

# **AFRICA AND THE RESSURGENCE OF TERRORISM: REVISITING THE FUNDAMENTALS**

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## **ABSTRACT**

The rise of terrorism in Africa is as a result of the instability, crisis, precarious situations and quagmires among others which are on top notch. These problems, though complex and disturbing, had followed a particular trend in term of terrorism with the rise of insurgentsø as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Hamas and Hezbollah in various states in Africa. Solutions that have been propounded to the issues on terrorism and how to stop the insurgency have failed. The negativism and inherent political intrigues in solution findings towards resolving the terrorist question are but obvious. Thus, the bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya in 1998, the Bombing of the United Nations Headquarters, Abuja, 2009 have therefore brought terrorism to the highest rung of the ladder. Therefore, this paper therefore seeks to revisit the concept of terrorism in light of the terrorist groups in Nigeria, Mali and Kenya and also revisit the fundamentals which have been ignored by the agencies set up to curb the stigma of terrorism as well as propound strategies for covering terrorism.

**Keywords: Terrorism, Negativism, Political Intrigues, Instability and Insurgency.**

## **Introduction**

õIt is important to stress, Africa is a victim of terrorist attacksö

Omar Bongo

The area of focus takes a critical look into Africa and the resurgence of terrorism focusing on the fundamentals which have been ignored. The failures, weaknesses and negativism, which have played an encouraging role in escalating the magnitude of terrorist activities in the contemporary international system, Africa in particular, cannot be overlooked. Providing solutions to the issues of terrorism if that is what it takes has brought about a rise in the activities of these terrorist

groups and hence endangered the lives of citizens of these countries in focus. However, evidences available in the African situation points to the inactions of the body meant to protect lives. It is this facts and the negativism that has allowed for different attacks, ranging from rebels and insurgence to engage in terrorism that have intensified African insecurity problems.

Thus, African and her people have been made to face the terrible situation of terrorism here and there which has gone beyond any possible amelioration. This several complex of problems stem from religious encumbrances, conflicts of power struggle, corruptions, election rigging, economic quagmire and resources control among others, which have however been occasioned by the craze and desires for the enjoyment of the spoils of the state to maintain the statuesque. The continent in this respect has been underscored as a continent of instabilities whose economy was uninteresting and people only good for charity recipients.

In the case of the terrorists, it was as if the opportunity had already been provided for as these terrorists trotted into Africa to encourage mayhems of no abatement. With no measure and no solution in sight, the every green African forest was set on fire uncontrollably. The level of carnage and wanton destruction caused by these insurgents left Africa in a helpless nature. The international community which I term as on lookers with all the assistance provided could not stop the streak of the bombings or even or even fish out these persons from their hiding spots. This international politics in combination with the failure of curbing terrorism exerts its strength on the activities in Kenya, Mali and Nigeria thereby showing no reproofs to the solutions propounded. Premised on this, this paper will further examine some definitions of terrorism, Terrorism in Kenya, Mali and Nigeria with basic instances, reiterated fundamentals and causes of terrorism and then conclude with the strategies for countering terrorism.

### **Conceptual Clarifications/ Definition of the term Terrorism**

Throughout history, every terrorist has been claimed to be a freedom fighter battling against dictatorships and appealing cruelties. Gearson Freedman (2002:10) is of the view that terrorism has historically been seen as a strategic

occurrence, which fluctuates according to religion, geography and culture and so cannot be rigidly defined. It has been used as an instrument by revolutionaries and nationalists and even by governments to maintain state control. Defining and understanding terrorism depends greatly on the perspective of the beholder. While a terrorist act, past or present would be seen by one as an act of revolution and ideological freedom, it would be seen by another as a cruel senseless act of ideological violence.

Wilkinson (2001:106) defines terrorism as a "special form of political violence". The concept of terrorism is, however, a broad one in that due to its intricate nature, defining it has never been an easy task. In the past, terrorism occurred in various frameworks as crime, politics, war, propaganda and religion. The definition of terrorism from a fanatical religious leader will differ from a law enforcement agent (Schmid, 2004: 197).

It is difficult to craft a single sentence that covers all aspects of the phenomena of terrorism, and thus it is no surprise that some attempts at definition are inelegant, cumbersome and bereft of the power of precision. For example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as violent acts that:

Appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping and occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum (FBI, 2006).

Bruce Hoffman notes that terrorism "is fundamentally and inherently political. It is also ineluctably about power: the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change" (Howard & Sawyer, 2004:4). With this, Hoffman defines terrorism as the "*deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change*" (Hoffman, 2006:41).

Eqbal Ahmed, an outspoken and highly acclaimed Indian anti-colonialism scholar, noted that the "terrorist of yesterday is the hero of today and the hero of yesterday becomes the terrorist of today. This is a serious matter of the constantly changing world of images in which we have to keep our heads straight to know what terrorism is and what it is not" (Ahmed, 1998:2). Ahmed identified five types of terrorism which are:

1. State terrorism
2. Religious terrorism
3. Criminal terrorism
4. Political terrorism; and
5. Oppositional terrorism

All of which fit his sample definition of terrorism as "the use of terrorizing methods of governing or resisting a government" (Ahmed, 1998:5). He also provided many examples of the shifting nature of the label of terrorism. One relates to an Israeli prime minister, the late Menachem Begin, who was a former commander-in-chief of the Irgun Tsvai Leumi, a Zionist terrorist organization. Begin once had a £1,000 reward issued for his capture (Ahmed, 1998:1) later he became prime minister.

Jessica Stern argues that terrorism can be distinguished from other forms of violence by only two characteristics: First, it is aimed at noncombatants; and second, it is intended to instill fear in the target audience. Thus Stern defines terrorism as "an act or threat or violence against noncombatants with the objective of exacting revenge, intimidating, or otherwise influencing an audience" (Stern, 2003: 20).

Walter Laqueur has written extensively on the problem of definition. He argues that a comprehensive definition does not now and may never exist. Nevertheless, he defines it as "the use of covert violence by a group for political ends" (Laqueur, 2001:79).

Military historian Caleb Carr, noting that terrorism is as old as human conflict itself, makes a strong argument that international terrorism is equivalent to war.

Carr places terrorism in the discipline of military history, as opposed to the disciplines of political science or sociology. He states that terrorism:

Is simply the contemporary name given to, and the modern permutation of, warfare deliberately waged against civilians with the purpose of destroying their will to support either leaders or policies that the agents of such violence find objectionable (Carr, 2002:6).

Carr argues that world leaders have generally identified international terrorism as a type of crime, rather than as war, in an effort to rally global indignation against the agents of such mayhem and deny them the more respected status of actual soldiers (Carr, 2002:7). According to Carr, denying that terrorism is the same as war has created a problem: it has limited our government to reactive, rather than proactive, responses to terrorism.

In Carr's view, our leaders (and we as their citizens) have in the past been, and in disturbing numbers remain, prepared to treat terrorists as being on a par with smugglers, drug traffickers, or, at most, some kind of political Mafiosi, rather than what they have in fact been for almost half a century: organized. Highly trained, hugely destructive paramilitary units that were and are conducting offensive campaigns against a variety of nations and social systems (Carr, 2002:9).

Some definitions specifically include religious motivations, others include hate, millenarian, and apocalyptic groups. Not everyone agrees that people who employ terrorist tactics on behalf of animals or the environment are terrorists. Several definitions refer only to nonstate actors, whereas others include state-sponsored terrorism. Terrorism by groups is an essential part of several definitions, but some definitions include terrorism by individual actors as well. Most definitions include violence or threat of violence. Most also include motivations (e.g., political, religious, economic). Distinctions between international and domestic terrorism are part of some definitions but not others.

In a study of 109 definitions of terrorism, a group of researchers collapsed the definitional elements into 22 categories. The most common elements were:

1. Violence or force (84% of the definitions).
2. Political motivation (65%)
3. Engendering fear or terror (51%)

4. Using a threat (47%)
5. Psychological effects (42%); and
6. Victim- target differentiations (38%)

The least common definitional elements included demands made on third parties (4%), repetitiveness or serial violence (7%), and clandestine, covert nature (9%; Schmid & Jongman, 1998). Finally, H.H.A. Cooper, the author of *Terrorism in Perspective* defines terrorism as "the international generation of massive fear by human beings of the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings" (Cooper, 2001:883). For the purpose of this paper, Cooper's definition will be used, although like him, it is noted that no single definition will be satisfactory to everyone.

### **Causes of Terrorism**

It is important to stress here that there are various motives and causes of terrorism across the globe. Crenshaw (1998:374) describes several reasons which influence terrorist movements to use terrorist tactics. Revolutionary terrorists firstly want to seize political power in a country or region; secondly they want to influence public opinion and thereby control the media; thirdly they want to maintain discipline within the terrorist organization and enforce obedience and conformity; fourthly, they want to discredit and disrupt the everyday operations of the government they are opposing; fifthly they want to win new recruits; and lastly they aim to project an image of greater strength that would be consistent with their numbers.

The above mentioned dimensions motives however represent one dimension. Describing the causes of terrorism, as is defining the term, is often a very complex exercise. The reason for this is that the causes tend to be influenced by more than one factor. Acts of terrorism can also be carried out for a variety of reasons to achieve multiple aims. An example of this is Al Qaeda's Jihad against the US and its allies. The Jihad, and its subsequent terrorist activities, is provoked by not only Al Qaeda's religious ideologies, but also by the struggle for political and economic power in the Middle East as well as the US support of sovereign Israel.

Bjørger (2005:3) lists four generic causes of terrorism across the globe. A terrorist group may be connected to one, two, or even all four. The four causes are:

### **1. Structural Causes**

The structural causes affect people's lives in ways that they may or may not comprehend, at macro level. This includes aspects like demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization, transitional societies, class structures, etc (Bjørger, 2005:3).

### **2. Facilitator (or accelerator) Causes**

This cause makes terrorism feasible or attractive, without being the prime catalysts. Examples include the evolution of modern news media, transportation, weapon technology and weak state control of territory. It is even acclaimed by certain academics that terrorism occurs mainly because modern circumstances have made it exceptionally easy to employ terrorist tactics (Bjørger, 2005:3).

### **3. Motivational Causes**

Here, the actual grievances that people experience on a personal level, motivating them to act. Ideologies and political leaders are sometimes able to elevate causes from a structural level to a motivational level, thereby moving people to act (Bjørger, 2005:3).

### **4. Triggering Causes**

The direct precipitators of terrorist attacks; may be momentous or proactive events, a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or other events that call for revenge or action. Even peace talks may trigger opponents of political compromise to carry out terrorist action in order to undermine negotiations and discredit moderates (Bjørger, 2005:3).

Terrorism therefore is used as a political tool to precipitate broader insurgency across the globe. This includes the use of terrorism strategies. Terrorist activities do not, as anticipated, always result in broader insurgency. Wilkinson (2006:16) maintains that by stating that the vast majority of groups using the weapon of terrorism remain locked in a cycle of individual, usually very spasmodic, acts of bombing, assassination, hostage-taking, etc. few terrorist movements, in the past,

have developed their operations into broader insurgencies. Terrorism tactics are used in targeting civilian and security forces. Urban warfare, such as Iraq, has resulted in insurgents using terrorist strategies (Hough, Kruys & Du Plessis, and 2005: 10).

### **Terrorist Activities in Africa: Selected Case Studies**

The first case study that will be discussed is the US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the Mombasa Bombings of 2002 and the case of the Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria looking into the July 2009 Massacre and the vehicle borne improvised explosive that destroyed the UN Building in 2011.

#### **US Embassies in the Horn of Africa**

In August, 1998, the Embassies of the US in selected East African Countries of Kenya and Tanzania were bombed. Vehicle borne imploded explosive set in cars were detonated near the embassies. In Tanzania, precisely Dar es Salaam, the embassy was further from the city center and the attack took the lives of about 12 persons and wounded at least 85 people. In Nairobi, the embassy was located in a busy area where an estimated number of 4000 people were injured. The terrorist attacks severely destroyed the embassies although the attacks were directed at United States Officials but in this case almost all the attacks were taken out on African civilians. Thirty-two Kenyans and twelve Americans were killed in Nairobi as well as eight embassy employees were killed in Tanzania. Local members of the Al-Qaeda network were found responsible for the attacks (US State Department Report of the Accountability Review Boards of the Embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, 1998).

The 1998 bombings instantly escalated Africa's Standing Battle against terrorism. The bombings resulted in the US government redirecting attention and resources towards Africa in their world wide fight against international terrorism. Susan Rice (2001:2) opined that:

It has become painfully obvious even to casual observers after the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that terrorism directed against the US is alive and well in Africa and throughout Africa, there are Al-Qaeda terrorist cells



located in various regions of Africa (Rice, 2001:2 cited in Accountability Review Boards).

It was then discovered that both countries had inadequate enforcement structures. The political rivalry between Christianity and Islam in both countries made it easy for Al-Qaeda to establish terrorist cells. The US unresponsiveness towards Africa as well as its policy deemed insensitive to local and regional conditions cost them dearly in the end. Even though African based emergency responded to the explosions very quickly, they were unable to deal effectively with the attacks of this scale.

### **Mombasa Bombings of 2002**

In 2002, yet again the security agencies failed to prevent an Al-Qaeda attack on foreigners and foreign property in Eastern Africa. Suicide bombers blew themselves up at an Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya. This attack occurred simultaneously with an attempt to down an Israeli airliner full of Israeli tourists bound for Israel from Mombasa. The surface-to-air missile however missed its target. Israeli survivors, as well as three Israelis killed in the attack were flown back to Israel by an Israeli Air Force plane. With this, several Western countries issued a number of warnings to their citizens after intelligence pointed out Mombasa as a potential risk. Burgess (2002: 3) opined that:

If forecasting such incidents is difficult, then preventing them is even trickier

The US government has however realized that there is a need for the US to increase its efforts to this. It is also noted that Israel's experience with suicide bombers had shown that it is difficult to prevent suicide bombers, irrespective of intelligence acquired. The Mombasa attacks further emphasized the danger posed by radical Islamic suicide bombers in and around Africa (Burgess, 2002:3).

### **Boko Haram: The 2009 July Massacre and the UN Building Bombing of 2011**

Boko Haram emerged from the northern Nigeria state of Borno. Some reports link the insurgency with earlier iterations of Islamist groups that opposed the Nigerian state but lacked the international notoriety of the current organization. These

accounts associate Boko Haram with small resistance groups composed of young men that began to congregate in the mid-1990s, led initially by Abubakar Lawan and later by the pseudonymous Aminu Tashen-Ilimi (õnew way of knowledgeö). However, a coherent group identity cannot be established until Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic Nigerian cleric, gained prominence among local youth in Maiduguri, Borno's capital. By 2003, Yusuf led a movement espousing a conservative theology that mimicked Saudi-style Salafism and opposed Nigeria's secular state, which it considered corrupt and un-Islamic. Over time, the sect demanded more economic and political reforms. According to Peter Pham (2011), an expert on African security issues and director of the Ansari Africa Center, these ultimatums were extreme, even in the face of a long-standing and popular movement to adopt Sharia law in the country's northern states. Pham writes,

The introduction of Islamic law (Sharia) in the 12 northern Nigerian states since 1999 was deemed insufficient by Yusuf and his followers who argued that the country's ruling class as a whole was moored by corruption and even Muslim northern leaders were irredeemably tainted by Western-style ambitions (Pham, 2011).

Northern residents who feel disenfranchised often point to Abuja (the country's capital) and Lagos (the seat of economic power), and over time the location of these cities has lent structure to the religious conflict. Both are located hundreds of miles away in what is often conceived to be õChristian territoryö. Today, grievances stem from inequalities between the predominantly Muslim north and the largely Christian south, perceptions about police brutality in the north-eastern states and the state's failure to uphold the rule of law (Copeland, 2013).

### **July 2009 Massacre**

Hostilities erupted in the summer of 2009 that pitched Boko Haram hardliners against Nigerian security officials in a series of violent clashes that irrevocably transformed the group from a small sect of religious zealots into a radical Islamist militia capable of coordinating a country-wide insurrection. The violence began when police clashed with mourners participating in a funeral procession on 11

June over the refusal of participants to wear helmets while operating motorcycles. As a result of the altercation, seventeen of Yusuf's followers were shot by police officers. Boko Haram denounced the police brutality and vowed to avenge the deaths. As the group consolidated its munitions, state security forces also took measures to stymie an offensive throughout June and July 2009. At least one Boko Haram safe house was raided and bomb-making materials were recovered from several sites. Over several days, a series of explosions and gun battles led police to besiege sites across northern Nigeria that were occupied by the insurgency. In total, 800 lives were lost. The majority, including Mohammed Yusuf, were believed to be extremists and executed by Nigerian officials. At least 28 policemen were killed and nearly 50 buildings were destroyed, many of them schools and churches. An undisclosed number of citizens believed to be militants were executed without trial in killings Human Rights Watch (HRW) called "extra-judicial" and "illegal". On 26 July, militants embarked on a violent and coordinated spree across northern Nigeria. Prisoners were freed from a local jail and the homes of security officials and police officers were assaulted with guns and homemade bombs, as well as knives, clubs, sticks, and even bows and arrows. Significant casualties were sustained when Boko Haram militants attacked the Wudil police station in Kano and the Potiskum police station in Yobe (Copeland, 2013).

### **United Nations 2011**

The 2011 VBIED (Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices) attack on the UN headquarters in Abuja, which killed 23 and wounded more than 80, presents the greatest aberration to Boko Haram's strategy as it is the first and, to date, only instance where the group specifically launched an attack on an international target. Immediate responses called for sweeping changes to Nigerian counter-terrorism policy and for organizations in the country to reconsider their security programmes. According to the Heritage Foundation, "Bombing the headquarters of an international organization is a wake-up call to the Nigerian government and the international community". Abu Dardaa, a Boko Haram leader in Laguna, further stoked fears of worldwide attacks when he issued a statement

following the suicide bombing that boasted, "More attacks are on the way! We will have unfettered access to wherever we want to attack" (Copeland, 2013:3).

As a whole, the UN system has taken precautions to mitigate the risk of future Boko Haram violence in the wake of the Abuja attack. When it occurred in August 2011, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon immediately condemned the bombing and dispatched security experts to the country, including Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro. In November 2011, Ban established a mission to examine the threat of arms proliferation following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. The mission submitted its report to the Secretary-General, suggesting that arms could be hidden at sites throughout the vast Sahel region and then sold to terrorist groups like Boko Haram. Like the congressional findings, the Security Council report explicitly states that Boko Haram is linked to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). "The mission representatives were informed that Boko Haram had established links with Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and that some of its members from Nigeria and Chad had received training in the Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb camps in Mali during the summer of 2011." This account seems to corroborate fears voiced by US leaders that the insurgency will seek assistance from international terrorist groups, perhaps expanding its operations outside of Nigeria. The mission also underlined the regional problems posed by the Nigerian militants when it stated, "Whereas Nigerian authorities viewed the group as a national threat without any links to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and it has become a growing source of concern for the countries of the region" (Copeland, 2013:3).

Africa has an intricate history of armed conflicts, political violence, civil war, state failure and poverty. Numerous African governments with their political, economic and social problems encountered a new security threat, namely terrorism. International terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah penetrated African states to establish networks to provide them with logistics support, new recruits, and even possible targets such as embassies, foreign banks and tourist destinations. Many African countries were unable to prevent this from

happening as they do not have the capacity to ensure efficient law enforcement, boarder control, institutional sovereignty and political, economic and social cohesion and development. This has made them easy targets for international terrorist groups to infiltrate in which to develop important economic and political networks, especially in the case of African countries that have Islamic communities residing within their borders (Copeland, 2013:3).

### **Characteristics of Terrorism**

The characteristics of the current war on terrorism are multi-dimensional and complex. To discuss them all would be a study unto itself and thus beyond the scope of this paper. However, as with all violent conflicts, certain constants frame how a conflict evolves and how it may be understood. Drawing from and somewhat modifying Sandole (1999) and Wehr (1979), there are six characteristics of terrorism:

1. Geography,
2. Parties,
3. Objectives and means,
4. Issues
5. Temperament.

The geography of the current conflict encompasses the geographical and political boundaries within which the war is waged. The parties comprise those key individuals, groups, states and organizations involved in the conflict. Interrelated, objectives and means comprise the goals and the tools, violent or otherwise, used to accomplish them. Finally the temperament of the parties defines their psychological and social predisposition to the conflict and its solutions, if any. These characteristics explain the where, who, what and how of the conflict; to use military parlance, they provide the situational awareness so necessary to analyze the war on terrorism and find a strategy to defuse it. If global in scale, the war on terrorism's primary theater of operations encompasses what Ullman (2002: 175) calls "the crescent of crisis."

## Counter Terrorism Strategies in Africa

“The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal-well-meaning without understanding”

Louis D. Brandeis

Counter terrorism activities within a nation’s own borders operate in the context of each nation’s laws and policies, history, politics, and culture. In democratic societies, “the rule of law is guaranteed by the legitimacy legal norms enjoy from whom such norms apply, on one hand, and by the threat of enforcement from specialized agents of control on the other” (Deflem, 2006: 240). But how vigorously can democratic countries fight terrorism and remain a democracy? How can democracies play by their own rules when terrorists obey no rules? Which of our civil liberties should we be willing to give up, and what kind of proof do we need that sacrificing our personal freedom is an effective antidote to terrorism? The counter terrorism strategies that will be examined in this paper will take a critical look from the perspective of the United Nations. The former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan identified five elements which he termed the five D’s for which is the principle and comprehensive strategy to counter terrorism in Africa in his keynote address at the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in 2005 which are:

- i. Dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their goals.
- ii. Deny terrorists the ability to carry out their attacks.
- iii. Deter them from supporting terrorists.
- iv. Develop capacity to prevent terrorism; and
- v. Defend human rights in the struggle against terrorism.

The United Nations and its agencies have developed a number of international agreements to enable the international community to take action to counter terrorism and bring those responsible to justice. Treaties, mainly in form of conventions, oblige member states to take stringent steps to root out terrorism out

of the globe. The conventions are transformed into actions by specialized agencies of the UN such as the International Maritime Organization (IMO). These actions include the development of measures to improve the security of air and sea travel.

The Security Council, the UN's principal organ for maintaining peace and security has also been very active in combating terrorism. The Security Council adopted a number of resolutions regarding terrorism and the countering thereof in Africa. The first resolution was 1044 of 1996 which called Sudan to extradite the three suspects wanted in connection with the assassination of the then President of Egypt, Hosni Mubarak, to Ethiopia. The second resolution 1054 which called on countries to develop sanctions against the Sudanese government in consequence of their non-compliance with the above mentioned resolution. The Security Council's management of the incidence was interrupted by US air strikes on a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, wrongly thought to be producing chemical weapons for terrorist use. The third resolution adopted by the UN Security Council relating to Africa was Resolution 1189 of 1998. This resolution concerned the terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 (Saul, 2005: 151). Finally in the case of the UN building bombing in 2011, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon dispatched security operatives. In January 2012, Ban reiterated the need for coordination efforts between member states and international organizations to implement counterterrorism measures in the country. Likewise, Nigeria's Ambassador Abdulahi Omaki urged the UN to increase security sector assistance partnerships, citing the "external influence" of international terrorists (Copeland, 2013:6).

### **African Union and the Counter-Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century**

The Threat that terrorism poses to Africa's stability and security was highlighted at the African Union in the constitutive act of the union, 2002 where it stated that the AU shall function in accordance with several principles, one of these being "Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive attacks". The African Union Protocol thereby is required to:

- i. Establish operational procedures, for information gathering processing and dissemination.
- ii. Establish mechanisms to facilitate the exchange of information among state parties on patterns and trends in terrorist acts and activities and on successful acts for combating terrorism.
- iii. Present an annual report to the assembly of the union on terrorist activities on the continent
- iv. Monitor, evaluate and make recommendations on the implementation of the Plan of action of the African Union High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa.
- v. Examine all reports submitted by state members on the implementation of the plan of action and programmes adopted by the AU
- vi. Examine all reports submitted by the state members on the implementation of Protocol
- vii. Establish an information network with national, regional, and international focus points on terrorism

This therefore presents Africa with guidelines on how to combat terrorism threats as it helps to ensure a strong of the law enforcement agency and border capabilities which will stop the illegal movements of terrorist in and around Africa. Also, it will help develop the necessary legislative and judicial measures to improve their counter terrorism capabilities which include the development of appropriate extradition measures. Finally it will aid member states to know how to suppress the financing of terrorism. This includes the requirement of member states to introduce legislation and criminalize the funding of terrorism and money laundering (AU, 2002).

The AU relies on regional organizations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to contribute and strengthen the counter terrorism strategies developed by the AU and thus requires regional organizations to:

- a. Establish contact points on terrorism at the regional level.



- b. Liaise with the commission of the AU to develop measures for the prevention and combating of terrorism.
- c. Promote cooperation at the regional level, for the implementation of all aspects in accordance with the AU Protocol.
- d. Adopt and coordinate national measures to prevent and combat terrorism in their respective regions.
- e. Establish modalities for sharing information on the activities of the perpetrators of terrorist acts and on the best practices for the prevention and combating of terrorism.
- f. Assist member states to implement regional, continental and international instruments for the prevention and combating of terrorism
- g. Report regularly to the AU Commission on measures taken the regional level to prevent and combat terrorist acts (African Union, 2002).

The different counter-terrorism initiatives in Africa highlight the fact that Africa plays a specific and significant role and has numerous responsibilities to fulfill regarding the counter terrorism programmes and strategies. Africa thus has a role to play in the current global war against terrorism.

### **Conclusion**

The twentieth century marked a watershed in Africa with terrorism adding its mark to the historical books which made it an imperative item on political and security agendas. Major terrorist attacks such as the instances cited above have had a significant impact on the importance of counter-terrorism strategies across the globe. Particularly the 1998 bombing of the US embassies in the Horn of Africa which illustrated how vulnerable the developing world is open to terrorist attacks that cause casualties at its wake and also proved that the terrorist opposing the West would use Third World Countries as the fertile ground to elevate war against the Western countries.

The need to revisit the fundamentals by developing effective counter terrorism strategies in Third World regions such as Africa is seen as an important step

towards the prevention of global terrorism at the global stage. Africa plays an important role in the plans of the United Nations and the United States to counter all terrorist networks and activities across the globe. The Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) cannot afford to exclude Africa as a vital stakeholder. Africa plays a significant strategic role in global counter terrorism measures. Strengthening political structures across Africa through democratization would enhance the chances of Africa's economic and social structures and the ability to deter threats posed by terrorism. Strong terrorism with thriving economies would ensure that populations would support the developments of their governments of necessary counter terrorism strategies to protect their own.

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