Jos crisis has claimed numerous lives of Nigerians and property worth millions of naira. However, the Jos crisis has resulted to several attacks on Christians by Muslims. Indeed, from 2007 - 2010, over 10,000 Christians were slaughtered during the Jos crisis. In 2010 crisis for instance, about 500 Christians lost their lives (Oladoyinbo, 2010: 15). Precisely, the Jos crisis has resulted in unimaginable confrontation, killings, bombings and

other forms of violence. Many observers have argued that the root causes of the crisis was the inordinate desire by Muslims to forcefully convert Christians in the area as Muslim faithful. Others assert that the root causes of Jos crisis are culture and land disputes. Thus, whatever the argument over the remote causes of frequent crisis in Jos may be, the fact remains that it is one of the greatest internal security threats to corporate existence of Nigeria. The Jos crisis which has been Sporadic in places like Dogo - Nahawa, Zot and Rassat, has continued to witness the onslaught and massacre of large number of Nigerians. This ugly trend largely explains why Terror Master, (Late President Gaddafi of Lybia), once suggested that Nigeria should be divided into two religious lines - Muslim and Christian countries. According to Sunday Tribune Editorial, the Islamic Assailants have continued to unleash terror and cause tension in Jos. They have succeeded in displacing Nigerians by setting their houses and property ablaze. According to the report:

...in Jos, conflict seems to recur in every narrowing cycles... deadly riots rocked the city in 1994, 2001, 2008 and two month ago ...in January 2010. The current conflict is said. to have started in reappraisal for the destruction that occurred in January... there have been reports of children and the elderly been particularly targeted by roving gangs armed with guns and machetes... (Sunday Tribune, November 15, 2008:15).

Thus, the crisis in Jos has adversely effected the economy and unity of Nigeria. Also, available evidence has shown that the crisis in Jos which has been fought on sectarian lines may be traced to 'sour relationship' between the Christian and Muslim communities in the area. This is crucial because as Human Right Watch Report argues:

...Jos lies on the border between Nigeria's Muslim majority North and Christian majority South. Access to land resources is often determined by whether one is a native or 'indigene'... Jos is historically Christian city... Settlers are most often Muslims from the North... (Human Right Report, July 10, 2010).

#### **iv. Boko Haram Crisis**



Another major security challenge in Nigeria which has adversely affected the Nigerian economy is the activities of Boko Haram group. Etymologically, the term 'Boko Haram' is derived from Hausa word 'Boko' meaning 'Animist', western, otherwise non-islamic education; and the Arabic word Haram figuratively meaning 'sin' or literally, 'forbidden' (Olugbode, 2010). The Boko Haram is a controversial Nigerian Militant Islamist group that seeks the imposition of Sharia law in the northern states of Nigeria. Ideologically, the group opposes not only western education, but western culture and modern science (Dunia, 2010). Comically, the Boko Haram group asserts that the belief that the world is sphere is contrary to Islam and should be rejected, along Darwinism and theory that rain comes from water evaporated by sun. Historically, the Boko Haran group was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri by Utaz Mohammed Yusuf. In 2004, it moved to Kanama in Yobe state, where it set up a base called 'Afghanistan', used to attack nearby police stations and killing police officers (Awowole-Browne, 2010). However, the founder of the group, Mohammed Yusuf was hostile to democracy and secular education system. This partly explains why he vowed that the war he began in 2002 would ultimately change the political and educational systems in Nigeria, a dream not realized till his death in 2009. The Boko Haram group does not mix with local people in the north and lots of its members that speak only Arabic come from neighbouring Chad. This perhaps explains why the group insists that western education is wrong. The group strongly believes in the Koranic phrase which says "anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors". Consequently, the Boko Haram group promotes a version of Islam which makes it 'haram' or forbidden for muslims to take part in any political or social activities in the western society. This includes voting in election, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education (BBC News Africa, June, 17, 2010). The activities of the Boko Haram group constitute serious security challenges in the contemporary Nigerian state. The activities of members of this group which have raised

critical questions among investors on the safety of their investments in Nigeria. This ranges from killing of innocent Nigerians, raping of women, to bombing of major cities and police stations in the northern part of Nigeria, particularly, Borno, Kano, Bauchi, Niger, Yobe, Adamawa, Abuja, among others. Chronologically, the Boko Haram group has dastardly carried out the following attacks in Nigeria since 2009:

i. The Boko Haram stormed Police station at Maiduguri in 2009 and this resulted to death of hundreds of Nigerians.

ii. The group freed hundreds of prisoners in Maiduguri jail in September 2010.

iii. In December 2010, the Boko Haram bombed the city of Jos and this led to death of 80 Nigerians.

iv. Dozens of Nigerians have been killed from 2007 to 2011 largely due to sporadic shootings in Maiduguri, the Borno State Capital by Boko Haram group.

v. Bombed several states in the north after the May 2011 inauguration of President Goodluck Jonathan.

vi. Bombed Police Headquarters, Abuja in June, 2011.

vii. Bombing of churches in Kano, Kaduna, Niger, Bauchi, Adamawa, Abuja in 2011.

Consequently, the criminal and unwholesome acts of the Boko Haram group has not only made Maiduguri, Abuja, Suleja, Damaturu, Minna, among others, cities of fear but also made Nigeria unsafe for investors and tourists.

The rise of Boko Haram terrorist group has posed a key challenge to Nigeria's security. Over these years in study range, they appear to have increased their capability. A sign of their growth, and increasingly daring nature was the bombing of the police headquarters in Abuja and many police stations in the country.

The agitation of this study was triggered by the perceived lack of capability of the present military apparatus in dealing with modern day security needs. In truth, the performance of the military has been hampered by years of underfunding, poor welfare situation, low morale, inadequate training and inadequate equipment or military materiel. This leads us to the next chapter that unveils the structural/ fundamental/root causes of these situations that is in itself a solution to these problems.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

# **THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND ECONOMIC SECURITY IN NIGERIA**

## **5.1 EPISTEMIC CONCEPT OF MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX**

Given the tendency for concepts such as the Military Industrial Complex (MIC) to elicit varying interpretations, matters of epistemic clarifications are apposite in this context. As such, the MIC as a concept central to this paper and hence, deserves further clarification.

The MIC was first coined by President D. Eisenhower, during his admonition/farewell address to the nation in 1961. He maintained that:

In the councils of government, one must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military industrial complex. The potential for a disastrous rise of unprecedented power will persist, but we, as a nation must not allow the weight of this power endanger our democratic process. We must take nothing for granted and it is only an alert citizenry that can compel the proper meshing of strong military machinery with our methods/goals of peace in order for security and peace to prosper together.

(Eisenhower 1961:1035)

Since delivering this speech, the term military industrial complex has been used to relate the existence of armaments industry to the economic and manufacturing base of the state. However, with the differing views with regards to MIC, understanding the concept is subject to different interpretations. Looking at the example of MIC in Russia (formerly Soviet Union), it was highlighted that there were high levels of policy influence within the military and the industry rather than hijacking the foreign policy by a collective interest(Adoba, 2012:2).

According to Weber (2001:13), the MIC refers to the cooperative relationship between the military and the industry that produces the military equipment. Koistinen (1980:1) on the other hand, views MIC as an accepted process by which other institutions, most especially the

military and other business ventures work together to provide the state with the business capabilities of war.

The differing definitions on the subject matter of military industrial complex shows that there is no universally accepted definition. However, for this study, MIC will be defined according to Adoba, (2012:3), as “the broad spectrum of relationship and support between the military and other strategic non-military establishments that are involved in the research and development of services critical to the sustenance and boosting of the state’s capacity to meet its security needs” (Aminu 2012:57). In clearer terms, it is the cooperative relationship between the producers and consumers of military goods and services.

Describing this definition in Nigeria, it involves the symbiotic relationship between the legislative arm- National Assembly, the military establishment- the ministry of defence and the arms industry- a combination of defence industries corporation of Nigeria and other manufacturing industries in Nigeria. In the previous chapter, emphasis was laid on the first two and their operations, but this chapter will focus more attention on the arms industry.

## **5.2 DEVELOPMENT OF DEFENSE INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF NIGERIA AND SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN ARMS PRODUCTION.**

The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria was established by an Act of Parliament in 1964. Consequently, a West German manufacturing firm Fritz Werner was assigned the task of providing technical expertise and setting up the ordnance Factory in Kaduna.

The objective of the federal government in setting it up was many to achieve self sufficiency in military and Para-military requirements. The following courses of actions were outlined.

- The operation, maintenance and control in such place or places in Nigeria as the minister may require of factories (in this act referred to as ordnance factories) for the manufacture, storage and disposal of ordnance and ancillary stores and material intended for a capable of being used by the armed forces and other forces or persons as. The council of ministers may authorize, and vested in corporation under subsection(1) of this section or hereafter executed on land the location which is approved by the minister.
- The inspection or testing, as the case maybe, of ordnance and material.
- Such other duties as may be prescribed under this act.

Wherever they have been established, defense industries have often turned out to be solid foundation for modern technology and industrialization, the optimum utilization of indigenous raw materials and the gradual improvement in technology.

The defense industry corporation as constituted in 1964, had as part of its objective the implementation of the government's policy on defense requirements. It was primarily initiate action with a new to getting imported items manufactured locally

The ordnance section of the DIC, which is indeed its nucleus, was designed and equipped to manufacture small arms and corresponding ammunition the initial production was programmed for 18,000 units of SMGM12 and 5,000 units of rifle. The production of Double Barrel short gun, a weapon that is in wide use for gaming throughout the country, and the pistol that never got beyond the drawing board. This was unfortunate. The ammunition workshop had the initial capacity to produce 6 million rounds of 7.62mm per annum in to produce three times its original capacity, once the need for Baretta riffle subsided, the factory stopped its production. The weapons workshop which formally devoted its production to Baretta BM 59 and which had a lion's of man-power became idle (Imobighe,1981:187) The

first technical partner of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) was Fritz Werner of Western Germany. FW designed and built the Kaduna Ordnance Factories in 1964 with the following production capacities;

- 5000 units of BM 59 Rifles per annum
- 18,000 units of SMG 12 per annum
- 12,000,000 rounds of 7.62mm x 51 per annum
- 4,000,000 rounds of 9mm x 19 per annum.

The Nigerian Civil War which occurred between 1967 -1970 necessitated the tripling of the above production rates and the factory was thus able to make a significant contribution to the war effort.

After the war in 1970, the lucrative arms market for DICON ended. Therefore, in order to remain in business DICON decided to use its equipment to produce civilian items like rural water supply equipment, industrial spare parts and furniture for sale to the public.(  
<https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/spotlight-of-the-defence-industries-corporation-of-nigeria/>)

#### SPECIAL VEHICLE PLANT (SVP) PROJECT

On 22nd January 1979 the Federal Government signed an agreement with Steyr Daimler Puch AG (Defence Division) of Austria. The agreement provides for the construction of Factory Building in Bauchi complete with all utilities, roads, rails and furniture for the production of Armoured Personnel carriers (APC).

The Factory was designed to assemble in 8-hour day shift the following;

300 units/yr 2 axles (4×4) Pinzgauer

(1 ton payload)

- 200 units/yr 3 axles (6×6) Pinzgauer

(1.5 ton payload)

- 140 units/yr Armoured Personnel Carriers

- 45 units/yr Command vehicles (APC)

- 10 units/yr Motor Carriers(ACP)

- 5 units/yr Ambulances(APC)

Factory buildings, utilities, roads, workshop equipment have all been completed and commissioned since 1982. The SVP buildings are currently being utilized by the Nigerian Army for the maintenance and rehabilitation of Armoured Fighting Vehicles and Armoured Personnel Carriers under a contractual arrangement,(  
<https://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2011/10/10/spotlight-of-the-defence-industries-corporation-of-nigeria/>)

## RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

In 2004, DICON successfully produced prototype medium range weapons namely 60mm mortar, 81mm mortar and the RPG-7. The weapons were successfully test-fired at the Kachia range with the former President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo in attendance. The



Corporation has produced locally an assault rifle similar to the AK 47, and is awaiting a new production line for the rifle which is currently under construction.

In 2011, DICON planned to establish a new production line for the manufacture of 7.62mm x 39 ammunition which is the preferred ammunition by the Security Services. This informed the Corporation's current effort to develop and mass produce a Nigerian version of AK47, which uses the same 7.62mm x 39mm ammo

## PRODUCTS

- 81mm Mortar
- Rocket Propelled Grenade Launchers(RPG 7)
- General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG)
- Sub-Machine Guns (SMG)
- AK 47 assault rifles
- \*NR – Light Automatic Rifle(LAR) (\*NR= Nigerian Rifle)
- Hand Grenades
- BMG Tripod Stand
- Static Display Machines
- 9mm X 19 (Live) ammunition
- 7.62mm X 51 (Live) ammunition

- 7.62mm X 51 (Blank Bulleted) ammunition
  
- 7.62mm X 51 (Blank) Ammunition
  
- 9mm X 19 (Blank Star) ammunition
  
- Military Field Kitchen

On 5 July, 2007, The Journalists For Development Communication Initiative (J.F.D.C.I) reported thus:

Last September when President Obasanjo, visited, he commissioned OBJ 006 after some rounds of test-firing at a secret firing range of the Nigerian Army, located in the forests along Kaduna-Kachia road. During the second week of May this year when he visited DICON's factory in Kaduna , the retired general admirably caressed the gun named after him. He expressed profound joy that DICON, which once performed at 15% capacity utilization, can now look forward to a robust future with small arms export operations. According to Nnaemeka Maduegbunam, DICON's capacity utilization is now at about 70%...along with the acquisition of a sophisticated range of equipment for the manufacturing of OBJ 006, an official document given to TELL at DICON shows that it now produces automatic sub machine gun, General purpose Machine Gun, GPMG, with firing rate of 1,300 rounds per minute, rocket propelled grenade launchers, mortars, hand grenades, and ammunition. DICON, which had a chequered existence since it began business in 1964, is also producing civilian products such as industrial machine tools, single barrel shotguns, coat of arms, hand pumps, mace, laterite compression machines and furniture. All these was made possible with the N1 billion released by President Obasanjo from the Petroleum Technology Development Trust Fund, to DICON in 2006.

Also, on 2 June 2011, National mirror reported thus:

The Federal Government and its Serbian counterpart are to cooperate in the areas of security and defence. Serbian Minister of Defence, Mr Dragan

Sutanovac, stated this yesterday when he visited the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) in Kaduna.

Sutanovac, who was received by the DICON Director General, Brig- Gen. Suleiman Labaran said: “This visit is based on the agreement we signed two months ago in Serbia to develop a corporation between the two countries. One of the possible areas of cooperation is, of course, in the area of defence industries. We are offering cooperation in the area of military academy, medical academy and military engineering, among others.

“We believe this cooperation will go a long way because Serbia is one of the biggest exporters of ammunition in South- East Europe, we have a lot of experience in this field and Nigeria can be our main partner. This is my first visit to sub-Saharan Africa and I believe it would not be the last time.”

He, however, listed possible areas of cooperation between the two countries as development of production lines for arms and ammunition, production of armored personnel carriers and training and manpower development, among others.

On 2 July, 2012, Vanguard reported thus:

President Goodluck Jonathan Monday in Kaduna commissioned a ballistics vest factory complex for the production and sale of military hardware, including personal protection armour such bullet proof vests and night vision goggle equipment, noting that henceforth, Nigeria would stop the importation of military goods that can be produced by the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria.

Towards this end, he said, the federal government is set to send a bill to the National Assembly to amend the DICON Act to give the official Nigerian government arms manufacturer, a global outlook and allow it to export its products abroad.

Dressed in an army uniform with the highest rank of Field Marshal, President Jonathan...disclosed that the federal government would also give preferential treatment to any local or foreign firm ready to partner and site defence industries anywhere in Nigeria.

The ballistics vest factory, situated in Kakuri, Kaduna State, is a result of a joint venture agreement between the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) and an Israeli firm –Maron Nigeria Limited. It is operating under the Public Private Partnership (PPP). The joint venture company – DICON-MARON – is also to diversify into the tactical textile

field, offering designing and developing services for tactical textile solutions.

DICON on its part, with Major General Labaran as DG, has perfected the production of rifles, pistols, sub-machine guns and General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMG). It has also the prototypes of the RPG (Rocket Propelled Grenade) Launcher and the 81mm mortar lined up for production.

Jonathan stated that with the take off of the new factory, along with new innovations in the Navy and Air Force, there was every reason for the nation to be proud that the military has keyed into the transformation agenda of Nigeria.

His words, “With this commissioning, you must convinced me beyond all reasonable doubt that DICON cannot produce any product before such product is imported. This commissioning marks the beginning of a vibrant defence industry.”

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in the light of the above perceived many achievements of the Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria, there still exists in Nigeria, a full time external dependence- massive importation of weapons that do not match operational environment as clearly shown in the ongoing fight against the Boko Haram Insurgents that led to the issuing of death warrants to about 50 officers because they refused to fight without adequate weapons. Apart from detracting the Army from freedom of action, this situation has had adverse effects on its operational effectiveness in its maintenance of national security, (Adoba, 2012:10).The impact of this trend on the Nigerian society is discussed exhaustively in the next section.

## **5.3 MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA.**

### **5.3.1 Military Industrial Complex And Labour Market security**

MIC and labour market security in this work, the review of the BIS countries of Brazil, India and South Africa, noted that in India, its organization phase in the development of a military industrial complex witnessed total focus on the development of its research institute, public sector institutions and military ordnance factories. In two decades (1949-1962), India:

- Established thirty three ordnance factories, nine public sector undertakings and thirty-four (34) major research and development organizations, all financed by government.
- Built helicopters, aircrafts, armored personnel carriers (APC) and other high tech equipments
- Thus, increased the number of Jobs by adding 59% of employed workers to the workforce which in turn produced 44% of the goods.
- At (2006-2007), India had about 40 major defense and development organizations that employ 25,000 people, 6,000 scientists, making it the largest civilian research organization.

Summing up the experiences of Brazil and south Africa:

- Foreign collaboration
- Mobilization of industrial resources by purchasing licenses and establishing local facilities
- Recruitment exercises and specialized manpower industry dominated by either private or public sector
- Equipment procurement from outside were modified and improved upon. Policies enacted to encourage domestic innovations and industries were driven by a sense of political will, patriotism and commitment.

- Research and development institutes were adequately funded and staffed with experienced specialists.

With the data provided in the previous section 5.2, it is observed that in Nigeria.

- Defense production flourished only during the Nigerian civil war after which the trend shifted to defense construction (Fayemi, 1994)
- The civilian population have been isolated from the process of developing defence industries. There were attempts such as Nigerian machine tool industry (NMTT) the Ajaokuta steel complex (ASC), the Delta steel company (DSC) the project development Agency (PRODA), the Nigerian Air force Training Group (NAFTG) and the Nigerian Naval Engineering college (NNEC). These according to best practices have lived beyond expectations. The Nigerian military created in the colonial era as now was intended to protect the government “from” rather than “for” citizens causing civil-military relations to lag.
- There exist lack of a coherent strategy and need for military industrial complex as evident in the number of unfinished and abrupt projects
- Huge amount of national wealth has been spent on several occasions to revive defence industries in Nigeria (aside the little allocation to defence industries annually) extra budgetary spending) to little avail. There has been clamour by scholars to cut down defence spending as it doesn't contribute to GDP. Between 2008 and 2014, Nigeria's military expenditure as a share of GDP is below 1%; 0.8%, 0.9%, 0.5%,0.6%,0.5%,0.5% and 0.4% respectively

Premised on the facts above, unemployment rate has been on the increase. Labour market security arises when there are ample opportunities for adequate income-earning activities. The vision 20.20/20 economic blue print report made the following observation:

- Of the 6million Nigerians graduating annually from the educational system, only about 10% are often employed thereby leaving about 4.5 million into the despairing labour market annually (a combination of unemployment, low employment and social exclusion)
- From the teeming population of about 140million people, 67million youths are unemployed and 80% of that number do not possess a university degree.

This is threatening to national security as these youths that have no access to income earning opportunities, see crimes of varying degrees as solace.

Thus, the Nigerian state is fully ripe for the type of rapid reform undertaken by the Indian government in the development of a military industrial complex.

### 5.3.2 Military Industrial Complex and Human Development Index

Still working with the data provided in 5.2 and the review of the BIS countries, this section assesses the impact of military industrial complex on human development index in Nigeria Human Development Index (NDI) is a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy level and income level. It measures the impact of economic policies on the quality of life and falls into three broad categories. High, medium and low human development.

**Table 5.1 Human Development Index, 2008**

Rank		Country	HDI	
Rank in Africa	Rank Worldwide		New 2014 Estimates for 2013	Change compared between 2014 report and 2013 report
<b>High human development</b>				

1	55	 <a href="#">Libya</a>	0.784	▼ 0.005
2	63	 <a href="#">Mauritius</a>	0.771	▲ 0.002
3	71	 <a href="#">Seychelles</a>	0.756	▲ 0.001
4	90	 <a href="#">Tunisia</a>	0.721	▲ 0.002
5	93	 <a href="#">Algeria</a>	0.717	▲ 0.002
<b>Medium human development</b>				
6	109	 <a href="#">Botswana</a>	0.683	▲ 0.002
7	110	 <a href="#">Egypt</a>	0.682	▲ 0.001
8	112	 <a href="#">Gabon</a>	0.674	▲ 0.004
9	118	 <a href="#">South Africa</a>	0.658	▲ 0.004
10	123	 <a href="#">Cape Verde</a>	0.636	▲ 0.001
11	127	 <a href="#">Namibia</a>	0.626	▲ 0.004
12	129	 <a href="#">Morocco</a>	0.617	▲ 0.003
13	138	 <a href="#">Ghana</a>	0.573	▲ 0.002
14	140	 <a href="#">Republic of the Congo</a>	0.564	▲ 0.003
15	141	 <a href="#">Zambia</a>	0.561	▲ 0.007
16	142	 <a href="#">São Tomé and Príncipe</a>	0.558	▲ 0.002
17	144	 <a href="#">Equatorial Guinea</a>	0.556	—
<b>Low human development</b>				
18	147	 <a href="#">Kenya</a>	0.535	▲ 0.004
19	148	 <a href="#">Swaziland</a>	0.530	▲ 0.001
20	149	 <a href="#">Angola</a>	0.526	▲ 0.002
21	151	 <a href="#">Rwanda</a>	0.506	▲ 0.004
22	152	 <a href="#">Cameroon</a>	0.504	▲ 0.003
22	152	 <a href="#">Nigeria</a>	0.504	▲ 0.004



24	155	 <a href="#">Madagascar</a>	0.498	▲ 0.002
25	156	 <a href="#">Zimbabwe</a>	0.492	▲ 0.008
26	159	 <a href="#">Tanzania</a>	0.488	▲ 0.004
26	159	 <a href="#">Comoros</a>	0.488	▲ 0.002
28	161	 <a href="#">Mauritania</a>	0.487	▲ 0.002
29	162	 <a href="#">Lesotho</a>	0.486	▲ 0.005
30	163	 <a href="#">Senegal</a>	0.485	▲ 0.001
31	164	 <a href="#">Uganda</a>	0.484	▲ 0.004
32	165	 <a href="#">Benin</a>	0.476	▲ 0.003
33	166	 <a href="#">Sudan</a>	0.473	▲ 0.001
33	166	 <a href="#">Togo</a>	0.473	▲ 0.003
35	170	 <a href="#">Djibouti</a>	0.467	▲ 0.002
36	171	 <a href="#">Côte d'Ivoire</a>	0.452	▲ 0.004
37	172	 <a href="#">The Gambia</a>	0.441	▲ 0.003
38	173	 <a href="#">Ethiopia</a>	0.435	▲ 0.006
39	174	 <a href="#">Malawi</a>	0.414	▲ 0.003
40	175	 <a href="#">Liberia</a>	0.412	▲ 0.005
41	176	 <a href="#">Mali</a>	0.407	▲ 0.001
42	177	 <a href="#">Guinea-Bissau</a>	0.396	—
43	178	 <a href="#">Mozambique</a>	0.393	▲ 0.004
44	179	 <a href="#">Guinea</a>	0.392	▲ 0.001
45	180	 <a href="#">Burundi</a>	0.389	▲ 0.003
46	181	 <a href="#">Burkina Faso</a>	0.388	▲ 0.003
47	182	 <a href="#">Eritrea</a>	0.381	▲ 0.001
48	183	 <a href="#">Sierra Leone</a>	0.374	▲ 0.006
49	184	 <a href="#">Chad</a>	0.372	▲ 0.002

50	185	 <a href="#">Central African Republic</a>	0.341	▼ 0.024
51	186	 <a href="#">Democratic Republic of the Congo</a>	0.338	▲ 0.005
52	187	 <a href="#">Niger</a>	0.337	▲ 0.002

Source: Wikipedia, [http://wikipedia.org/wiki/list\\_of\\_African\\_countries\\_by\\_HDI](http://wikipedia.org/wiki/list_of_African_countries_by_HDI).

The table above is a rank of African countries by human development index (2014). Nigeria occupies the 22nd position in Africa and 152nd position in the world rank with an HDI of 0-504 representing a 0.004 increase from the previous year still comprised under the low HDI. While India and South Africa have medium HDI and Brazil has high HDI.

According to figures provided by World Bank in 2014, the poverty rate in Nigeria had dropped from 35.2 percent of population in 2010/2011 to rate in the now areas and 12.6 percent in the urban areas.

Youth literacy was valued at 75.57 percent in 2008 and adult literacy was valued at 51.08. This implies that the Nigerian population is a highly literate one. Life expectancy at birth in Nigeria is 52-62 years.

The expending role of the military in economic development globally makes the lag in Nigerian Defence Industries suicidal to Nigeria, as a nation, especially with the increasing threats of terrorism and general insecurity. Poverty and literacy rate in Nigeria is high, life expectancy is low, and on the other angle, military expenditure as a share of GDP is less than 1%. This implies that presently in the country (Nigeria), military expenditure contributes to the impoverishing of the Nigerian citizens. However, the high literacy rate is a breathe of relief as it symbolizes again that the Nigerian population can stand rapid military research and development given proper strategising and coordination.

## **5.4 FACTORS THAT AFFECT MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN NIGERIA**

### **5.4.1 Composition of the board under the DIC Act, Schedule 1**

Under the DIC act schedule 1, membership shall consist of nine fit persons appointed by the minister as indicated below:

- a. Permanent secretary, Ministry of Defence – chairman
- b. General manager – Deputy Chairman
- c. One on the recommendation of the Accountant-General
- d. One from the ministry of Industries
- e. One from the Army
- f. One from the Navy
- g. One from the Air force
- h. One from the Nigerian Police
- i. The Chief Accountant in the Ministry of Defence (Now Permanent secretary, Finance).

The above observation was noted by Imobighe, (1981:152-153), he noted that the composition of the board did not reflect the type to which one could say the government attached high priority and utmost importance. It was structured as another bureaucratic set up meant for routine administration. For maximum result, a project of this nature needed a high-powered board that could plan and act decisively

### **5.4.2 Insufficient Capital Allocation to the Defence Sector in Nigeria**

As already espoused by the chapter four of this work and as shown in figure 1.1 below, the prevailing pattern shows that recurrent military expenditure takes the lion share or larger portion of allocation to defence expenditure mirrors total military expenditure. In essence, the higher the allocation to defence, the greater the allocation for recurrent expenditure. Also,

even in the low capital milex, there is a lopsided allocation of resources in favour of buildings and other civil engineering projects (defence construction) as against the equipping of the armed forces (defence production).

In 1970-74, Capital allocation to defense industries corporation was 1,000,000. In 1975 – 80, it rose to 100,000,000, then,125,000,000 in 1981 – 85(Fayemi,1994:269).In 2012, DIC was allocated N4.6billionout of which about N3.5billionwill go into development of advanced armament applications and in 2014,DICON received 0.56% of N340bn, which is the total milex.


**Fig 5.1: Nigerian security budget analysis**

# NIGERIA: SECURITY BUDGET ANALYSIS

## \*2014 Proposed Budget

Exchange Rate: N160 = \$1


### 2014 BUDGET OF SECURITY AGENCIES




\*includes




Most of Security budget spending goes to salaries and administrative costs



### Comparing Security Sector Budgets




64% Ministry of Defence got 64% of its capital expenditure in 2013



## \$5.86bn

Total Size of Nigeria's Budget for Security



Most of Security Spending goes to salaries and administrative costs

### How much do security agencies budget for weapons?

**NIGERIAN ARMY**  
Procurement of Ammunition  
\$4.36m

**NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER**  
Procurement of Security Equipment  
\$5.23m

**STATE SECURITY SERVICE**  
Firearms and Ammunition  
\$2.19m

### Nigerian Airforce

**MI-34/35 Helicopter**  
\$1.79m

**6 MI-35m Helicopters**  
\$11.6bn

## DO WE NEED TO RE-ORDER OUR PRIORITIES?

### 2014 BUDGET

**\$937.5m**  
National Assembly

**\$825m**  
Nigeria Army

**\$75m**  
Army Quick Response Team

**\$68.75m**  
State House Budget

Source: Budget Office of the Federation

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Source: www.yourbudgit.com

### **5.4.3 Proliferation of Small Arms and Light weapons**

A common indicator of the disjointed link between the legislative arm, military establishment and the arms industry in Nigeria is the use of Small Arms and Light Weapons(SALWs). Thus, Nigeria now features prominently in the three-spot continuum of transnational organised trafficking of SALWs in West Africa: origin, transit route and destination. Weapons in circulation in Nigeria come from local fabrication, residue of guns used during the civil war, thefts from government armouries, smuggling, dishonest government-accredited importers, ethnic militias, insurgents from neighbouring countries and some multinational oil corporations operating in the oil-rich. The civil war arguably commences the militarization of Nigeria society. In essence the proliferation of SALW did

escalate during and after the war, both arms dealers, some state personnel and corrupt state officials all contributed to blossoming small arms market linking neighboring states as well as those in the Niger Delta area through the sea. Put differently, during the civil war large numbers of SALW passed into general circulation, hence the militarization of Nigeria society (John et al. 2007). The legacy bequeathed to Nigeria by the thirty-month civil war was a protracted military rule, though there was a period of interregnum from October 1979-December 1983 after which the military continued until return to civil rule in 1999. The continuous stay of the military in power arguably led to entrenchment of what scholars referred to as military national psyche and a culture of violence. Therefore, what was virtually believed to be in place at that time was that political power only flows through the barrels of gun. For example the government of General Sanni Abacha was characterized by brutal repression in order to maintain a grip on power. Nigeria society in response to military oppression resulted to violence; the result of which is the uncontrollable proliferation of SALW. Its effect on sociopolitical and economic development in Nigeria has never been

positive but negative. The proliferation of light weapons and illicit arms trafficking in some parts of Africa have been a major threat to peace, security and development in the continent and Nigeria is not left out in this quagmire.

Other explanations for the proliferation of SALWs as enumerated by Adetiba, (2012:179) includes: Political/electoral violence, politicization of ethno-religious differences, growth of ethnic militias, unemployment and poverty, domestic agitation for resource control, and profitability and its socio-economic utility. All these aforementioned factors fuel SALWs in Nigeria, which in turn affects the smooth running of the defence industries in Nigeria as arms dealers and producers are scattered round the country.

#### **5.4.4 Nigeria's Porous borders**

Another factor which is a corollary to the first factor, is that Africa by virtue of its size, the second largest continent in the world and population, the second most populated and given the level of its development experience persistent problem of border control. Also, due to the sheer size of some of its countries, for instance, Nigeria, has 770 km of shared land border with the Republic of Benin to the west, about 1500 km with Niger to the north, 1700 km with Cameroon to the east, 90 km with the Republic of Chad to the north-east and 850 km maritime border on the Atlantic Ocean. Out-stretched these tally up to 4910 km of borders which have to be controlled. Each of these entry points, along with the airports, has been used to smuggle arms into the country. One can imagine how tasking it is to effectively control these borders. It is also interesting to observe that all three largest sub-Saharan countries, namely Sudan (the continent's overall largest), the Congo DRC (3rd overall largest) and Chad (5th overall largest) have been experiencing instability and armed conflict for long. It may well be that their size and their porous borders make it easy for weapons to be smuggled inflaming and protracting violence (Ngang, 2007).

## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION**

#### **6.1 SUMMARY**

The research studied the Nigerian defence strategies and national security vis avis budgetary allocation to national defence sector and the establishment of Military Industrial Complex (MIC) as they implicate on internal security and economic health of the nation respectively. This is done with respect to how ineffective these strategies have been in providing for the maximum security need of the Nigerian populace. The paper took into cognizance the fallouts of these strategies; especially the budgetary allocation which over the year has been poorly funded and inadequately appropriated on one hand and on the other hand, a weak MIC base in Nigeria which has predisposed the country to wanton military spending, deficit defence budget and a colossal labour insecurity which put together engender humanitarian consequences and economic damage to the Nigerian state.

Based on the foregoing, the study tries to underscore how inefficient and ineffective these two defence strategies adopted by the Nigeria government has been, blaming such weakness on the neo patrimonial, prebendalist, rent seeking and corrupt nature of the Nigerian state. It is against the backdrop of these strategies which are founded within the context of the above factors that the Marxist theory of post colonial state is adopted for the analysis.

To achieve this academic proficiency, attempt to answer the following questions were made;

(1) Has budgetary allocation to national defence sector ensured internal security in Nigeria?



(2) Does establishment of Military Industrial Complex ensure economic security in Nigeria?

However, in order to achieve this mission, the study relied on the following objectives:

- To examine whether the budgetary allocation to national defence sector ensured internal security in Nigeria
- To examine whether the establishment of Military Industrial Complex ensure economic security in Nigeria.

In the bid of answering this question, the researcher was guided by the following hypothesis:

(1)The the budgetary allocation to national defence sector has not ensured internal security in Nigeria

(2)The establishment of Military Industrial Complex has not ensured economic security in Nigeria.

The work made some findings:

- The two strategies have meted a colossal damage to the general security well being of the nation as the fund allocated to the defence sector over the years have not yielded commensurate positive result as expected but has always been on the decline. This is evident in the lethal sectarian insurgency in the north east which has remained intractable irrespective of security votes.
- The effectiveness of these two strategies has been in doubt especially the weak Military Industrial base of the country which has kept the nation at the mercy of western influence and control due to her lack of readiness to establish a viable military industrial complex. This is shown in the illicit smuggling of arms through

Nigeria's porous borders, the proliferation of light and heavy weapons in the country, labour insecurity and to mention but a few.

The work is divided into six chapters. Chapter one focuses on the introductory and methodology issues. Chapter two dwells on the review of relevant literature where the account of the Nigeria's defence spending over the years and military industrial complex were critically reviewed. Chapter three focused on the methodology used in the research. While Chapter four focuses on the budgetary allocation to national defence sector and internal security in Nigeria with emphasis on national defence management, military budgeting process, factors affecting budgeting, analysis of defence budget allocation since 2008 and threats to internal security, Chapter five dwells on the establishment of military industrial complex in Nigeria with emphasis on its epistemic background, Defence corporation of Nigeria, factors affecting MIC in Nigeria, the Defence Industry Corporation Act of 1964 and finally, the socio-economic development of Nigeria.

. Chapter six focuses on summary, conclusion and recommendations. The Marxian Theory of Post colonial state was used as the framework of analysis for the study.

## **6.2 CONCLUSION**

Relatively high military spending is not a guarantee of military success or the security of borders. Military spending determined only the increment to one of the four dimensions that according to Samuel Huntington (1996) produce military power. This was the quantitative dimension (men, arms and resources). The other three are technological (effectiveness of the equipment), organisational (deployment and morale of the troops), and societal (ability and willingness to apply military force in various situations). Military activity itself takes place at

four different levels- political, strategic, operational, and tactical- of which the political sphere contains the funding decision and the defence industry dictates the other three.

This work concludes that one of the ways by which government has responded to these threats is to increase budgetary allocations to defence and security personnel which has been of little significance as the threats equally increases due to constraints of emergency response and combat readiness of the Nigerian Armed Forces, that is implied in allocation of more defence spending to recurrent needs. Excessive personnel costs mean that there are fewer resources available for equipment, training, maintenance, and other operational needs.

This work further concludes that elsewhere, in some post-colonial states as the BIS countries of Brazil, India and South Africa, that Military Industrial Complex through defence industries are pilots of the economy, rather than a burden as experienced in Nigeria, improving living standards through massive employment creation and research and development.

Since it has been established that Nigeria runs a militarized economy, it only wise that the civilian population be incorporated into this militarism in this world of globalization.

### **6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS**

As the defence expenditure increases the level of insecurity (insurgency, kidnapping, armed robbery) equally increases in Nigeria and the state tends to further increase her spending on her repressive apparatus to forcefully hold the people within the bounds of order. Thus, this recommendation is divided into two:

Firstly, this work recommends that the composition of the defence budget, that is the capital and the recurrent expenditure be properly balanced, giving more attention to the equipment of the armed forces through investment in defence industries and Research and development under the capital expenditure, that will in the long run adequately cater for

recurrent needs outside Governmental budgetary provisions. This can be ensured through proper accountability and transparency in order to allocate resources between the different functions performed within the defence and security sectors to maximise operational performance, not only in terms of disclosure of information (as this was a limitation to this study), but the establishment of an effective and robust system of oversight and control.

Secondly, In order to develop a viable Military Industrial Complex in Nigeria, there is need for:

- The formulation of defence industrial plan that will involve exceedingly high planning input and expertise. There is need for interministerial cooperation especially the incorporation of ministries of commerce and industries, mines and power, agriculture and water resources
- Foreign collaboration and involvement of the private sector in the manufacturing of items used by the armed forces and the civilian population.
- Skilled and innovative personnel in the design, innovation and development of high quality military weapons system. To this effect, the study of military technology should be included in Nigerian institutions, particularly in institutes of technology and the Nigerian Military academy given the relatively high literacy level in Nigeria.
- A sustainable research and development program will enhance the military industrial complex in order to boost her readiness to respond to defence and national security challenges.
- the elite class in Nigeria to muster the political will to pursue the policies and recommendations made in the past that have the potential to transform the defence industrial base of Nigeria.

Developing Military Industrial Complex in Nigeria can lead to an increase from the current 0.6% to 1.2% on the GDP which is within the UN recommended figure of the next five years to fast-track MIC in Nigeria. Thus, within the next five years, it is expected that DICON should be able to stand on its own without government funding as it will help in dealing with the problem of inadequate funding, thereby impacting on national security.

The above recommendations may not be novel in this field, it however calls for a reawakening of the Nigerian state to critically assess where we are and where we ought to be after fifty-four(54) years of independence.